To meet future challenges and opportunities the Department of Defense (DOD) must decide how to adjust the armed forces structure in an austere economic environment. Based on current strategic direction and fiscal constraints, the general force structure and capabilities necessary to rebalance Joint Force 2020 is a smaller but fully integrated joint military organization. The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) emphasizes US military power will evolve and remain modern, capable, and ready while accepting some increased risk through force reductions. Rebalancing will require innovative approaches and solutions to protect the homeland, build global security, project power, and win decisively with a leaner organization. The subsequent sections …show more content…
will propose how smaller and better-combined joint services maintain their lethality, mobility, and survivability. In spite of some associated risks, adjustment is an opportunity to form an aggregate joint force. Nevertheless, these contractions will not mirror equally among the services. The result will be a lean joint armed force that maintains the ability to defeat conventional and asymmetric threats in all domains. Discussed in this order, Air Force, Army, United States Marine Corps (USMC), and Navy force structure will revolve around the integration of skills and capabilities. Next, discussion of the four categories of risk involved in the transition to Joint Force 2020 include operational risk, force management risk, institutional risk, and future challenge risk. Air Force innovation and modernization efforts toward a Joint Force 2020 must ensure air dominance, project power, and support a multitude of possible contingencies.
Systems like advanced unmanned programs and next generation aircraft lend to this effort and will enable the Air Force to contract. The Air Force must also simultaneously find ways to increase resources for other emerging capabilities to include space and cyber. Both reports from the “National Commission on the Structure of the Air Force” and the “Strategic Agility” concept suggest resources for space and cyber could result from shifting more air force aircraft from the active to the reserve component (RC). The National Commission on the Structure of the Air Force …show more content…
stated, Transitioning missions from the active component to the reserve components will allow the Air Force to perform missions with less expensive reservists while reducing the active component end strength, thus saving money in the military personnel accounts that can be put to use in readiness, modernization, and recapitalization accounts. In this way, all components of the force will remain more ready and mission capable and the Air Force will retain the capacity to surge its forces when needed. The Strategic Agility concept proposed it was less critical to keep air force iron in the active duty air force. Both articles argued those air force platforms, and their support personnel, placed in the RC will save resources through ebbing personnel costs and extend the service life of these weapon systems. An expeditionary airpower integrated throughout the armed forces will ensure the lethality, mobility, and survivability of Joint Force 2020 and arguably mitigate risks from other services force contractions, especially in the ground force. The US Army requires the biggest reduction in this period of budgetary austerity. Current strategic guidance does accept risk with declining land force capacity. In spite of required adjustments, future army expeditionary forces must be “globally-engaged, modern, trained, and ready… to conduct a wide spectrum of operations –support civil authorities, security force assistance, major combat operations, deter aggression and win decisively if deterrence fails.” However, a smaller land force capacity creates potential competence gaps. The Stimson Strategic Agility strategy predicts averting these gaps if US forces do not enter protracted land wars that require large ground forces. Another concept, Air Sea Battle (ASB), arguably mitigates other gap concerns like anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) by naval and air forces. In contrast to both ideas, Scott Gerber’s article “No More Easy Wars” counters that any assumptions about future ground force needs is not valid. Mr. Gerber correctly states, “The enemy gets a vote.” This phrase means there are no quick or easy solutions to ground force operations, especially ones based on which direction the political winds blow. Further, he believes “techno-war solutions” like ASB are dangerous, invite war, and are too dependent on legacy systems. As adversarial systems become less expensive, investments in systems that are obsolete when fielded or defeated by systems whose costs are fractional in comparison is absurd. What is not absurd is that the future structure of the US Army will be smaller with no foreseeable decrease in operational tempo or room for decreased effectiveness. A leaner expeditionary army must maintain potency through shared means. For example, a smaller army can maintain A2/AD means if investments in naval and air forces are adequate and made available when required. Additionally, RC’s maintain force-generating potential for the Army. Any valid concept or strategy that decreases capacity for future army forces will require a fusion into a multi-service joint force. An integrated Joint Force 2020 not only maintains army power, but also is a roadmap to remain a lethal, mobile, and survivable ground force. The general force structure and potency of the USMC in an integrated Joint Force 2020 remains relatively unchanged from its current form. The USMC is and will persist to be a small US rapid response ground force. Freier and Berteau, in “Beyond the Last War”, argue maintaining a standing capability is critical for “rapid response.” The USMC unique skill set is to be a forward deployed presence accomplished through rotational deployments of Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU). Integrating deployable MEU’s into overall US ground power allows the USMC to be a rapid response force and capability provider. In short, the USMC must carry on relatively unchanged- forward deployable and ready to deter or counter aggression. Using the mobility of the US Navy to project power, the USMC will sustain US commitments to global allies and partners. The future force structure of the US Navy must remain able to ensure freedom of access in the global commons, project air and sea power, and deter and defeat adversaries.
With the Pentagon’s directional shift toward the Asia-Pacific region, the current strategic direction has a maritime semblance. In order to meet the requirements of the 2014 QDR in an austere financial environment, “investments will focus on those assets that will ensure naval preeminence and preserve the Nation’s security and prosperity.” As these investments pay dividends, advocates claim cost savings will allow modernization and modest force structure reductions. Required ground force reductions will necessitate greater dependence on naval forces to protect key priorities in the air, land, sea, and space domains. Overall force reduction, restructuring, and pivot to the Asia-Pacific region requires naval forces to take a leadership role in the integration of Joint Force 2020. A thoroughly cooperative, efficient, and adaptable Joint Force 2020 not only ensures US national security in any budget or strategy environment, but also helps mitigate risks associated with those
environments. The 2010 QDR describes four categories of risk as operational, force management, institutional, and future challenges. Joint Force 2020 assumes increased operational risk. Conjoined armed services offset risk increases and mitigate single service access requirements to enabling capabilities, compensate for faulty assumptions on land-based operations, and disperse the support required for legacy systems that are subject to further divestment. There is little room for error for increased operational risks. However, there is room for increased force management risk with an integrated Joint Force 2020. The combined military service readiness will continue to depend on economic health. Despite the challenges of the well-being of military members, entitlement requirements, and the pace of cyclic technology obsolesce, the US armed forces have historically demonstrated the adaptability of our all-volunteer armed services. Next, common management and business practices will minimize some institutional risks across all services. These efforts will increase velocity in acquisition and fielding processes, recoup resources by enforcement and standardization of administrative functions, and provide knowledge management between and within US services. Integrated armed services manage institutional risks. Finally, DOD’s future challenges risk would remain static in aggregate armed services. Strong linkages between the services will facilitate political partisan support for appropriate investments and divestitures of weapon systems, mitigate capability gap discussions that spur inter-service and intra-service capacity disagreements, and hedge against economic fluctuations. Although Clausewitz advocated putting “the largest possible Army into the field,” current fiscal realities and strategic direction dictate otherwise. DOD must pursue a broader, more unitary approach to military ends, ways, and means to mitigate the risks associated with defalcation and force structure rebalance. However, institutional biases, partisan political gridlock, and an economically and technologically interconnected world may prove truly and fully integrated joint armed services unrealistic. Even if all previously discussed risks are mitigated, the article “Beyond the Last War” exposes a possible enduring challenge, the significance of the human aspects of war. Albert Einstein provided humanity a warning when he commented, “I fear the day technology will surpass our human interaction. The world will have a generation of idiots.” Idiocy aside, the current fiscal and future security environments require the US military services to become a leaner more integrated expeditionary force that ensures US national interests against existing and emerging threats with minimal risk.
After reading your company's core values, it makes me wonder if I was actually there helping create them. What follows is a brief summation of my thoughts after reading Delta Defense's core values.
In 1968, the United States Army activated the 123rd Aviation Battalion, creating a remarkable unit that was comprised of several Army assets. The design of the battalion revolutionized how assets could be combined to complete many missions by mixing infantry, signal, aviation, and support units. The 123rd’s mission ranged from was to collect intelligence, deliver supplies, insert and extract infantrymen, and provide air support. In addition to their primary mission they also participated in medical evacuation, an invaluable asset on the battlefields of Vietnam.
The U.S. Navy nurtured into a challenging power in the years previous to World War II, with battleship construction being revived in 1937, commencing with the USS North Carolina . It was able to add to its fleets throughout the early years of the war when the US was still not involved, growing production of vessels both large and small. In a conflict that had a number of amphibious landings, naval superiority was important in both Europe and the Pacific. The mutual resource...
The Civil Reserve Air Fleet is a partnership between the Department of Defense and commercial airlines where the airlines contractually commit a portion of their aircraft and crews to be used by the Department in the event of any level of military conflict. These aircraft can be “called up” and required to respond quickly to provide airlift support to the Department of Defense. There are minimum required levels of participation in order for the airlines to be eligible, and in turn they receive peace time business including passenger and cargo movement approximately in proportion to their commitment level. The program is divided into three segments which include varying amounts and sizes of aircraft that serve specific purposes. There are also three levels of activation depending on the severity of the conflict, which also require different amounts and sizes of aircraft. This program has been in place for nearly 53 years, and has become an essential partnership required for an effective United States military. The following pages are an investigation various aspects of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet such as its purpose, history, and effectiveness.
In the thirty-eight years of the United States Naval Submarine Service no United States submarine had ever sunk an enemy vessel. With the ignition of the Second World War the poorly equipped and poorly trained Silent Service, nicknamed for the limited access of the media to the actions and achievements of the submarines, would be thrust into the position American submariners had longed for. The attack on Pearl Harbor left the United States Navy with few options for retribution. The three remaining aircraft carriers were to be “the last line of defense.” Commander Stuart S. Murray made the precarious situation clear to his skippers, captains, upon sending them on their first war patrol. He stressed the importance of smart sailing by warning them not “to go out there and win the Congressional Medal of Honor in one day. The submarines are all we have left.” We entered the war with 55 submarines, 27 at Pearl Harbor and 28 at Cavite in the Philippines. At first our submarine strategies lacked ingenuity and failed to use our subs to their full potential. United States subs were assigned to reconnaissance, transporting supplies, and lifeguard duty, picking up downed airmen and sailors. They were even, on occasion, sent to rescue high profile Americans on the run from the enemy or from islands under enemy siege. Although their ability was, unfortunately, wasted in our entrance to the Pacific Theater the Silent Service would soon gain the recognition its men yearned for.
What is the difference between a'smart' and a'smart'? In conclusion, this paper talked about the pros and cons of disbanding the Air Force into a separate Air and Space Force. Lastly, it showed why it was best for them to become separated. END NOTES
Air Force Special Operations The United States of America is a powerful and well known force throughout the world. It has become a superpower of nations in just about three hundred years, being one of the newest nations in existence today. Its military reaches out into several countries in the globe and holds a presence as a peacekeeper and wielder of democracy. Of the US military’s five branches, the Air Force is the ruler of the skies, keeping control of the earth’s aerospace. Without the Air Force Special Operations, the military could not complete operations as effectively or efficiently as it potentially could.
In today’s operational environments, the U.S. Army is facing a range of problems and mission sets that are arguably more complex than previously encountered. Forces face an array of demands that encompass geo-political, social, cultural, and military factors that interact in unpredictable ways. The inherent complexity of today’s operations has underscored the need for the Army to expand beyond its traditional approach to operational planning. In March 2010 in FM 5-0: The Operations
In his speech of March 23, 1983, President Reagan presented his vision of a future where a Nation’s security did not rest upon the threat of nuclear retaliation, but on the ability to protect and defend against such attacks. The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) research program was designed to tell whether, and how, advanced defense technologies could contribute to the feasibility of this vision.
Armed with numerous studies, and intensive public hearings, Congress mandated far-reaching changes in DOD organization and responsibilities in the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. This landmark legislation significantly expanded the authority and responsibility of the chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Included in this expanded authority and responsibility was the requirement for the chairman to develop a doctrine for the joint employment of armed forces. As operations Urgent Fury, Just Cause, and Desert Storm have vividly demonstrated, the realities of armed conflict in today's world make the integration of individual service capabilities a matter of success or failure, life or death. Furthermore, the operation Desert One demonstrated the need for a strengthened Joint Warfare Doctrine and the consequent change in Joint Warfare Employment. It is plain to see the benefits of having the greatest navy integrated with the world's greatest army and air force. However, even in the wake of a relatively successful joint operation in the Middle East (Desert Storm), certain weaknesses are evident in the current joint employment tactics and/or capabilities. By analyzing past operations such as Urgent Fury and Desert Storm, we are able to see sufficient evidence that the Joint Warfare Concept can be disastrous in one instance and virtually flawless in another.
INTRODUCTION : a brief overview of the current situation regarding the security issue in the Pacific region
America is facing one of the most important geopolitical objectives since World War II and at that time it was to prevent the rise of a regional superpower on the Europe and Asia continent. The U.S must not treat China any different in this case if China is on the brink of becoming a regional superpower. The United States should rebalance their strategy in the South China Sea to answer Chinese growing power, that would not only be against China’s increasing assertiveness in the region like contested territorial and maritime space but also against China’s increasing trade and economic takeover. For the last decades the United States has shown its global power through its navy and around the world bases; there increasingly challenges through the rise of new naval power from other superpowers, making much improvement and proliferation of A2/AD capabilities, and piracy. Forces ranging from globalization to regional-power competition are motivating a number of states around the world to invest in maritime capabilities. Following the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, during which the United States moved two aircraft carriers to the Strait as a show of force after Chinese aggression, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has prioritized the development of a blue-water navy that rivals the United States’. Additionally, countries including Japan, South Korea, India,
... problem are under constant development and analysis, in a hope to avoid these situations. The civilian industry continues to lead in development due to commercialization, with the military not far behind. The only real deficiency in CRM program development seems to be the area of general aviation as described earlier. Until this problem is addressed, there will still be a glaring weakness in the general area of aviation safety. However, with the rate of technology increase and cheaper methods of instruction, we should begin to see this problem addressed in the near future. Until then, aviation will rely on civil commercial aviation the military to continue research and program development for the years to come, hopefully resulting in an increasingly safe method of travel and recreation.
The U.S. and NATO planners both have doctrine that defines the Center of Gravity (COG) concept making it a primary tool for planning their military operations. Integrating the two COG concepts is possible by understanding the similarities and differences of both. In each of their doctrine, AJP-5 for NATO and JP 5-0 for the U.S., both define COG with similarities; however there are some noticeable differences. The two doctrines agree that the COG is the “center of strength” or “the primary strength” and that there are both strategic and operational COGs (AJP-5, 2-32 & CPH, 63).
Tice, Brian P. (1991). Unmanned Aerial Vehicles – The Force Multiplier of the 1990s. Airpower Journal.