Metaphysics Of Consciousness

Title: The Metaphysical issues of Consciousness

Name: Vaibhav Gupta

Roll no. : 13110131

Word count: 3083

Abstract

In this term paper, I have tried to tackle the metaphysical issues of consciousness by first defining consciousness and doing a thorough study about the term. Then I proceeded to the metaphysical aspects of consciousness, examining and understanding them.

Consciousness

Consciousness is a very common and much used word used to describe the condition of being awake and aware. In other words, being conscious means responding to the environment, in contrast to being asleep or in coma. But in philosophical terms, consciousness is defined as the state in which humans are able to clearly distinguish between themselves and all other

b) State consciousness: A mental state is conscious when an agent is aware of it. For example – a conscious desire, a conscious pain etc.

Consciousness is actually composed of-:

1- Phenomenal consciousness: Also called P- consciousness. It cannot be defined; we can only point towards it. It is basically related to whatever is experienced by us. For example- our experience of redness(and other such qualia) come under P- consciousness. Feelings, sensations, thoughts, desires, emotions etc. also come under P- consciousness.

2- Access consciousness: Also called A- consciousness. A state is said to be A-conscious when its content is available to other parts of the brain to be used in reasoning. Unlike qualia, A- consciousness is something we can explain to our fellow human beings. For example- perception, sensation etc. as information that can be used in modifying behavior.

These two components of consciousness can exist independently as well. We can have persons with P- consciousness but not A- consciousness and vice-versa. For example- People with blind-sight are considered to have A-consciousness but not P-

The philosophical notion of a “zombie” basically refers to such conceivable creatures which are physically indistinguishable from humans but they lack consciousness entirely. Therefore a creature as Zombie is logically possible but it is impossible practically. Philosophers often contrast what is logically possible i.e. “that which is not self-contradictory” from what is empirically possible and adheres to the actual laws of nature. Thus, it is logically possible for me to jump say forty-four feet in the air, but not empirically possible as laws of motion and gravity won’t allow that. Philosophers often use the notion of “possible worlds,” i.e., different ways that the world might have been, in describing such non-actual situations or possibilities. The objection, then, typically proceeds from such a possibility to the conclusion that materialism is false because materialism would seem to rule out that possibility. It has been fairly widely accepted that all identity statements are necessarily true that is, true in all possible worlds, and the same should therefore go for mind-brain identity claims. Since the possibility of zombies shows that it doesn’t, then we should conclude that materialism is