Koone's Influence On Japan

Japan’s government had gone through many policy reforms, but by late 1938 reformists, also known as radicals or left-wing’s, and conservatives, also known as right-wing’s, clashed over the creation of a new mobilization plan. Both parties wanted to obtain control over the lower house in government in order to influence new policies. Fumimaro Konoe, Prime Minister of Japan at the time, believed that the war with China needed national harmony instead of elite conflicts. Konoe’s successor, Hiranuma Kiichirō, shared his view on national harmony. Hiranuma’s main focus was deciding whether or not Japan should ally itself with Germany and Italy. The Hiranuma cabinet agreed that the pact might neutralize Soviet power, but before the pact was made Germany

He started agreeing more with reformists instead of the conservatives like he did before. Konoe believed that the flaws in the constitutional order could be the downfall of Japan when administrative coordination lacked. The first part of the new system was a new political party that included all existing groups, but he would dominate like a president. Forty percent of the new party would be conservatives and the remaining sixty percent would be reformists. In gaining political support for the new party, Konoe could strengthen his position and, in theory, control the people, the lower house, the bureaucracy, and the military. The new party would consume the functions and responsibilities of the lower house since it’s the only political party in the lower house. The new party would also engulf the armed forces memberships and bring them under Konoe’s control. His reform plans included establishing a centralized policymaking organ under his rule, and establishing a supreme defense council where he could influence military planning. Konoe knew that his ideas would be subject to a widespread rejection, so he presented them in a way each different group would listen to. To the people of Japan, he promised helpful reforms and to follow the constitution; to the lower house, he promised that the new party would recue them from losing power; to new party activists, he promised to give

Within two more months, Tōjō had to bear the weight of war as well. In attempts to resolve some political issues, he retained his position as army minister and took over as the home minister too. This didn’t help persuade the other elite groups to follow his ideas. Conflicting ideas between the army and navy on war priorities and ministries fighting over budgets and raw materials continued throughout the war. The military was able to successfully integrate into administrative areas normally controlled by civilian leaders. Although the civilian leaders were displeased with military intrusions, they allowed limited presence for wartime necessity. The military presence helped synchronize civilian work with cabinet policy, but failed to gain military control over affairs. Conservative party leaders again attempted to crush lower house influence. In early 1942, Tōjō called an election in hopes of creating a new Diet that would be loyal to the army. Tōjō stressed that voting was a patriotic duty, but the voters didn’t regard the elections as different from the others. Unfortunately for Tōjō, the leaders who won the elections were the very same as the ones he had hoped to get rid of. The army and the reformists had to accept that the attempt to form a new, flexible Diet was a failure. In 1942 to early 1943, the army attempted