In response to the recent failure of the international community to prevent the famine crisis in the Horn of Africa since July 2011, Suzanne Dvorak the chief executive of Save the Children wrote that, “We need to provide help now. But we cannot forget that these children are wasting away in a disaster that we could - and should - have prevented” she added, “The UN estimates that every $1 spent in prevention saves $7 in emergency spending.” (Dvorak, 2011).
Many people who read such statement wonder about our obligation towards famine relief, and ask, whether we are morally obliged to spend one dollar in order to prevent such a crisis or not. Forty years ago, Peter Singer answered this question in his article
Famine, Affluence, and Morality; Singer suggested, “we should prevent bad occurrences unless, to do so, we had to sacrifice something morally significant” (C&M, 827). However, different philosophers and writers have criticized his view and the general idea to help the poor.
In this paper, I will argue against two articles which were written against Singer’s view, and against helping the poor countries in general. I will argue against John Arthur’s article Famine Relief and the Ideal Moral Code (1974 ) ,and Garrett Hardin’s article Lifeboat Ethics: the Case Against Helping the Poor ( 1976); I will show that both articles are exaggerating the negative consequences of aiding the poor, as well as building them on false assumptions. Both Arthur and Hardin are promoting the self-interest without considering the rights of others, and without considering that giving for famine relief means giving life to many children.
A Case against John Arthur
In the article Famine Relief and the Ideal Moral Cod...
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Friedman, U. (2011, July 19). What It took for the U.N to declare famine in Somalia. Retrieved
from http://www.theatlanticwire.com/global/2011/07/what-it-took-un-declare-famine-somalia/40152/
Hardin, G. (1974, September ). Lifeboat Ethics: the Case Against Helping the Poor. Retrieved fromhttp://www.garretthardinsociety.org/articles/art_lifeboat_ethics_case_against_helping_poor.html
Montgomery, K. (n.d.). The Demographic Transition. Retrieved on August 4, 2011 from http://www.marathon.uwc.edu/geography/demotrans/demtran.htm.
White, J. (2009). Contemporary Moral Problems [pp360]. Retrieved from http://books.google.com/books?id=dcK6-h1ngtcC&pg=PA357&dq=Consumption+,+global+warming+and+famine&hl=en&ei=diw7TsOyGoSisQLK_N35Dw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=3&sqi=2&ved=0CDcQ6AEwAg#v=onepage&q=Consumption%20%2C%20global%20warming%20and%20famine&f=false.
In this paper I will examine both Peter Singer’s and Onora O 'Neill 's positions on famine relief. I will argue that O’Neill’s position is more suitable than Singer’s extreme standpoint. First I will, present O’Neill’s argument. I will then present a possible counter-argument to one of my premises. Finally I will show how this counter-argument is fallacious and how O’Neill’s argument in fact goes through.
Singer’s belief that everyone should give away all excess wealth to eliminate as much suffering as possible conflicts with the idea of competition and, therefore, reduces the productivity of human civilization. Peter Singer, a professor of moral philosophy, stated in his essay “Famine, Affluence, and Morality” that it is everyone’s duty to participate in philanthropy since it is morally wrong to not help someone who is suffering. Singer thoroughly explained the details of the “duty” of philanthropy: “we ought to give until we reach the level of marginal utility - that is, the level at which, by giving more, I would cause as much suffering to myself or my dependents as I would relieve by my gift.” If this philosophy is followed, and the poor beneficiary experienced the same level of comfort as the wealthy benefactor, then what incentive would the beneficiary have for
According to Peter Singer, we as a society must adopt a more radical approach with regards to donating to charity and rejecting the common sense view. In the essay Famine, Affluence, and Morality, Singer argues that we have a strong moral obligation to give to charity, and to give more than we normally do. Critics against Singer have argued that being charitable is dependent on multiple factors and adopting a more revisionary approach to charity is more difficult than Singer suggests; we are not morally obliged to donate to charity to that extent.
In Peter Singer’s “Famine, Affluence and Morality,” Singer makes three claims about moral duty; that avoidable suffering is bad, that it is our moral obligation to help others in need, and that we should help those in suffering regardless of their distance to us or if others are in the same position as we are to help. First, I will elaborate on Singer’s arguments for each of these positions. Next, I will discuss two objections to Singer’s position, one that he debates in his writings and another that I examine on my own, and Singer’s responses to those objections. Then I will examine why Singer’s rebuttals to the objections were successful.
In the article “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” Peter Singer argues that our conceptions on moral belief need to change. Specifically, He argues that giving to famine relief is not optional but a moral duty and failing to contribute money is immoral. As Singer puts it, “The way people in affluent countries react ... cannot be justified; indeed the whole way we look at moral issues-our moral conceptual scheme-needs to be altered and with it, the way of life that has come to be taken for granted in our society”(135). In other words Singer believes that unless you can find something wrong with the following argument you will have to drastically change your lifestyle and how you spend your money. Although some people might believe that his conclusion is too radical, Singer insists that it is the logical result of his argument. In sum, his view is that all affluent people should give much more to famine relief.
This paper explores Peter Singer’s argument, in Famine, Affluence, and Morality, that we have morally required obligations to those in need. The explanation of his argument and conclusion, if accepted, would dictate changes to our lifestyle as well as our conceptions of duty and charity, and would be particularly demanding of the affluent. In response to the central case presented by Singer, John Kekes offers his version, which he labels the and points out some objections. Revisions of the principle provide some response to the objections, but raise additional problems. Yet, in the end, the revisions provide support for Singer’s basic argument that, in some way, we ought to help those in need.
Peter Singer a philosopher and professor at Princeton University who wrote the essay titled “Famine, Affluence, and Morality”, where he argues that wealthy people have a moral obligation to help provide to developing nation’s resources that would increase their standard of living and decrease death due to starvation, exposure, and preventable sicknesses. John Arthur’s essay argues that Singer says that all affluent people have a moral obligation to give their money to poor people to the extent that the wealthy person would be on the same level as the poor person, poor people have no positive right to our assistance, and wealthy people have a negative right to their property, which weighs against their obligation.
Peter Singer's paper “Famine, Affluence, and Morality”has made a drastic impact on modern applied ethics. The simple nature of the paper makes for an easy read, yet the point clearly set out by Singer is at the end with the targeted audience's popular beliefs. Although most will object to Singer's idea by throwing away a basic principle of most moral theories, I wish to deny Singer's solution by showing that the ability to apply Singer's conclusion is not reasonable and does not address the problem's core. Singer starts with the assumption that suffering and death from lack of the essentials of food, water, shelter, and proper medical assistance are bad. I find no problem with accepting this assumption, as it is consistent with most widely accepted moral theories.
The world is divided into two sections: the rich and the poor, “two thirds of them are desperately poor, and only one third are comparatively rich…” (290) Garrett Hardin uses the “Lifeboat Ethics: The Case against Helping the Poor” to illustrate whether the poor should be saved by the
Singer, Peter. “Famine, Affluence, and Morality.” Current Issues and Enduring Questions. 8th ed. Eds. Sylvan Barnet and Hugo Bedau. Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2008. 7-15. Print.
Singer’s principle ‘If it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance we ought, morally, to do it,’ outlines such high obligations for people of wealthy countries that are too demanding. I do not agree with Peter Singer’s principle. This principle limits my freedom of choice, my freedom to act. It fails to recognize the morals and ethics I value as a person. It requires me to favor those who are physically distant rather than my neighbor; furthermore, the drowning child example does not support his thesis because physical distance affects the amount of obligation I feel to help others. And lastly it rejects other moral concerns we have, that may be of equal importance.
In “Famine, Affluence, and Morality”, Singer claims that the moral valuations of a reasoning body can be quantified economically, that people mustn’t help those in need who are near to us before helping those across the globe if their suffering is greater, that one must believe that every person on earth is equally morally obligated to relieve suffering but must act as though no other people are attempting to do so—in short, that nothing may lessen “our obligation to mitigate or prevent” any evil, pestilence, or discomfort across the globe until we are all living in equal squalor. If this principle isn’t sufficiently abhorrent, Singer concludes his argument by stating that were we to accept this ‘m...
Peter Singer practices utilitarianism, he believes the consequence of an action matters more than the reason behind the action. Singer is trying to convince his audience to donate their money to end world poverty. He believes it is moral to give as much money as the person can give, allowing them to purchase just enough for them to live on, and this will be the right action to take. Singer is aiming toward the United States to contribute more to charity. Singer does not consider specific aspects that do not support his argument and causes his argument to not list specific aspects of his belief. Singer’s argument is not a good argument because he does not consider the ramifications of people donating their surplus of money would do to the economy; is it our duty to feed the poor; and that our moral intuitions are not consequentialist at all when it concerns what our rescue duties entail.
Singer, P. (1972, April 1). Famine, affluence, and morality. Philosophy & public affairs, 1(3), 229-243. doi:10.2307/j100428
The position taken by Singer is that the way people in wealthier countries respond to situations in which others around them need help due to some man-made or natural disaster is unjustifiable. Singer argues that many things need to be redesigned—namely, what shapes and affects our definition of morality and our way of life that we tend to take for granted. Singer takes on many assumptions, inferring that if one can agree with each assumption, they will also agree with the conclusion. He observes that in a general sense, suffering and death due to a shortage of food, shelter and medicine is bad. The next is that if it is within our power to do something without something else bad happening and without ceding anything of equal moral consequence, then we are therefore responsible to do it.