Higgenbotham Book Review

Don Higginbotham expertly combines both primary and secondary sources providing the

reader a composite historical narrative of the American Revolution as “seen through American

ideas.” Higginbotham was Dowd Professor at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

until his death in June 2008. Higginbotham contributed several articles on comparative

revolution and many other books and articles about the American Revolution.

The book’s subtitle is Military Attitudes, Policies, and Practice 1763 – 1789. However,

Higginbotham devotes substantial attention to other themes providing the reader with a

synthesized version of the political and military aspects of the war. He also addresses the cultural

and social aspects of the war. In doing so, he illustrates how the war affected the development of

an American identity and how whig philosophy translated into everyday reality for the common

man. Finally, he uses the book to compare the Vietnam conflict to the American Revolution.

The author never directly discusses the development of an American identity, but one can

see that thread as he discusses the militia system and its reinforcement of the provincialism and

localism during the period (7). Higginbotham continues this theme, contending that a group of

“American political leaders” emerged within the Continental Congress who were nationalists and

desired to go beyond the simple provincial assemblies (81). Higginbotham maintains this

concept, proposing that Manifest Destiny may have been an issue as early as 1776 in the colonial

discussions concerning the invasion of Canada (108). The concept of an American identity came

to fruition in 1776 when opinion concerning independence grew increasingly favorable (117).

One could argue, however, that most Americans possessed little concept of an identity even after

the Declaration was signed. Nevertheless, in 1781 the Pennsylvania line must had some concept

of an American identity. After revolting due to lack of pay and other necessary items, one

soldier remarked that, “Clinton might ‘bribe such a mean toadeater as Arnold,’ but ‘it is not in

his power to bribe an American soldier’” (404). Without an innate knowledge of what an

American soldier was, it seems unlikely that such a remark would have been made.

Higginbotham clearly demonstrates how colonial Americans internalized whig beliefs

and turned them into action not only resisting British authority, but also resisting its own

Continental Army. This created somewhat of a quandary for colonial authorities throughout the

war, for in resisting the militarism of George III (118), they needed to establish a military that

became what they were fighting against. Higginbotham describes Congress’ first attempt at this

in a “restrained military code” that would reflect the society from which it originated.