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General Patton and the Battle of the Bulge
Battle of the bulge success, failures, and consequences
Battle of the bulge success, failures, and consequences
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By the 26th of December, elements of Patton’s 3rd Corps and chiefly the 4th Armoured Division broke through the German lines and relieved Bastogne, as well as securing the vital road junction that would slow Hitlers offensive in its tracks. Following the relief of Bastogne, Patton and the Third army pressed on in continuing their counteroffensive to St.Vith, and to contain the German Easterly advance past the Meuse river. Later the same day, Allied headquarters received news that the German offensive had lost its vital impetus. Throughout the reminder of the Battle of the Bulge, which lasted until the 25th of January 1945, General Patton worked closely with General Bradley and played a key role in successfully pushing the Germans back into …show more content…
the Rhineland, and reestablishing the Allied front line that was previous to Hitler’s offensive. During the course of the counteroffensive, Third Army fired a total of 1,485,166 rounds of ammunition into the Ardennes. Further, General Patton’s feat of moving the entire Third Army from the Saar offensive North to hit the Germans flank at Bastogne was an achievement that surprised even General Eisenhower. In George Patton's words, “During this operation the Third Army moved farther and faster and engaged more divisions in less time than any other army in the history of the United States- possibly the history of the world.” Since the end of the Second World War, many historians have debated why the Germans lost the Ardennes offensive and come to 3 chief reasons; the first being that the German army was too weak at that point in the war, the second being that the Germans couldn't capture the vital town of Bastogne, and lastly the inability to halt Patton and his Third Army from advancing. Moreover, on December 31, 1944, General Bradley submitted a report in which he described Patton’s Third Army’s performance as superior, and recommended him for command of an army group; two weeks later, General Eisenhower remarked that Patton was the fourth greatest contributor to the Allied victory in Europe. For these reasons, it can be justifiably argued that General Patton aided the Allied victory in the Ardennes tremendously. It is worthwhile to discuss the influence that European weather had upon the planning of Hitler’s Wacht am Rhein offensive, and how Patton’s Third Army adapted. During the later months of 1944, central Europe was experiencing the harshest Winter in 38 years; Hitler and the Nazis would inevitably use this to their advantage. In the midst of the movement to Bastogne, General Patton even remarked about the weather in his memoirs; saying that he kept seeing black objects pointing out of the snow, and upon inspection, found them to be dead mens frozen toes. By 1944, the German Luftwaffe was dwarfed by the air superiority of the combined Allied airforce of the Americans and Royal Air Force of Great Britain. Hitler and his commanders knew that if their plan had any chance of success, they would need at least 10 days of low clouds and bad weather so that the Allied airforce wouldn't be able to inflict total destruction. Hitler’s initiative was originally planned for late November, however in search for the perfect weather conditions, the plan was pushed back until the 16th of December when it sufficed. Once the battle had commenced, Patton knew that in order to relieve Bastogne and defeat Hitler’s offensive, air support would be of great aid. In lieu of this, Patton order a prayer from his chaplain and distributed it onto cards for all of his men to pray; miraculously it worked, and better weather ensued a few days later. In the meantime, Patton's tanks struggled on the icy roads to Bastogne in the Ardennes forest, although the men developed a strategy to quickly and efficiently pull out stuck tanks and other vehicles (they couldn’t travel off the roads because the terrain was heavily vaulted and full of trees). Taking into consideration the weather and heavily forested terrain of the Ardennes, the ability for Patton's Third Army to effectively reach the Ardennes front in as little time as they did was a tremendous feat. It proves the testament of strength and ingenuity Patton’s Third Army possessed, as well as the kind of commander that General Patton was. It can then be said that characteristics such as these are what led to Patton’s successful counteroffensive in the Battle of the Bulge. In conclusion, the Battle of the Bulge was one of the hardest fought battles of the Second World War.
Over the course of the 41 day conflict, General Patton’s Third U.S Army provided the main Allied counter attack against the German offensive. General Patton, who could be summed up by one of his own quotes, “The only way you can win a war is to attack and keep on attacking, and after you have done that, keep attacking some more,” was the brainchild behind the Allied counteroffensive. Even for Patton, the achievement of cancelling his current attack into the Saar, turning 90 degrees, and driving 100 miles North, all in 48 hours was impressive, let alone striking the ripe underbelly of the Germans flank. During the course of Patton’s assault on the German lines, he relieved Bastogne, worked with remnants of General Hodges First U.S Army and defeated Hitler’s offensive. Consequently, by the end of the Battle of the Bugle, Patton's Third Army would move farther and faster and engage more enemy divisions in less time than any other army in the history of the United States. Therefore, it can be justifiably argued that Patton’s third army provided the spearhead of Allied counter offence in the Battle of the Bulge, solidifying the Allies success in cutting off the Germans in the Ardennes, and defeating Hitlers last major offensive of the
war.
The Canadians advanced behind a creeping barrage, which is a precise line of intense artillery fire advancing at a set rate, timed to the minute. This allowed other soldiers to capture German positions in the moments after the explosions, before the enemy soldiers emerged from their underground bunkers. By the afternoon, Canadian forces had taken all of their objectives, except for one where troops were facing the worst terrain and toughest enemy defences. It took three more days of fighting before the Canadians were finally able to gain control of this last part of the front. The Battle of Vimy Ridge was over, and the Germans were forced to withdraw three kilometres.
Hitler’s conduction of the Battle of Stalingrad was his biggest mistake. The decisions that Hitler made during the Battle of Stalingrad influenced the outcome of following battles and World War 2. Adolf Hitler kept sending men into the front line even though generals advised him to withdraw the troops and surrender. According to William L. Shirer, “When General Zeitzler got up enough nerve to suggest to the Fuehrer that the Sixth Army should be withdrawn from Stalingrad, Hitler flew into a fury. ‘Where the German soldier sets foot, there he remains!’"(The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, Document 1) Hitler aspires to take over the world so a loss could make his leadership appear to be weak and expose flaws to the rest of the world creating a downward spiral of his reputation, of being
In order to receive a victory in the Battle of the Bulge, General Patton used Mission Command Analysis in order to understand how he can be successful for this mission. The first thing of understanding t...
superior to the German artillery. The BEF was thirty-five miles long. line in the centre of the bulge while the French Army in the area. commanded by General Ferdinand Foch, manned the flanks to the south of the city of the city. At the outset of the battle, French and Foch both retained the hope of launching an offensive of their own.... ...
...attle was to take advantage of General Patton’s Army and stop the initiative. Adolph Hitler had no time to plan his counterattack on the 3rd U.S. Army, and his men had no training. The unity of command principle of war from the 3rd U.S. Army side was perfect.
The Hammelburg Raid (also known as Task Force Baum) has been one of the most controversial operations of World War II, and it cast a shadow over General George S. Patton’s otherwise illustrious career. While in command of the 3rd Army, Gen. Patton ordered the controversial and secret operation. The operation took place on March 26-28, 1945 with the official purpose of taking a small task force 60 miles behind enemy lines to liberate the prisoner of war camp OFLAG XIII-B near Hammelburg, Germany. But unofficially, its purpose was to free Patton's son-in-law, Lieutenant Colonel John Waters, who was taken prisoner at Kasserine Pass, Tunisia, in 1943. Initially, the operation was successful. They reached the camp and released the prisoners, but they were ambushed on the way back and taken prisoner. It resulted in nine dead, 32 wounded, and 16 missing in action. I will be discussing some of the principles of Mission Command and their effects on the outcome of the Task Force Baum.
The prelude to the Battle of the Bulge began on a winter day in mid-December of 1944. Three powerful German divisions, were the last German offensives in the west at that time during World War II. They began after the Normandy invasion in June 1944. Allied had forces swept rapidly through France but became stalled along the German border earlier that year in September. On December 16, 1944 taking advantage of the weather, which kept the Allied aircraft on the ground, the Germans launched a counteroffensive through the semi-mountainous and heavily-forested Ardennes region in Germany, and advanced 31 miles into Belgium and northern Luxembourg near the Meuse River. Their goal was to trap four allied armies, divide the Americans and the British to force negotiated peace along the western front, and retake the vital seaport of Antwerp in Belgium. Thinking the Ardennes was the least likely spot for a German offensive, American staff commander chose to keep the thin line, so that manpower might concentrate on offensives north and south of the Ardennes known as the "bulge" in the Allied lines. These American lines were thinly held by three divisions in the Allied Army and part of a forth division, while fifth division was making a local attack and the sixth division was in reserve. Division sectors were more than double the width of normal defensive fronts, therefore there were more men scattered along a larger area. The German advance was halted near the Meuse River in late December. Even though the German Offensive achieved total surprise, nowhere did the American troops give ground without a fight. Within three days, the determined American stand and the arrival of powerful reinforcements insured that the ambitious German goal was far beyond reach. In snow and sub-freezing temperatures the Germans fell short of their interim objective- to reach the rambling Meuse River on the edge of the Ardennes. But they managed to avoid being cut off by an Allied Pincer movement.
The Generals and politicians thought the war was going to end very quickly where every I gets to go home on Christmas. Generals and Politicians said “A few quick campaigns and a few decisive victories would “bring the boys home by Christmas, “perhaps even by the fall” (Overfield, James H. Sources of Twentieth-century Global History. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2002. Print.) , p74. They were definitely wrong on that note. The war lasted 4 years in the hell the soldiers called the battlefield. One of the first major battles on the western front was called the Battle of Marne. The battle that halted the Germans from entering France into a long standing stalemate. The trench warfare started here, where soldiers dug deep into the ground and settled down to fight off the enemy soldiers. It was a stalemate for man...
...did not exist.” However, when this information arrived the next morning, Haig told Rawlinson that “The enemy has undoubtedly been severely shaken and our correct course, therefore, is to press him hard with the least possible delay” . This military strategy was one which led, as Terraine argued, to long-term success. Primary source German Order of the Day from General Von Bulow on 3 July stated “the decisive issue of the war depends on… our victory on the Somme. We must win this battle…” . Furthermore, Haig’s strategy is shown to be perceptive and correct when we consider Ludendorff’s, German Chief of Staff, thoughts: “We were completely exhausted on the Western Front… If the war lasted our defeat seemed inevitable... I cannot see as I look back how the German G.H.Q. could have mastered the situation if the Allies had continued their blows as they did in 1916.”
Early in the operations Alexander’s vague commander’s intent encouraged Patton to develop an independent understanding, different from Alexander’s, to the point that he assumed he would push north, beyond phase line blue, along with Montgomery to protect his flank all the way to Messina. (site) Mission Command crises culminated when General Alexander shifted the boundaries between the 7th and 8th Armies.(site) Alexander made his decision based on lack of trust in the 7th Army and his own clouded commander’s intent and incomplete understanding of the follow-on effects of a quick capture of Messina. His decision denied the Allies an opportunity to execute a quick breakout through the Axis defenses. But more importantly, it motivated General Patton to abandon his disciplined initiative and ignored Alexander’s directive to push north to protect Montgomery’s flank. Instead, he drove to Palermo seeking to reclaim this army’s prestige and later with a secure port of Palermo beat Montgomery to Messina. (site) The Allies’ poor foundation of Mission Command delayed a promising advance and replaced it with a rogue commander this allowed the German General Hube, a very competent combatant, time to concentrate and consolidate his forces to stiffen his defensive positions to delay the Allies until he was able to evacuate the bulk of his forces
Outline of Operation Market Garden In early September 1944, Montgomery, in order to maintain the momentum of the Allied movement from Normandy towards Germany , conceived an operation to outflank the German "West Wall" defensive line. Montgomery persuaded Supreme Allied Commander General Dwight D. Eisenhower that his daring plan of forcing a narrow corridor from Eindhoven northward to Arnhem and establishing a bridgehead across the Rhine River held the promise of causing a German collapse by the end the year. Market Garden became the biggest airborne operation in our history. Montgomery's Operation Market-Garden consisted of two parts.
Warfare was in a state of transition. Older commanders and generals in the French and British militaries were very cavalry and infantry focused. These commanders believed that cavalry, infantry, and artillery would assure victory in any circumstance, against any foe. They clung to the static tactics of the bygone World War I era. World War I had been fought primarily on French soil, and the military as well as the government never wanted that to happen again, therefore they wanted to reinforce their main border against any future German. Little did they know that only twenty two years later they would be bested by German forces in a way that would shock the world. This research will be analyzing many important assumptions, oversights,...
To write this book the author, John Toland, had to devote 15 years researching different stories from all sides of the war. He studied war memoirs, interviewed war veterans, and read military documents. While doing this he focused on both the allied and axis forces to truly understand both sides of the story and be able to write such a descriptive and accurate piece of work. This research was used in the book to describe the unlikely victory of the Americans over the Germans during the “Battle of the Bulge”.
It began to emerge the differences in tactics. The question was whether to continue so far the Supreme Allied Commander of the Allied Forces Europe, General Eisenhower’s tactics attacking on a broad front, or due to problems of supply to take just one mighty blow. In that period Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery developed a new operation plan, which would include the use of 1st Airborne Army (Lieutenant General Lewis H. Brereton), actually 1st Airborne Corps (Lieutenant General Frederick Browning). The Corps comprised of 82nd US Airborne Division (Brigadier General James M. Gavin), 101st US Airborne Division (Major General Maxwell D. Taylor), and 1st British Airborne Division (Major General Robert “Roy” E. Urquhart) supported with, under his command, 1st Polish Independent Parachute Brigade (Major General Stanislaw Sosabowski). These units should be dropped along the roa...
General George S. Patton, Jr.: Main Concepts, Stategy, Tactics, Leadership. (n.d.). Retrieved May 5, 2013, from University of North Carolina Wilimington: http://people.uncw.edu/kozloffm/pattonnew.doc