Humanitarian Intervention: The Complexity Of Genocide

In our first discussion, we discussed the complexity of genocide and the difficulty in defining it to be a “one size fits all” concept. I proposed that a transferable definition to all nations needs to be established because different circumstances can cause the definition to be amended. Therefore, a feasible policy of intervention can be developed in order to confront the problem of genocide, yet it might need to be a transferable policy as well.

Appropriate humanitarian intervention should be utilized during different types of genocide. For instance, humanitarian intervention can be associated with “military response to atrocities, separating warring factions, supervising negotiations, and brokering political settlements” (Jones, 2006).

However, military action is not always the best response. In the Rwandan genocide, France actually supplied and trained the Hutus even when they just continued to kill thousands of Tutsis. This type of intervention actually enables whichever side of the group to continue their genocidal acts.

Moreover, Jones argues that there should also be “non-military intervention strategies… military solutions should be a last resort” (Jones, 2006). While this argument is between what types of intervention to decide on, there is still the other argument about whether or not to intervene at all. Donnelly’s article highlights Robert Jackson’s opinion on the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention. Jackson argues that “atrocities such as those in Bosnia and Kosovo are local tragedies rather than matters of international responsibility… international society has no right to come between a people and its government” (Donnelly, 2002). I cannot disagree with Jackson enough. When human rights are clearly being violated, then international society has the right to come between the people and their government. If the government no longer respects their people, then the international society no longer has to respect the “boundaries” that were stopping intervention in the first place. Unfortunately, this would clearly disrupt international order. Therefore, a feasible policy of intervention needs to be developed in order to account for most situations and not create another world

war. Not only is sovereignty a concern when discussing intervention, but Donnelly discusses other factors that need to be considered when determining whether intervention is appropriate. He argues that mixed motives, problems of consistency, and partisan politics will play significant roles in genocides and interventions. Furthermore, Jones argues that another intervention strategy is actually trying to prevent genocide when warning signs are prevalent.
Yet, genocide has and will most likely occur again. Therefore, a feasible policy of intervention can be and needs to be developed in time. Donnelly concludes that “giving full weight to both moral limitations of intervening only against genocide and the very real dangers of partisan politics, this still seems to me a small but significant step forward for international human rights” (Donnelly, 2002). Humanitarian intervention needs to be for the protection of the innocent victims and legitimate policies of intervention need to be established. Once a policy that can be amended for every situation is established, protecting a state’s sovereignty will no longer be an issue.