Famine, Affluence, and Morality
Webster's English Dictionary defines "morality" as: the conformity to ideals of right human conduct. With this in mind, I wonder who determines right human conduct? Religion aside, there is no literary context that strictly states the rights and wrongs of human behavior. So who decides? Who determines what we ought morally to do and what we are obligated to do as a society? An Australian philosopher, Peter Singer attempts to draw the line between obligation and charity with the moral incentives to providing food for the starved in East Bengal. Although he presents many sound arguments, the reality of his utopian world is that it cannot exist. In the following expository, I will justify my reasoning behind this fact.
To discourse a charitable act is generally viewed as a philanthropic gesture, one that stems from a kind and worldly human being. However, if one has the resources to donate to a charitable cause, are they obligated to do so? Singer claims "if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it." (page 151) If true, everyone who has ever had the funds and opportunity to help a charitable cause but didn't, has neglected the welfare of the human race. Singer claims that generally speaking, "people
have not given large sums of money to relief funds; they have not written to their parliamentary representatives demanding increased government assistance, they have not demonstrated in the streets, held symbolic fasts, or done anything else directed toward providing the refugees with the means to satisfy their essential needs." With all respect to Mr. Singer, I beg to differ....
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...they were in no way obligated to do so, the likelihood of murder would not be as popular. With this in mind, any attempt to force moral obligation would end in failure. People care most about priorities. What must be done now and what directly follows that. If one were to decide upon which choice to follow, I should hope they would choose the first, being not to commit an act of murder. In conclusion, the utopian world that Singer produces is not achievable. Unless he wishes for all of human kind to conform and follow a universal set of codes and laws, the moral obligations of each person shall remain inevitably different. Therefore, his world cannot exist, as stated in my thesis. In no way will every human being abide to the same moral logic and hence, adhere to his "giving to charity" master plan. It proves to be an idealistic world, but unattainable at best.
Bentham, an act utilitarian, created a measurement called hedonic calculus that calculates if an action is wrong or right by determining factors like intensity and duration of pleasure. Singer strains on the importance of the act by the number of people affected from it. He believes that every human being is equal. Therefore, geographical and emotional closeness is irrelevant to moral responsibilities. He states that “death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad” and that if you disagree “read no further” because it would be hard to convince anyone otherwise (P. 231 Singer). He argues that if we can prevent bad things from occurring without “sacrificing anything of moral importance” it’s our moral obligation to act on it (P.231 Singer). What is not clear is as to how much we should give, as we should keep in mind that not everyone in the world gives aid to famine relief so we must take that into account. Singer then tries to make it easier on us by stating that instead of negotiating something of comparable ethical significance in his second premise, it can be of any moral significance. He also believes that if one is to ignore a duty to aid others then he or she is no different than an individual who acts wrong. This is because he believes that it is our moral responsibility to do good deeds and people dying is wrong
Peter Singer’s position in his work “The Obligation to Assist”, is that all people are morally obligated to help one another without it causing any additional harm. He refers to “comparable moral significance”, which means that helping another must not cause anything worse to happen, or be a morally wrong action in and of itself, and must also be done if a comparably awful event can be stopped. His first premise is that if absolute poverty is wrong, and it can be stopped without worse consequences, then it should be stopped altogether. His second premise is that if you were to see a drowning child, you would help them out of the lake, even if your coat happens to get wet. His third premise is that morals do not need to be examined, as the need to help others should be logical without examining the morality behind it. His final premise is that the First World is rich enough to reduce poverty, and can therefore feel obligated to help. The implication of this position is that no matter what situation surrounds the person in need of help, another person would be obligated to assist them. Thusly, people who could help without having to forgo “comparable moral significance” and refrain from
Singer’s belief that everyone should give away all excess wealth to eliminate as much suffering as possible conflicts with the idea of competition and, therefore, reduces the productivity of human civilization. Peter Singer, a professor of moral philosophy, stated in his essay “Famine, Affluence, and Morality” that it is everyone’s duty to participate in philanthropy since it is morally wrong to not help someone who is suffering. Singer thoroughly explained the details of the “duty” of philanthropy: “we ought to give until we reach the level of marginal utility - that is, the level at which, by giving more, I would cause as much suffering to myself or my dependents as I would relieve by my gift.” If this philosophy is followed, and the poor beneficiary experienced the same level of comfort as the wealthy benefactor, then what incentive would the beneficiary have for
According to Peter Singer, we as a society must adopt a more radical approach with regards to donating to charity and rejecting the common sense view. In the essay Famine, Affluence, and Morality, Singer argues that we have a strong moral obligation to give to charity, and to give more than we normally do. Critics against Singer have argued that being charitable is dependent on multiple factors and adopting a more revisionary approach to charity is more difficult than Singer suggests; we are not morally obliged to donate to charity to that extent. Throughout his essay, Singer argues that we must reject the common sense view of giving to charity. The common sense view of giving to charity is one that is supererogatory; it is not obligated for us as a society to give to charity, however, we should if we want to.
The objection says that Singer’s analyses of moral duty conflicts with society’s current outlook on charity, which views it as not an obligation but a personal choice, where those who choose to give are praised for their philanthropy but those who choose not to give are not condemned (236). Singer retorts this objection by saying that we as a society need to essentially change our perspective of charity (236). What Singer means by this is that we need to drastically revise our ideas of what a moral duty is because, in agreement with Singer’s premise that we are morally obligated to help those who are suffering if it is within our power to do so without causing something equally as bad as the suffering to happen (231), charity should be considered as our moral responsibility and a mandatory duty for society
The Limit of our Moral Duty in regards to Famine Relief. In the article “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” Peter Singer argues that our conceptions of moral belief need to change. Specifically, he argues that giving famine relief is not optional but a moral duty and failing to contribute money is immoral. As Singer puts it, “The way people in affluent countries react. cannot be justified; indeed the whole way we look at moral issues-our moral conceptual scheme-needs to be altered and with it, the way of life that has come to be taken for granted in our society”(135).
This paper explores Peter Singer’s argument, in Famine, Affluence, and Morality, that we have morally required obligations to those in need. The explanation of his argument and conclusion, if accepted, would dictate changes to our lifestyle as well as our conceptions of duty and charity, and would be particularly demanding of the affluent. In response to the central case presented by Singer, John Kekes offers his version, which he labels the and points out some objections. Revisions of the principle provide some response to the objections, but raise additional problems. Yet, in the end, the revisions provide support for Singer’s basic argument that, in some way, we ought to help those in need.
Peter Singer organizes his arguments into an outline form allowing a reader to take individual thoughts, adding them together giving a “big picture.” Within the first few pages, Singer shares two guiding assumptions in regards to his argument to which I stated above. The first assumption states “that suffering and death from lack of food, shelter and medical care are bad” (231). Singer steps away from the typical writing style; he states the assumption yet he does not give a personal comment in regards to the assumption. He chooses to do so because the assumption itself is surely uncontroversial; most people would agree, but to those who don’t agree, there are so many possibilities at which to arrive to this assumption that, after all, if they don’t yet comprehend its truth, it would be hard to convince them of its accuracy. Speaking for myself, if I encountered an individual that does not agree to the assumption that death by avoidable causes is bad; I would not hesitate to declare them of being heartless. There are many cases, whether across oceans on foreign land or areas to which we live, where people are dying because of inescapable, unfortunate reasons. Within such cases, even a possible little voice in the back of the head can lead one to wonder who has the responsibility of helping those who are enduring such unnecessary deaths. This sense of wonder leads us to Singer’s second assumption; “if it is in our power to prevent something from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it” (231). To better clarify what this assumption is looking for, Singer points out that “It requires u...
In this piece he makes it clear that nearly everyone has the ability to make a difference is others lives. dings”. Narveson, unlike Singer, thinks that our voluntary choices about giving are morally permissible, whether we choose to give or not. If you choose to sacrifice your luxuries for charity, then that’s fine (morally speaking), as long as you haven’t neglected your obligations with your family. In “The Singer Solution to World Poverty”, the author Peter Singer argues that there is no reason why Americans don’t donate money to the needy when they can afford countless of luxury that are not essential to the preservation of their lives and health. In the case that you choose not to sacrifice for charity, then that’s fine too. As per Narveson 's position it’s up to us to help or feeding the hungry and whatever we decide is correct too. What Narveson does argue is that it would be wrong for others to force us to give, say, by taxing us and giving our money to charity. This claim does not contradict anything that Singer says in “The Singer Solution to World Poverty”. Nowhere in that article does Singer say that people should be forced to give. But for a utilitarian, such as Singer, there is no reason in principle why it would be wrong to force people to give. If the policy of forcing people to give maximizes utility, then it is ipso facto the right policy. On the other hand Narveson makes a distinction between
response to the Singer. Cullity argues that Singer’s conclusion, that we ought to help others in need so long as this does not cause any significant damage to ourselves, is severely demanding, as it is essentially arguing that we are morally obligated to help everybody in the world. The only way in which we would be able to justify not helping somebody who needed our help would be if doing so would put the person helping at significant risk. Cullity argues in his paper that Singer’s argument is asking too much of people when it claims that donating to aid agencies is a moral obligation and that not doing so would be immoral. His main way of doing so is by rejecting the Severe Demand.
Peter Singer a philosopher and professor at Princeton University who wrote the essay titled “Famine, Affluence, and Morality”, where he argues that wealthy people have a moral obligation to help provide to developing nation’s resources that would increase their standard of living and decrease death due to starvation, exposure, and preventable sicknesses. John Arthur’s essay argues that Singer says that all affluent people have a moral obligation to give their money to poor people to the extent that the wealthy person would be on the same level as the poor person, poor people have no positive right to our assistance, and wealthy people have a negative right to their property, which weighs against their obligation.
Singer continues by stating “if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it”(Singer, Pg.231). Like his first statement, this one is easy to swallow. No moral code, save for maybe ethical egoism or nihilism, would attempt to refute either of his premises. His final conclusion is that if it is in our power to stop suffering and death from lack of the essentials, without sacrificing anything of comparable moral worth, we are morally obligated to do so. This essentially removes the current definition of charity, making giving money to famine relief, not a supererogatory act, but a moral duty of all people who have the ability to do so.
In addition, the author is sometimes being too forceful by telling the reader what to do. Since he uses such an emotional and forceful tone in the article, it is doubtful if Singer is successful at selling the audience on his point concerning this issue. He may have convinced many people to donate a particular amount of money for charity to poor countries, but his article is not effective enough to convince me. All human beings have the right to have luxury items even though many would argue that they are doing so at the expense of their morality.
In this paper, I will argue against two articles which were written against Singer’s view, and against helping the poor countries in general. I will argue against John Arthur’s article Famine Relief and the Ideal Moral Code (1974 ) ,and Garrett Hardin’s article Lifeboat Ethics: the Case Against Helping the Poor ( 1976); I will show that both articles are exaggerating the negative consequences of aiding the poor, as well as building them on false assumptions. Both Arthur and Hardin are promoting the self-interest without considering the rights of others, and without considering that giving for famine relief means giving life to many children.
Peter Singer practices utilitarianism, he believes the consequence of an action matters more than the reason behind the action. Singer is trying to convince his audience to donate their money to end world poverty. He believes it is moral to give as much money as the person can give, allowing them to purchase just enough for them to live on, and this will be the right action to take. Singer is aiming toward the United States to contribute more to charity. Singer does not consider specific aspects that do not support his argument and causes his argument to not list specific aspects of his belief. Singer’s argument is not a good argument because he does not consider the ramifications of people donating their surplus of money would do to the economy; is it our duty to feed the poor; and that our moral intuitions are not consequentialist at all when it concerns what our rescue duties entail.