History Of Irregular Warfare

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The Irregular Warfare of the Somalian Nation
SSgt Patrick Sipplin
"Class name goes here"
24 March 2014

Western civilization, with our superior technology and organization, have been killed for a long time by primitives or “savages" whose style of war that we misunderstood and whose skills exceeded those of the West in irregular wars. Irregular warfare is the oldest form of warfare, and it is a phenomenon that goes by many names, including tribal warfare, primitive warfare, "little wars," and low-intensity conflict. The term irregular warfare seems best to capture the wide variety of these "little wars." Such wars plague much of the non-Western world, and they will increasingly claim the Intelligence Community's attention.
Since World War II, by one count, there have been more than 80 irregular conflicts. They include civil wars in Rwanda and Somalia, guerrilla wars in Sudan, and rebellions in Chechnya; they involve irregular elements fighting against other irregular elements, regular forces of a central government, or an external intervention force. The acquisition and use of modern military technology is often seen as a solution to the problems of warfare in the late 20th century, with information warfare the latest example. Irregular warfare, however, remains perplexingly unaffected by changes in technology. In an irregular conflict, sociology, psychology, and history will have more to say about the nature of the conflict, including its persistence and intensity.
One of the most apparent activities of irregular warfare in Somalia was the planning development. Typically, we engage in parallel planning which implies concurrent planning and simultaneous coordination among planners from the strategic to the tactical level...

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...nontraditional mission indicators. Future operations may suggest alternatives.
Addressing the issues raised here and answering the uncertainties outlined in reference to irregular warfare procedures may provide a more subtle analysis of the capabilities of modern and irregular forces. What is called for is a greater degree of attention and sensitivity to, and flexibility for, irregular forms of warfare. It requires the Community to preserve what expertise it has on areas where irregular warfare is under way or likely and to develop new skills and the people to use them for this form of war.

References
Allard, Kenneth “Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned (April 2002)
Arnold, S.L. and Stahl, David T., “A Power Projection Army in Operations Other Than War (Winter 1993-94)
Taylor, John M. “Somalia: More Than Meets the Eye,” Marine Corps Gazette (November 1993)

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