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How experiences shape identity
Identity (philosophy)
The definition of identity
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Quine's essay, Identity, Ostension, and Hypostasis, is an investigation into the nature of identity, and how it is that a particular object can remain consistent in itself despite subjection to the continuous material fluctuation inseparable from temporal existence. Quine has identified the notion of identity as a source of perplexity which has puzzled many philosophers throughout the history of the philosophical sciences, and has attempted to explore its relation to ostension, or the means by which a particular object can be said to possess a certain nature through the provision of multiple exemplary instances of property instantiation. Although philosophers have remained uncertain as to how it is that any one person can retain the same identity throughout time, despite being immersed in the causal process of time, Quine believes that those who wish to accept the notion of a “changeless and therefore immortal soul,” as the foundation upon which identity rests, must also be able to sold the same to be true for other, less humanistic, phenomena.
Quine introduces Heracleitus's assertion that one “cannot bathe in the same river twice, for new waters are ever flowing in upon you,” as a classical example of philosophical exploration into the nature of identity. In response, Quine offers that one can, in fact, bathe in the same river twice, but will be experiencing the same river in a different river-stage. The ability to bathe in two different river-stages belonging to the same river are enough, from Quine's perspective, to constitute bathing in the same river twice. In justification of this belief, Quine claims that it is only in accordance to the passing of time that one is able to identify a river wherein bathing had previou...
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...nguistics allows identification to become increasingly specific, resulting in the conceptualization of a process as a non-temporal object; and through conceptualization our means of identification remains unaffected by the varying stages of physical changes which occur over time.
Although pointing is a generally crude method of object identification, it can be useful in identifying a particular object, not only through time, but space as well. Quine believes that, at the most rudimentary level of ostension, space and time are inseparable, and therefore provide an essential function in object specification as a platform upon which similarities among particulars can be recognized. Identity also provides an unchanging point of reference for the accumulation and arrangement of objects into groups of kindred particulars. Conversely, it might be said that a particular
Although the concept of identity is recurrent in our daily lives, it has interpreted in various ways.
This paper is an initial attempt to develop a dynamic conception of being which is not anarchic. It does this by returning to Aristotle in order to begin the process of reinterpreting the meaning of ousia, the concept according to which western ontology has been determined. Such a reinterpretation opens up the possibility of understanding the dynamic nature of ontological identity and the principles according to which this identity is established. The development of the notions of energeia, dynamis and entelecheia in the middle books of Aristotle’s Metaphysics will be discussed in order to suggest that there is a dynamic ontological framework at work in Aristotle’s later writing. This framework lends insight into the dynamic structure of being itself, a structure which does justice as much to the concern for continuity through change as it does to the moment of difference. The name for this conception of identity which affirms both continuity and novelty is "legacy." This paper attempts to apprehend the meaning of being as legacy.
This paper aims to endorse physicalism over dualism by means of Smart’s concept of identity theory. Smart’s article Sensations and the Brain provides a strong argument for identity theory and accounts for many of it primary objections. Here I plan to first discuss the main arguments for physicalism over dualism, then more specific arguments for identity theory, and finish with further criticisms of identity theory. Physicalism is the theory that the universe contains nothing other than the physical. Therefore, the universe can be fully explained in physical terms.
Descartes’ epiphany of “I exist, I am” was the catalyst for the exploration of the issues he discusses in Meditations. Although I find problems in some instances of his reasoning, I realize that he has provided answers through his Method of Doubt that have endured the ages and allow us to continue to ponder their truth today.
In his 1971 paper “Personal Identity”, Derek Parfit posits that it is possible and indeed desirable to free important questions from presuppositions about personal identity without losing all that matter. In working out how to do so, Parfit comes to the conclusion that “the question of identity has no importance” (Parfit, 1971, p. 4.2:3). In this essay, I will attempt to show that Parfit’s thesis is a valid one, with positive implications for human behaviour. The first section of the essay will examine the thesis in further detail, and the second will assess how Parfit’s claims fare in the face of criticism. Problems of personal identity generally involve questions about what makes one the person one is and what it takes for the same person to exist at separate times (Olson, 2010).
Consciousness is seemingly always during the present and memory, a past entity. However, Locke responds to Reid and claims that one can have a memory of something without having consciousness of that memory. Reid continues to argue that identity must be something that stays exactly the same over time, however, our consciousness is in a state of constant fluctuation, thus our personal identity would be endlessly changing. Locke counters Reid, however, arguing that our consciousness is constantly changing and that we could still be very much conscious when we are sleeping. Furthermore, our personal identity is not restricted by our consciousness however, our capability to be conscious of former memories. Although Locke successfully responds to Reid’s first criticisms, Reid presents the analogy of the brave officer which highlights key contradictions that effectively subvert Locke’s account of personal
The differences of mind and soul have intrigued mankind since the dawn of time, Rene Descartes, Thomas Nagel, and Plato have addressed the differences between mind and matter. Does the soul remain despite the demise of its material extension? Is the soul immaterial? Are bodies, but a mere extension of forms in the physical world? Descartes, Nagel, and Plato agree that the immaterial soul and the physical body are distinct entities.
For Plato, Forms are eternal and changeless, but there is a relationship between these eternal and changeless Forms and particular things we perceive by means of our senses in the world. These particular things change in accordance to the perceiver and the perceiver’s environment and this is why Plato thought that such things do not possess real existence. For Plato, onl...
Locke viewed the identity of living entities in a different light. Above, change in mass constituted a change in identity. But, in living entities a change in mass does not affect the identity of the object. Locke uses the example of the oak tree. It starts off as a sapling and grows into a huge oak tree, with a massive change in mass. That oak tree could be subjected to the cutting of branches, and the winter fall of leaves, however it still remains an oak tree because it continues the life of a tree. It maintains the same functional arrangements of components (Blackburn, 1999: 125-126). An interesting example is raised by Blackburn in assessing “how much change to tolerate while still regarding it as the same ‘thing’” (Blackburn, 1999:127). ‘Theseus’ ship’ is used to illustrate this. The ship goes on a long voyage and is in need of constant repair and maintenance. By the end of the voyage, all the components of the ship have been changed.
In “A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality” John Perry conveys conversations between a philosopher and her two friends a few nights before she dies. We then come to how the dying philosopher is trying to have everyone convince her that she will survive even after her body dies. In this John Perry claims that there are three ways of deliberating personal identity: bodily identity, psychological continuity and immaterial soul. The essay then describes the different types of identity and how they can use them to prove to the perishing philosopher that she can still remain alive. I will argue that the only way we can distinguish personal identity is through psychological continuity and how we can determine a person based on their memories and experiences. From this we can go into discussion about some terms that will be used throughout this paper.
What is personal identity? This question has been asked and debated by philosophers for centuries. The problem of personal identity is determining what conditions and qualities are necessary and sufficient for a person to exist as the same being at one time as another. Some think personal identity is physical, taking a materialistic perspective believing that bodily continuity or physicality is what makes a person a person with the view that even mental things are caused by some kind of physical occurrence. Others take a more idealist approach with the belief that mental continuity is the sole factor in establishing personal identity holding that physical things are just reflections of the mind. One more perspective on personal identity and the one I will attempt to explain and defend in this paper is that personal identity requires both physical and psychological continuity; my argument is as follows:
Every since Plato introduced the idea of dualism thousands of years ago meta-physicians have been faced with the mind-body problem. Even so Plato idea of dualism did not become a major issue of debate in the philosophical world until the seventeenth century when French philosopher Rene Descartes publicized his ideas concerning the mental and physical world. During this paper, I will analyze the issue of individuation and identity in Descartes’ philosophical view of the mind-body dualism. I will first start by explaining the structure of Cartesian dualism. I will also analyze the challenges of individuation and identity as they interact with Descartes. With a bit of luck, subsequently breaking down Descartes’ reasoning and later on offering my response, I can present wit a high degree of confidence that the problems of individuation and identity offer a hindrance to the Cartesians’ principle of mind-body dualism. I give a critical analysis of these two problems, I will first explain the basis of Descartes’ philosophical views.
Locke believed that the identity of a person has the sameness of the consciousness: “What makes a man be himself to himself is sameness of consciousness, so personal identity depends entirely on that—whether the consciousness is tied to one substance throughout or rather is continued in a series of different su...
Personal identity examines what makes a person at one time identical with a person at another. Many philosophers believe we are always changing and therefore, we cannot have a persisting identity if we are different from one moment to the next. However, many philosophers believe there is some important feature that determines a person’s identity and keeps it persistent. For John Locke, this important feature is memory, and I agree. Memory is the most important feature in determining a person’s identity as memory is the necessary and sufficient condition of personal identity.
Distinctiveness refers to whether an individual displays different behaviors in different situations. What we want to know is whether the observed behavior is unusual. If it is, the observer is likely to give the behavior an external attribution. If this action is not unusual, it will probably be judged as internal.