“How can we understand the world in which we find ourselves?” In The Grand Design, a 2010 book written by theoretical physicist Stephen Hawking and Leonard Mlodinow, two authors claim that they have found a philosophical approach – Model Dependent Realism (MDR) – as the solution to this fundamental question of philosophy. Combining the ideas raised from methodology of mathematics and Physics, MDR leads a possible path to reconcile the uncertain nature of modern science and the idealistic pursuit of absolute truth – perhaps the theory of everything (TOE).
According to Hawking and Leonard, Model Dependent Realism “is based on the idea that our brains interpret the input from our sensory organs by making a model of the world. When such a model is successful at explaining events, we tend to attribute to it, and to the elements and concepts that constitute it, the quality of reality or absolute truth.”
The development of MDR
Several hypothetical models explaining a same event could exist at the same time with equal legitimacy. Such is called Alternative Reality. “There may be different ways in which one could model the same physical situation,” says Stephen Hawking, “with each employing different fundamental el¬¬ements and concepts.” For example, both the legend that a giant wolf eats the moon and the theory that the moon is covered by the shadow of the earth account for the phenomenon of eclipse, and “if two such physical theories or models accurately predict the same events,” Hawking explains, “one cannot be said to be more real than the other; rather, we are free to use whichever model is most convenient.”
The idea of alternative reality challenges the Principle of Contradiction, a fundamental part of logics which lay...
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... that “they must have been served to hold without exception – if not universally.” The rule of preciseness requires that the models make as specific predicts as possible so that future observations can disprove or falsify the model.
Despite the fact that the resort to MDR is inevitable in the modern philosophical context, it still has some flaws than should not be overlooked. The most important of all is that, although titled Realism, MDR produces educated guesses at best. In a sense, both the Scientific Method and Model Dependent Realism are like riding a wild horse. When one puts on a saddle and rides, the horse may seem to be following his will by running in assigned direction, but it is indeed possible that it is not the case, for the horse has its own mind. Model Dependent Realists need to avoid overconfidence by keeping in mind that models are only artificial.
In order to understand the concept of Moore’s Paradox, we must first assess and understand the behavior of logical and performative contradictions. Credited for devising and examining this paradox, George Edward Moore, a British philosopher who taught at the University of Cambridge and studied ethics, epistemology, and metaphysics describes the paradox in its omissive and commissive forms in which we will discuss thoroughly. I will then express my standpoint on which solution is the most optimal choice for Moore’s Paradox in order to analyze and explain why I believe my solution is superior to other solutions. I will also discuss any issues that arise
...concrete theories and empirical truths, no matter how factual, that we may attempt to use
... a theory should be able to explain a wide variety of things, not just only what it was intended to explain.
Realism, in philosophical terms, refers to the concept that there is a reality beyond our perception. This means that how we see things and what we believe about them has no impact on the nature of said things. For example an individual may see an object as blue and another see the same object to be red, this is merely a disagreement between both parties about how they should label the colour. This wouldn’t mean that both parties are discussing different objects, this shows that no matter what individual’s beliefs or thoughts on the real world are only ever approximations and do not accurately capture reality. (O’Brien, M and Yar, M, 2008)
I take direct realism to be the better version of realism, as unlike Locke, it does not infer the existence of the external world, it just assumes it. Direct realism is the theory that suggests we perceive the external world directly, and that external objects exist in reality, furthermore these objects are independent to our experience. One of the merits of this view, is the way in which it responds to the sceptic, who will argue that the realist must somehow prove, with certainty, that their experiences as of a table are in fact caused by a table (1), not an evil demon (2). However, Devitt argues that a realist does not need certainty, but only needs to change the epistemological standard, and instead ask whether it is more reasonable to believe (1) than it is the believe (2).
Realism claims that what we can review about our surrounding is established in the fact that they absolutely exist. What we believe about gathered information is what we think about the actual world. It states that there is an actual world that assimilates directly with what we think about it.
Krauss, Lawrence Maxwell, and Richard Dawkins. A Universe from Nothing: Why There Is Something Rather than Nothing. New York, NY: Free, 2012. 7-8. Print.
Rejection of Naïve Realism Naive realism is the way the majority of people are aware of their world, and is based on the assumption that what they are seeing and experiencing is real; that they understand their world through knowledge gained from these experiences. However, certain arguments reject that this world is as familiar as it seems, presenting a need for revision of the naive realist's concept of reality. We discard the idea that the senses offer a reliable window on the world and come to state that our perception is simply a veil that cloaks reality. What we consider to be objective, can be held to be, in fact, highly subjective - a slurred version of reality seen through human bias and constructs, the human mind projecting itself onto what is perceived.
Alain Badiou’s entire philosophical project rests on reclaiming the centrality of truth in philosophy, and he does so through a detailed working through of subjectivity, truth, and the event. Badiou makes it clear that in his systematic philosophy he wants to do without any reference to a subject who has and constructs its experiences, and the phenomenological structures of conscious life are not his focus. Although Badiou calls the method he uses in Logics of Worlds a phenomenology - it is, in his terms an objective phenomenology because it is about the existence of objects in a world and the relations that obtain among these objects, “the degrees of identity and difference among objects in a world” (Logics of Worlds, p. 48) Badiou identifies
is the most accurate argument out of the four major theories about the nature of reality and
After reviewing the skepticisms that arise from the standard philosophical approach, Davidson suggests that we need a theory that will accommodate all three models while making sense of their relationships among each other; anything else will leave us with the question: how can we know the world in three completely different ways? Davidson’s argument begins with an exploration of why the three kinds of knowledge are each in their own right necessary and irreducible to the other two forms. His argument is on the basis that we simply could not go on without knowledge of the mental states of others, or knowledge of our own mental states.
“Arguments Concerning Scientific Realism” is Bas van Fraassen’s attack on the positive construction of science. He starts by defining scientific realism as the goal of science to provide a “literally true story of what the world is like;” and the “acceptance of a scientific theory” necessitates the “belief that it is true”. This definition contains two important attributes. The first attribute describes scientific realism as practical. The aim of science is to reach an exact truth of the world. The second attribute is that scientific realism is epistemic. To accept a theory one must believe that it is true. Van Fraassen acknowledges that a “literally true account” divides anti-realists into two camps. The first camp holds the belief that science’s aim is to give proper descriptions of what the world is like. On the other hand, the second camp believes that a proper description of the world must be given, but acceptance of corresponding theories as true is not necessary.
Some kinds of utterances which have an indicative grammatical form seem, for different reasons, to be unable to say something true of the world. Logical contradictions are only the prime example of something the author baptizes impossible descriptions. So-called performative contradictions (e.g., "I do not exist") make up another kind, but there are at least two more such kinds: negating affirmations and performatives which cannot be explained within the philosophy of language. Only philosophical anthropology can explain their feature of "impossibleness," and a distinction between unreflective and reflective consciousness is central to the explanation. Particularly important here is G. H. Mead's distinction between two aspects of the self: the "I" and the "me." Each of the four kinds of impossible descriptions distinguished has its own contrary opposite. These are, in turn, logical tautologies, performative tautologies, affirming negations, and omissive performatives. The last three types as types have not received the philosophical recognition that they deserve. All four fit a general characterization which is given as a definition of the concept of superfluous description.
In the laws of Newtonian mechanics, an object traveling in a straight line at the same speed is identical to being at rest. Therefore, Newton’s theory of universe at motion would make the same predictions as his theory of the universe at rest. Though we now know this theory to be incorrect, it is a good example to explain how theories can be empirically equivalent while possessing different claims. This is an argument against realism because it shows how any accepted theory could have competing theories that are empirically equivalent yet different. If theories are empirically equivalent, then they are identical in the strength supported by the evidence. So the choice between the accepted theory and the rival theory is arbitrary. This is a strong argument by the antirealists as they bring up a powerful point of not believing in the truth of accepted theories because there are other theories which are equally well-supported in evidence. Going back to the electrons theory, a realist scientist may have accepted the theory of electrons to be real because it may have developed