James's Pragmatism and Plato's Sophistes

James's Pragmatism and Plato's Sophistes

ABSTRACT: In the first chapter of Pragmatism, William James outlines two philosophical temperaments. He argues that though one's temperament modifies one's way of philosophizing, its presence is seldom recognized. This statement by James led me to Plato's Sophistes, especially the relationship between temperament and being. Although Plato describes certain temperaments, I hold that the main topic is being. The ancients restricted All to real being, e.g., the tangible or the immovable. This reading of the Sophistes puts a different face on the first chapter of Pragmatism. However, if we allow James to speak to present-day philosophers as well as his turn of the century audience, then this reading of the Sophistes will clarify the current philosophical temperament. Neither James nor the contemporary philosopher is satisfied with any restriction on All; for this reason, both lack interest in being. Being, once the richest word, no longer satisfies the philosopher's greedy temperament.

Introduction

In the first chapter of Pragmatism (2) William James speaks about a rather unusual aspect of philosophy. He gives an outline of two prevailing temperaments in philosophy. 'Temperament', he argues,

'...is no conventionally recognized reason [in philosophy]... Yet [a professional philosopher's] temperament really gives him a stronger bias than any of his more strictly premises. ...

Yet in the forum he can make no claim, on the bare ground of his temperament, to superior discernment or authority.' (3)

James argues that, although one's temperament modifies one's way of philosophizing, its presence is seldom recognized. This statement by James prompted me to the reading of part of Pl...

... middle of paper ...

... 1979)

(5) The Greek words on and ousia are both translated as real, real being or reality.

(6) Not surprisingly, in the Sophistes as in Pragmatism the fight between the temperaments is claimed to be of all times.

(7) His name is not mentioned in the dialogue.

(8) Cf. Apology 23c, Theaetetus 168a.

(9) Cf. 216a-c, 224e-226a, 233a, 249cd, 253a-254b, 259d.

(10) Cf. ai)sxu/vh 230d, ai)sxu/nein (247bc)

(11) J. Souilhé, Étude sur le terme ΔΥΝΑΜIΣ dans les dialogues de Platon (Paris: Librairie Félix Alcon, 1919) cf. p. 36, 112, 154 ff..

(12) `Real being ... is always in the same unchanging state ....' (248a)

(13) Cf. 258c-259b.

(14) W. James, Some Problems of Philosophy: A beginning of an Introduction to Philosophy (New York: Longmans, Green adn Co., 1924)

(15) James (1924), p. 37

(16) James (1924), p. 46