Ptco Case

As the aviation industry developed rapidly over the years it was difficult for air traffic control (ATC) to keep up with the increased demands, and maintain an acceptable level of safety. Needed improvements to the ATC network had been identified by several government appointed committees, which included such things as: radar surveillance equipment, transponders, increased navigational facilities, more control towers and increased ATC staffing. However, due to continued budget cutbacks by Congress it wasn’t until the harsh reality of several deadly midair collisions that lead way to actual appropriations being made to update the airway and ATC system.
Unfortunately, the needed improvements identified were already becoming outdated as they

were slowly implemented. As modern aircraft began to fly higher and faster air traffic controllers needed better resources and staffing to safely separate them. Air traffic controllers were continually frustrated with the slow development and constant cutbacks. Eventually, air traffic controllers sought for unionization in attempt to be able to collectively bargain for better work rules and increased safety measures.
Major concerns brought forward by the unions were “a shorter work week, pay increases, improved working conditions, and better safety for air travelers.” (Neidenberg, 2006). Furthermore, the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization (PATCO), which represented the air traffic controllers, sought to be released from the Civil Service System (Nolan, 2011).
Management attempted to resolve some of the unions concerns by granting “sole representation rights for controllers in the towers and centers, and early retirement program, a medical disability program, airline familiarization flights, and a number of changes in compensation rules.” (Nolan, 2011, p. 34). However, controllers were never released from the Civil Service System, so any negotiations that affected working conditions would be passed on to all other federal employees.
Negotiations between PATCO and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) were not progressing has PATCO had hoped, so they resorted to some unorthodox methods in the hopes of drawing attention to their needs, and the shortcomings of the current ATC system. On July 3, 1968, PATCO announced “Operation Air Safety,” which as a result caused numerous delays in air traffic (Nolan, 2011, p. 33). In addition on March 25, 1970, the “union orchestrated a controller sick-out,” in which 2000 employees called in sick forcing management to take on their duties (Nolan, 2011, p. 33). Air traffic was again delayed for hours, but in retrospect the FAA saw the need to fast-track the upgrades to the ATC system.
Due to the fact that PATCO was designated as a trade union they could not strike, and as civil service employees there bargaining power was limited since they were tied to all other federal agencies.

Ultimately, PATCO felt that an illegal strike might trigger a separation from other federal employees allowing them to become an independent agency, similar to what the Postal Service had done in the early 1970s (Nolan, 2011). PATCO was more concerned with being separated from the Civil Service System and control of the workplace, rather than wages or working conditions. If they were able to become an independent agency they would have better leverage to later collectively bargain for wages and work

rules.
The illegal strike eventually took place on August 3, 1981, and the world took notice. Numerous organizations were curious how the strike would unfold, because if it were successful it would give other labor organizations more incentive to strike, thereby leveraging employers to give in to union demands. However, President Ronald Reagan’s response to the strike “undermined the bargaining power of American workers and their labor unions.” (McCartin, 2011, n.p.). Even though prior to being elected President Reagan had supported PATCO’s initiatives, by not giving into the strike he showed the government’s response was unwavering. In the government’s eyes PATCO had violated the law, and was jeopardizing the safety of air travelers. In addition, Reagan and the United States government gained a stronger foothold in the global arena by making a strong impression on foreign leaders.
The long-term repercussions of the strike were twofold.

On the positive side, the strike sparked the FAA to reevaluate the status of the ATC system. This evaluation later lead to the development of NextGen, which was created in an attempt to further “modernize and transform the National Airspace System.” (Nolan, 2011, p. 36). On the opposite side of the spectrum, it took about 8 years longer than the FAA anticipated before staffing levels were returned to normal. This resulted in numerous delays, flow control programs, and an increased controller workload at a time when the airlines were expanding rapidly due to deregulation. Another negative outcome of the strike is that unions have lost the striking leverage that once existed and “unions have been unable to pressure employers to increase wages as productivity rises.” (McCartin, 2011,

n.p.).
The unions were the real losers of the 1981 strike. Even though the strike was illegal the FAA was very aware of the shortcomings and safety concerns that had been identified over the years leading up to the strike. Had more effort been focused on maintaining and upgrading the ATC system to accommodate the growing aviation industry, the strike may have been prevented all together. Furthermore, I agree with McCartin that the controller strike has “polarized our politics in ways that prevent us from addressing the root of our economic troubles: the continuing stagnation of incomes despite rising corporate profits and worker productivity.” (2011, n.p.). In today’s industry big business gets bigger, while unions struggle to negotiate competitive contracts for their members.