Kant and Moral Values

Kant says that moral values are ‘good without qualification.’ This assertion and similar remarks of Plato can be understood in terms of a return to moral data themselves in the following ways: 1. Moral values are objectively good and not relative to our judgments; 2. Moral goodness is intrinsic goodness grounded in the nature of acts and independent of our subjective satisfaction; 3. Moral goodness expresses in an essentially new and higher sense of the idea of value as such; 4. Moral Goodness cannot be abused like intellectual, aesthetic, temperamental and other values; 5. Moral values are good in that they never must be sacrificed for any other value, because they are incomparably higher and should absolutely and ‘first’ be sought for; 6. Moral goodness makes the person as such good; 7. All three different modes of participation in moral values are linked to the absolute, most ‘necessary’ and highest good for the person; 8. Moral Values are goods "in the unrestricted sense" by being pure perfections in the sense that "neither in this world nor outside it" can we find anything that could be called good unqualifiedly except moral goodness which is absolutely better to possess than not to possess. 9. Moral Values are unconditionally good because they are never just ‘means’ towards ends. 10. Moral values imply a new type of ought which elucidates the ‘absolute sense’ in which they are good. Conclusion: These distinctions allow a better grasp of Kant and Plato as well as of a central ethical truth decisive for the moral education of humankind.

Kant calls moral values the only values that are ‘good without qualification,’ and thereby states something very profound about morality. Let us read his great text in which he expresses ma...

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...1961. S. 58-84.

(8) See John Finnis, Fundamentals of Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983); see also the same author, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980).

(9) See on this Anselm von Canterbury. Monologion, ch. 15. See also Josef Seifert, Essere e persona. Verso una fondazione fenomenologica di una metafisica classica e personalistica. (Milano: Vita e Pensiero, 1989), ch. 5.

(10) Also in Anselm the deepest meaning of ‘maius’ is a moral one. Compare my Gott als Gottesbeweis (Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag C. Winter, 1996), ch. 11.

(11) See on this Ethics, 2nd edn (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1978), ch. 17-18; Josef Seifert, Josef Seifert, Essere e persona, cit., ch. 9.

(12) On a sevenfold motivation of moral acts see Josef Seifert, Was ist und was motiviert eine sittliche Handlung? (Salzburg: Univ.Verlag A. Pustet, 1976).