The Irregular Warfare of the Somalian Nation
SSgt Patrick Sipplin
"Class name goes here"
24 March 2014
Western civilization, with our superior technology and organization, have been killed for a long time by primitives or “savages" whose style of war that we misunderstood and whose skills exceeded those of the West in irregular wars. Irregular warfare is the oldest form of warfare, and it is a phenomenon that goes by many names, including tribal warfare, primitive warfare, "little wars," and low-intensity conflict. The term irregular warfare seems best to capture the wide variety of these "little wars." Such wars plague much of the non-Western world, and they will increasingly claim the Intelligence Community's attention.
Since World War II, by one count, there have been more than 80 irregular conflicts. They include civil wars in Rwanda and Somalia, guerrilla wars in Sudan, and rebellions in Chechnya; they involve irregular elements fighting against other irregular elements, regular forces of a central government, or an external intervention force. The acquisition and use of modern military technology is often seen as a solution to the problems of warfare in the late 20th century, with information warfare the latest example. Irregular warfare, however, remains perplexingly unaffected by changes in technology. In an irregular conflict, sociology, psychology, and history will have more to say about the nature of the conflict, including its persistence and intensity.
One of the most apparent activities of irregular warfare in Somalia was the planning development. Typically, we engage in parallel planning which implies concurrent planning and simultaneous coordination among planners from the strategic to the tactical level...
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...nontraditional mission indicators. Future operations may suggest alternatives.
Addressing the issues raised here and answering the uncertainties outlined in reference to irregular warfare procedures may provide a more subtle analysis of the capabilities of modern and irregular forces. What is called for is a greater degree of attention and sensitivity to, and flexibility for, irregular forms of warfare. It requires the Community to preserve what expertise it has on areas where irregular warfare is under way or likely and to develop new skills and the people to use them for this form of war.
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“The Price of Military Folly.” U.S. News Online. 1996. 10 April 2000 . Robinson, Linda.
The world’s history is majorly shaped by mega wars that happen both inside and outside the boundaries of individual nations. Almost every sovereign state in the world had to forcefully liberate itself from its colonizers and oppressors mainly through warfare. For instance, America had to fight a long and exhausting revolutionary war against the British before it could attain its independence in 1783, likewise is the fate of many other nations. It is important to understand the two distinct types of wars that exist and their implications. Guerrilla warfare and the conventional military warfare are two types of war that are very different in their execution and military approach. The purpose of this paper is to highlight the similarities and differences existing between the American war in Vietnam and the American Revolution (Vetter, 1997).
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In today’s operational environments, the U.S. Army is facing a range of problems and mission sets that are arguably more complex than previously encountered. Forces face an array of demands that encompass geo-political, social, cultural, and military factors that interact in unpredictable ways. The inherent complexity of today’s operations has underscored the need for the Army to expand beyond its traditional approach to operational planning. In March 2010 in FM 5-0: The Operations
Jalali, Ali Ahmad, and Lester W. Grau. Afghan Guerrilla Warfare - In the Words of the Mujahideen Fighters. St. Paul: MBI Publishing Company, 2001.
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The U.S. is facing a future of irregular warfare conflict where victory comes through by controlling and influencing the population via the land domain.
The tactics of guerillas are those of harassment. Striking swiftly and unexpectedly, they raid enemy supply depots and installations, ambush patrols and supply convoys, and cut communication lines, hoping thereby to disrupt enemy activities and to capture equipment and supplies for their own use. Because ...
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