Peter Singer Famine Rhetorical Analysis

In Singer’s essay “Famine, Affluence, and Morality” Singer argues his first position with the statement relatively affluent countries should be doing more to alleviate the suffering happening in lesser developed countries. (Singer 229) His second position is that it is necessary that we change how we view and define duty and supererogatory.
Peter Singer’s first part of his argument states that “if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it.” (Singer 231) With this, Singer means that we should donate as much aid as a country and individually as we can without jeopardizing our own well-being. Singer’s second part to his argument

is also his least controversial and states that suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad. This leads the third part of his argument and his conclusion stating that members of affluent countries ought to give money to prevent suffering.
The first premise Singer uses is that general principles of impartiality make the proximity or distance of those in need irrelevant. “The fact that a person is physically near to us, so that we have personal contact with him, may make it more likely that we shall assist him, but this does not show that we ought to help him rather than another who happens to be further away” Singer admits that proximity does help judge the situation better, and helps provide the necessary aid that is appropriate for the situation. But because the development of the world into a “global village” we are able provide relief to someone on the other side of the world just as effectively as providing relief to someone in our own block. (232)
Singer’s second premise states that persons in the same circumstances have the same obligations; that others share an obligation does not lessen it.

In this premise he gives the example of if he should feel less obliged to save the drowning child if on looking around and he sees other people that are no further away but are also doing nothing to save the child. This example points out the absurdity of the view that numbers lessen obligation. He also points out that the view of: “if everyone in circumstances like mine gave $5 to the Bengal Relief Fund, there would be enough to provide food, shelter, and medical care for the refugees; there is no reason why I should give more than anyone else in the same circumstances as I am; therefore I have no obligation to give more than $5.” (233) This is argument appears sound until we notice that the premise is highly hypothetical because not everyone will give that five dollars that is necessary for the relief in Bengal, and you cannot assume that your five dollars will be enough to provide the relief needed. “Therefore by giving more than $5 I will prevent more suffering than I would if I gave just $5.” (233) Singer also points out another problem with this hypothetical situation. That it assumes that everyone is sending money simultaneously, and are also unexpected. But because those giving later will know how much money is needed and will only contribute the amount that is necessary to reach this

amount.
The most controversial premise is Singer’s desire to change our moral scheme.

Singer’s controversial claim is that “we ought to give the money away, and it is wrong not to do so.” To redefine “the traditional distinction between duty and charity cannot be drawn, or at least, not in the place we normally draw it.”(235) He states that the act of giving money to the Bengal Relief Fund is regarded as an act of charity and the bodies that collect the money are known as charities. In our society there is nothing wrong with not giving money to these charities and if you do give money then you are praised as generous. We also do not condemn people who spend their money on new clothes in the name of being fashionable, nor do we condemn those who buy a new car instead of giving it to famine relief. To describe how we as a society view giving our money to relief organizations. Singer uses the term “supererogatory” -an act which it would be good to do, but not wrong to not do. He claims “on the contrary, we ought to give the money away, and it is wrong not to do so.” (235) Singer wants to revise our moral conceptual scheme. Singer’s view is controversial because he believes that our current way of drawing distinction between charity and duty, allows for a man living in affluence level, which most of us in more developed countries enjoy, to give money to save those who are suffering, cannot be supported. This is too drastic a revision of our moral scheme. “People do not ordinarily judge

in the way I have suggested they should. Most people reserve their moral condemnation for those who violate some moral norm, such as the norm against taking another person's property. They do not condemn those who indulge in luxury instead of giving to famine relief”. (236) Another objection to Singer’s controversial desire to change the distinction between duty and charity is made against utilitarianism. Singer’s position varies from the utilitarian theory that we all ought, morally, to be working full time to increase the balance of happiness over misery. Singer’s revision would not lead to this utilitarian theory.
The objection is to Singer’s argument that we should redraw the distinction charity and duty, and that giving money to end suffering is not just supererogatory. It is something that is morally wrong if we do not do it. In Hursthouse’s essay “Environmental Virtue Ethics” she says that “we should note that the introduction-or discovery-of a new virtue is a formidable task.” (Hursthouse 160) Singer would be redefining the virtue of charity and duty. To redefine the act of giving money to those who are suffering or to help alleviate those who are without food shelter, and medical care. As not an act of charity but as an act of duty. Not only to give away some of your money to those who are suffering, but
“that [he] and everyone else in similar circumstances ought to give as much as possible, that is, at least up to the point at which by giving more one would begin to cause serious suffering for oneself and one's dependents-perhaps even beyond this point to the point of marginal utility, at which by giving more one would cause oneself and one's dependents as much suffering as one would prevent in Bengal.” (Singer 234)
This expectation to change our moral scheme is far too drastic to realistically expect our society to adhere to these new moral standards. Hursthouse suggests that if we are too resistant to radically change from our traditional definitions of charity and duty that we “should have a recognizable preliminary version; a way that children can be that, although on the right track, still needs to be developed and expanded, and ultimately corrected, by practical wisdom.” (Hursthouse 160) Relying on our children is the best course of action in transitioning from a society that sees living in affluence while others are suffering is acceptable to a society that values preventing human suffering to being able to afford new cars and buying clothes for the sake of fashion and not to keep warm.
Singer could respond to this objection by saying that this change in our moral scheme cannot only rely on our children. We need to spread the idea that “no man should have more than enough while others have less than they need” (Singer 237) is not absurdly unrealistic. He could also respond by saying that his conclusions are not so radical when looking at other times and in other places. He quotes Thomas Aquinas saying, “whatever a man has in superabundance is owed, of natural right, to the poor for their sustenance.” (238) Singer also could point out that again his ideas are not that drastic. He is not asking for our society to take the utilitarian idea which says we “ought to be doing all we can to prevent starvation, but the idea that giving away a great deal of money is the best means to this end.” (239) Singer believes, “what is possible for a man to do and what he is likely to do are both, I think, very greatly influenced by what people around him are doing and expecting him to do” (237) this belief calls for us to bring the change in our moral scheme and not solely rely on our children.