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US involvement in Korean war
US involvement in Korean war
US involvement in Korean war
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The Politicization of Intelligence in the Korean War
The role of intelligence in policy making has always been an ambiguous one. On the one hand, the intelligence community must be independent from policymakers, so the intelligence community can do its job objectively and unbiased. On the other hand, policy depends on intelligence for providing relevant information usable for policy production and implementation (Gookins, 2008). Betts (2002) states that because of this paradox, politicization of intelligence is inevitable. He defines politicization as “to give a political tone or character” or “to bring within the political realms”. Gookins’ (2008) definition is more specific, stating that politicization of intelligence “refers to the influence of partisan, bureaucratic, and personal politics on intelligence analysis”.
In this paper it is studied how the strains of intelligence producers and policymakers can express itself in practice. A case study is used to demonstrate this strained relationship. The case that is studied is the lead up to the 1950 Korean War, where intelligence played a crucial role. The research question of this study therefore reads as follows: How did the politicization of intelligence affect the action taken by the US concerning the Korean War in 1950?
After a brief analysis of the relevant literature on the politicization of intelligence, the case of the Korean War is outlined. Next, the literature is applied to the case and, lastly, the research question is answered in the conclusion section of this study.
The Politicization of Intelligence
As mentioned before, it seems that intelligence and policy cannot live with and without each other (Betts, 2002). The intelligence community and policymakers need to ...
... middle of paper ...
...wered by stating that the politicization of intelligence affected the action taken by the US extensively. The decisions taken by Washington concerning the situation in Korea were based completely upon the intelligence they received. It was because of the incomplete and distorted intelligence reports that the US did not prepare for war and, consequently, was taken by surprise when the North Koreans and Chinese attacked. Because of bad intelligence, the Korean War started with thousands of casualties on the side of North Korea and the US. Therefore, it would only be logical to assume that these casualties, or a great deal of them, could have been prevented if the intelligence community had done its job right and remained objective and unbiased, even if that meant an angry General MacArthur. This case illustrates how bad intelligence can have devastating consequences.
Since, as he establishes, leadership’s political priorities were critical to the ultimate decision in the CIA’s actions, the degree to which the CIA actually concentrated on this mission of collection and analysis depended on the perceived threats from the top. Consequently, the actual level of reliable analysis deteriorated as demonstrated by the example of ORE analysists who were “normatively risk averse” and trying to “get it right,” and provide analysis that fit into the view of their leadership. Lacking trust in their analysists’ conclusions, the CIA proved unable to supply reliable intelligence and forge “collaboration and integration.” Rather than addressing institutional problems the CIA developed a pattern that continued throughout its entire history. Even though it refers to the Reagan era, Immerman’s conclusion that in a time of crisis the CIA deemed that they “required a change in leadership more than an institutional adjustment,” could easily apply to any other period. This application of psychology to history while enlightening does detract from the reader’s understanding of a formation of a CIA “culture” that limited its intelligence analysis efficiency. Without this fundamental comprehension of a CIA “culture,” some of Immerman’s later
The lesson to be learned from all this: the deciding factor in diplomacy should be more based on what one thinks will happen as opposed to could happen. While a little idealistic, MacArthur certainly knew what he was talking about when it came to warfare, and America would have won the Cold War sooner if MacArthur?s mindset were accepted.
He states, "...we had no money, no intelligence apparatus, either in government, business or in labor unions; and no communications with our own people excep...
After World War II American intelligence had the need to be transformed. The inexperience along with bureaucracy and poor coordination among American intelligence officers obligated the United States intelligence community to change dramatically in order to confront the new challenges that emerged after the end of WWII. From Early America through WWI the intelligence system of the United States of America was involved in operations in which they had to construct intelligence systems virtually from scratch (Andrew 1995). Human intelligence was already developed, but with certain limitations and other intelligence disciplines were underdeveloped and very seldom sophisticated. After WWI America recessed and settled in a period of peace. The United States faced no threat to its security from its neighbors, from powers outside of the Western Hemisphere (Lowenthal 2006). That caused a visible absence of intelligence activities, leaving America out of sight for any international conflicts; the United States of America focused and limited its activities beyond its own borders. In later years the Japanese attack to Pearl Harbor, America rushed to reactivate their military forces, moving from a passive country to full participation into a another international conflict; WWII. As a consequence, the United States engaged in activities that improved its intelligence system increasing its capabilities needed to address seriously the future threats of the Cold War.
Wirtz, James J. The Tet Offensive: Intelligence Failure in War. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1991. Print.
One of the main failures of law enforcement and intelligence agencies identified by both the authors of “The Cell” and Senator Richard Shelby was that the F.B.I. and C.I.A. acted in competition with one another to produce results, as opposed to in centralized collaboration. Gladwell points out that the intelligence community was structured in this manner in response to the failures of the Bay of Pigs operation, which had been based on highly centralized intelligence gathering. In turn, the structure of intelligence agencies at the time of the Bay of Pigs was in response to the failure of decentralized intelligence to identify the threat of an attack on Pearl Harbor. The iterative cycle of intelligence failures and subsequent reform efforts ignores the premise that the failures do not represent evidence of the limitations of intelligence agencies, but rather the limitations of intelligence itself. As Gladwell states, “in our zeal to correct what we believe to be the problems of the past, we end up creating new problems for the
No one could have realized that what seemed as an insignificant gesture to partake in training South Vietnamese armies and America’s involvement in Southeast Asia would one day have the impact it did on America. Although at the time when Eisenhower was trying to stop of the spread of communism it seemed the right thing to do, the repercussions of that decision and the war it eventually led to was devastating to America politically, socially, and culturally.
...at to American security is at stake….A war in Asia should be recognized as unthinkable….We cannot justify the shedding of American blood in that kind of war in Southeast Asia” (Handout 18). Therefore, these politicians were not wise in their position concerning the war.
...e community have had conflicting views and opposing agendas. Lack of cooperation and communication between intelligence agencies; such as the FBI and the CIA refusing to share information prior to the terrorist attacks of 2001, resulted in limited information and failure on the part of the intelligence community and policy decisions regarding US safeguards against terrorist.
Nedzi (D-Mich.), Luclen N. “Oversight or Overlook: Congress and the US Intelligence Agency.” A Congressman talk to the CIA senior seminar, November 14, 1979, https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol18no2/pdf/v18i2a02p.pdf (accessed January 7, 2014).
It is critical to initiate change in the culture of intelligence professionals in this new changing support environment. Setting the conditions and training to a strategically deployable capability must be embraced by the TIB/MIBs in each operational theater. Moving beyond the imprinted habits of Cold War intelligence support to the GCC, the MI culture must change to meet future challenges. The MIB must expand its intelligence support beyond the ASCC headquarters in order to truly fulfill its role as a modular intelligence unit. Emergent threats or critical intelligence requirements require an in depth knowledge of a geographical area and groups or individuals that operate in them. This level of detail can only be provided by analysts that are dedicated to one particular geographic area on a steady basis.
About two weeks ago, I went to a discussion with General Michael Hayden at the Commonwealth Club. Hayden is the only person to have served as a director of both the CIA and the NSA. The talk he gave was about “American intelligence in an age of terror,” specifically discussing portions of his new book, which bears the same name. For sake of our discussion, we will focus on only one primary facet of Hayden’s talk--how we should view the role the intelligence community plays in everyday life.
"Enlightened rulers and good generals who are able to obtain intelligent agents as spies are certain for great achievements." Throughout history, the use of spies has assisted countries in gathering intelligence to use as ammunition against their enemies. These spies would courageously go behind enemy lines and risk their lives in order to gather information that could be vital to the war effort. The idea of spies and espionage is an age-old tradition that is discussed in detail in Sun Tzu’s famous writings, The Art of War. In chapter 13, Sun Tzu states, “Intelligence is of the essence in warfare-
It could cost not only a failure of a military mission but also cost enormous expense and thousands of lives. In Korean War, U.S intelligence failed to analyze North Korea’s invasion of South Korea and even China entering the war. The result of unsuccessful anticipation was severe to the United States (U.S.) to include a lot of lives of U.S. troops and cost of war. This tragedy could have been prevented if U.S. Intelligence
The Central Intelligence Agency’s main responsibility is stated in its Vision statement: “We will provide knowledge and take action to ensure the national security of the United States and the preservation of American life and ideals” (www.cia.gov). The CIA’s job is to provide pertinent, timely, and un-biased foreign intelligence. They also act as an unseen force by conducting undercover action as ordered by the President in order to preempt threats or achieve objectives of the United States. The CIA is the only intelligence organization that is not subject to cabinet prerogative, making it reliable in it is unbiased in its reports, because it has no political agenda. There are six main types of intelligence by which the CIA collects information. Human intelligence (HUMINT) is information gathered by field operatives through overt and covert techniques (www.cia.gov). Communications intelligence (COMINT) is acquired from intercepted foreign communications (www.cia.go...