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Institutional Investors: Power and Responsibility
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Importance of institutional ownership in firm performance
Institutional ownership or institutional investor is considered as a corporate monitor in many aspects that links to the performance of the company. The institutional investor need to monitor how the managers perform their duties ensuring that they put the company’s best interest rather than their own self interest. This is because, the manager which act as an agent to the company is the one who’s responsible to operate the business ensuring stability in performance of the company. This include examine internal control that exist in the company. For example, to avoid fraud or misrepresenting of the company’s data, the institutional investor needs to monitor the internal control system to be efficient and effective in delivering the best corporate governance practices in the company. Moreover, the institutional investor had invested large sum of money in the company which in return they will gained benefit in term of dividend which depends on the company’s performance during the year. According to Grossman and Hart, 1980, large shareholders may have a greater incentive to monitors managers than members of the board of directors, who may have little or no wealth invested in the firm. These events occurred when the large shareholders have the ability, materials, opportunity and can influence how manager operates the company. The hypothesis have been made by several researcher claimed that corporate monitoring by institutional investor can push the managers to focus on the best interest of the corporate performance rather than opportunistic or self-serving behaviour.
In addition, a function of the size of the shareholdings in the company may also have the ability to influence ...
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...types of mechanisms can be used to alligned manager interest and objective with those of sharehoders and prevent problems related to monitoring and controlling.
1) To alligned manager interests and objectives with the shareholder by carrying out efficient management system. For examples, executive compensation plans, pension scheme, stock option and direct monitoring by boards.
2) Strenghtening of shareholder’s right in term of a greater incentive and ability to monitoring management. These rights will bring a justice and legal protections from unethical managers. For example, the shareholders may bring a punishment toward a managers by loss of employment or reduce in the salaries of the manager.
3) Last method is by using a indirect means of corporate control where takeover specialist must acquire control of a firm in order to displace poorly performing managers.
– Investments in other businesses indicate that management is only concerned with earning a salary and not the earnings of the shareholders themselves. If they owned a greater stake, it would be their money at risk as well, encouraging and driving a stronger work ethic. Currently, it would be classified as a moral hazard.
Control – The shareholders have control of the company. They elect a board of directors who oversee business decisions.
In the Introduction of the article of the author Lynn A. Stout pointed out the two arguments in regard to shareholder primacy that were made by Adolph A. Berle and Merrick Dodd.
Managers are encouraged to act more in the interest of shareholders and the amount of leverage in the capital structure affects firm profitability (Ebaid, 2009).
In contrast , the shareholder theory organisations or organisation's decision-makers only have the responsibility to their shareholders by increasing the organisation profits and should only make the decisions to increase as much as possib...
This separation between ownership and managerial control in this instance can be problematic as the principal and the agents have different interests and goals. In a large publicly traded corporation such as NOL/APL, shareholders (principals) lack direct control when the CEOs (agents) make decisions t...
Nottingham Trent University. (2013). Lecture 1 - An Introduction to Corporate Governance. Available: https://now.ntu.ac.uk/d2l/le/content/248250/viewContent/1053845/View. Last accessed 16th Dec 2013.
... the public and private sector. It uses both the weak form and semi strong from to make decisions. When an investor is given both public and private information the investor would not be able to profit about the average investor even if he was provided with new information at any given time. These investors are given name such as insiders, exchange specialist, analyst and money mangers. Insiders are senior managers that have access to inside information of that company. The security exchange commission prohibits that allow of inside information use to achieve abnormal returns on investments. An exchange specialist can achieve above average returns with specific order information on a specific equity. Analysts can analyze whether an analyst opinion can help an investor achieve above average returns. Institutional money mangers work handle mutual funds and pensions.
There are many different factors that have led to the issues with corporate governance, but some of the most important to consider include the fact that corporate accounting has shifted toward the interest of protecting and providing for individuals in the company, investor protection rules have become too relaxed, and the fact that “too many corporate executives and directors have been placed in positions of great power and authority without an adequate understanding of their fiduciary duties” (Bogle, p. 31). Bogle provides multiple scenarios as to how to help with these issues, and some of them are essentially describing a movement back to traditional owners capitalism. First, he notes that the most major thing that needs to be reformed is stockholder rights, and policies that limit those. Regarding the stockholders, Bogle says that reforms should be made so to better allow stockholders to have a say-so in election of corporate board members, as well as have the rights to help in replacing one if needed. For example, instead of a company’s CEO appointing its board members, the stockholders should appoint them because as stockholders they reserve the right to have some input into the way the company in governed.
Shareholder’s agreements are contractual documents that work as a complement to the constituent documents and that are usually kept secret. They include clauses which intend to level the rights between majority and minority shareholders, so that no single block (majority shareholders) can adopt decisions that would bind or undermine the other block (minority shareholders). These clauses are the rearrangement of voting rights, appointment rights or exit rights, for example.
They may be in line with the old strategies that had been put in place. They are not adjacent periodically or when the need is to meet the needs of the current implementing strategies. The systems include schemes used for compensating shareholders when they quit or when they die. It may prevent appropriate compensation of the shareholders. The old management systems may, therefore, induce loss to the company or may not administer the decent dividend to the shareholder which in an injustice act. Methods used in monitoring developments in the management, when set in tune with the old system may produce either an underestimation of growth or overestimation of the development of the administration in cases where there in a decrease. Understanding communications systems that are due to adjustment of the company’s regulation may cause disruption and ineffective communication in the management of the system as evident in (Nag & Hambrick,
A number of legislative controls are available to shareholders wishing to exercise their rights. If it appears that the affairs of the company are not being conducted properly, shareholders have some options available to them and among which, the statutory remedy for shareholder oppression. It protects minority shareholders against being deprived of their fair share and greatly improves their ability to take action against the company alleged to be in breach of good corporate practices. The Courts have adopted a liberal approach in the interpretation of the oppression remedy following some leading common law cases and it is now the broadest of all the remedies available to minority shareholders. There could be many instances where conduct has been held to constitute oppression, among them is the conduct of company meetings. Formal exercise of majority power may in fact, be unfairly prejudicial to a minority shareholder, justifying Court intervention.
standards, catch up with the trends and produce tax revenues. The importance of equity investors
...eve efficient resource allocation. Failure to achieve appropriate and efficient corporate governance could result in sub-optimal allocation of resources, abuses and theft by management, expropriation of outside shareholders and creditors, financial distress and even bankruptcy. While evaluating the role of corporate governance, it is imperative to also consider the levels of development of market institutions and other legal infrastructure including laws and enforcement that provide good standard for investor protection as well as ownership structures.
The office of the Director of Corporate Enforcement (ODCE, 2015), Ireland defines Corporate Governance as “the system, principles and process by which organisations are directed and controlled. The principles underlying corporate governance are based on conducting the business with integrity and fairness, being transparent with regard to all transactions, making all the necessary disclosures and decisions and complying with all the laws of the land”. It is the system for protecting and advancing the shareholder’s interest by setting strategic direction for the firm and achieving them by electing and monitoring the capable management (Solomon, 2010). It is the process of protecting the stakes of various parties that have their interest attached with a company (Fernando, 2009). Corporate governance is the procedure through which the management of the company is achieving the goals of various stake holders (Becht, Macro, Patrick and Alisa,