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Free will vs determinism comparison
Free will vs determinism comparison
Free will vs determinism comparison
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1) The three main assumptions we have discussed in class for the cause of events are Hard Determinism, Libertarianism, and Compatibilism, which is divided into Traditional Compatibilism and Deep-self Compatibilsim. As defined in lecture, Hard Determinism is the assumption that “the future is determined by the past,” Libertarianism is the assumption that “human beings are free,” and Compatibilism as a whole is the assumption that “free will is compatible with determinism” (Farley, PHIL 101, 2014.) Further delving into Compatibilism, Traditional Compatablism is the assumption that “we are free as long as we can do what we want to do without being constrained by outside forces,” and Deep-Self Compatibilism is the assumption that “we are free as long as we act on those desires that we deeply identify with” (Farley, PHIL 101, 2014.) The problem of free will forces us to reject one of the following: human beings have free will, the world is deterministic, or free will is incompatible with determinism because allowing each of these assumptions to exist would generate a contradiction. The most plausible solution to prevent a contradiction would be to reject that human beings have free will, while allowing the assumptions that the world is deterministic and free will is incompatible with determinism. It is plausible that the world is deterministic and that free will is incompatible with determinism, and thus, reject that the humans have free will. In other words, Hard Determinism is more plausible than Libertarianism and Compatibilism. Although it certainly seems to us that we have the power to rationally choose a course of action from among various alternatives, all previous events directly or indirectly cause us to form our decisions. A...
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...no power over the future necessary consequences of ‘x;’ thus, we have no power over our future actions; if we have no power over our future actions, then we’re not responsible for our future actions; thus, we’re not responsible for our future actions. (Farley, PHIL 101, 2014.) While this argument counter Moorean Response in that it shows that we are actually not responsible for our actions because we do not have free will, it also works against Traditional Compatibilism and Deep-Self Compatibilism. For Traditional Compatibilism, Van Inwayen’s Consequence Argument takes into account the past and the laws of nature, two things humans have no control of that can be constraining outside forces that prevent us from doing what we want. As for Deep-Self Compatibilism, the past and laws of nature can also prevent us from acting on those desires that we deeply identify with.
Compatibilist like Peter van Inwagen believes that freedom can be present or absent in any situations. One of the famous Consequence Argument on compatibilism is by Peter van Inwagen who says: “If determinism is true, then our acts are the consequences of the laws of nature and events in the remote past. But it is not up to us what went on before we were born, and neither is it up to us what the laws of nature are. Therefore, the consequences of these things (including our present acts) are not up to us."1 The contradiction here is that human cannot refrain from performing free will. Therefore, determinism cannot abolish free will. He also mentions that if determinism is true then no one has power over the facts of the past and the laws of nature. Therefore, no one has power over the facts of the future, and, also, have no control over the consequences of one’s behavior. For example, he expresses how compatibilism has been in existence before laws were even made. Since laws put certain restrictions on human’s free will, it should not stop humans from doing what he or she wants to do. He also expresses how society and nature should not determine one’s own free will because it can never be taken away from humans. Humans are incapable of knowing what the future looks like, therefore they cannot be morally responsible for the
There is much debate over the issue of whether we have complete freedom of the will or if our will caused by something other than our own choosing. There are three positions adopted by philosophers regarding this dispute: determinism, libertarianism, and compatibilism. Determinists believe that freedom of the will does not exist. Since actions are events that have some predetermined cause, no actions can be chosen and thus there is no will to choose. The compatibilist argues that you can have both freedom of the will and determinism. If the causes which led to our actions were different, then we could have acted in another way which is compatible with freedom of the will. Libertarians believe that freedom of the will does exist.
Consequence argument means taking a radical claim between compatibilism and determinism. Compatibilism is the free will to do whatever one wishes to do because it is in their own nature. In the free will debate of “Consequence Argument,” Peter van Inwagen, the author of An Essay on Free Will, takes on a compatibilist view by arguing that determinism is not true because one cannot be held responsible for their own actions. Determinism is the belief that human actions or free will have either a positive or an effect in the future. John Martin Fischer, professor of philosophy at the University of California, takes on a determinist view by arguing that compatibilism is never true because one must be held responsible for their own actions. Between both views on compatibilism and determinism, I will explain how the Consequence Argument can be challenged.
Before I begin it is pertinent to note the disparate positions on the problem of human freedom. In "Human Freedom and the Self", Roderick M. Chisholm takes the libertarian stance which is contiguous with the doctrine of incompatibility. Libertarians believe in free will and recognize that freedom and determinism are incompatible. The determinist also follow the doctrine of incompatibility, and according to Chisholm's formulation, their view is that every event involved in an act is caused by some other event. Since they adhere to this type of causality, they believe that all actions are consequential and that freedom of the will is illusory. Compatiblist deny the conflict between free will and determinism. A.J. Ayer makes a compatibilist argument in "Freedom and Necessity".
In “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person”, Harry Frankfurt illustrates the concepts of freedom of will and freedom of action, but more importantly, Frankfurt has refined the compatibilism theory. Compatibilism allows the freedom of will to exist in the deterministic world. According to determinism theory, the future state of worlds is determined by some events in the distant past (E) and the laws of nature (L). More specifically, E refers to the history, such as experiences or states whereas L refers to scientific or physical law like gravity. For example, an alcoholic’s action is determined that he will not stop drinking. Here E is that he had been drinking in the past, and L is the physiological addiction effect caused by alcohol. As we can control neither E nor L, then it follows that we can never act free. The thesis of compatibilist, however, states that we may have free will, even if all of our actions are determined by forces beyond our controls.
In this essay, I will explore the concept of free will by drawing a correlation to determinism and analyse if free will is dictated for us. I will argue that the future is
It has been sincerely obvious that our own experience of some source that we do leads in result of our own free choices. For example, we probably believe that we freely chose to do the tasks and thoughts that come to us making us doing the task. However, we may start to wonder if our choices that we chose are actually free. As we read further into the Fifty Readings in Philosophy by Donald C. Abel, all the readers would argue about the thought of free will. The first reading “The System of Human Freedom” by Baron D’Holbach, Holbach argues that “human being are wholly physical entities and therefore wholly subject to the law of nature. We have a will, but our will is not free because it necessarily seeks our well-being and self-preservation.” For example, if was extremely thirsty and came upon a fountain of water but you knew that the water was poisonous. If I refrain from drinking the water, that is because of the strength of my desire to avoid drinking the poisonous water. If I was too drink the water, it was because I presented my desire of the water by having the water overpowering me for overseeing the poison within the water. Whether I drink or refrain from the water, my action are the reason of the out coming and effect of the motion I take next. Holbach concludes that every human action that is take like everything occurring in nature, “is necessary consequences of cause, visible or concealed, that are forced to act according to their proper nature.” (pg. 269)
Compatabilists are the people who consider free will is compatible with determinism. They believe that if certain minimal conditions of voluntariness are met, actions of a person are freely chosen, notwithstanding that they are predetermined. They argue that even if the actions are predetermined, people are free in other ways that are enough to consider them blameworthy for their actions. Whatever the forces that determine an action (biology, social conditions, upbringing, god whatever) does not cripple our ability to act according to our free will. The compatibilist attitude is in vogue since a long time the forces that determine the action (role of determinism) have been evolving since then but the basic idea, the fact that we do a particular thing even though we don’t really choose what we want to do, we do only as we choose to do. This is put in a better way by T.M Scanlon ‘ Even If our attitudes and actions are fully explained by genetic and environmental factors, it is till true that we have these attitudes and that our actions express them.’ According to Fried this is the ‘indigestible common core of compatibilism’ that we are blameworthy for doing what we could not help but do. Fried argues that blaming a person for doing something which one cannot help his action is indigestible. Fried argues this by a hypothetical situation in which the driving force of an action is replaced by a result (which still is determinism, but of a different type). For this she gives an example of a bus driver who did his job with care and prudence but on one particular day when he is going on accustomed route. A child dar...
For centuries philosophers have debated over the presence of free will. As a result of these often-heated arguments, many factions have evolved, the two most prominent being the schools of Libertarianism and of Determinism. Within these two schools of thought lies another debate, that of compatibilism, or whether or not the two believes can co-exist. In his essay, Has the Self “Free Will”?, C.A. Campbell, a staunch non-compatiblist and libertarian, attempts to explain the Libertarian argument.
Soft determinism attempts to make the disagreeing data of determinism and freedom compatible. The theory of soft determinism rests on three fundamental claims: (1) the deterministic concept that human behaviour is causally determined; (2) that there is freedom in voluntary behaviour, so long as there is no physical impediment or constraint upon the action; and (3) that the cause of the voluntary behaviour (which is possible in the absence of impediments or constraints) is an internal state of the agent of the action. According to soft determinism, therefore, we are responsible for our actions on o...
All in all, each view of the philosophy of free will and determinism has many propositions, objects and counter-objections. In this essay, I have shown the best propositions for Libertarianism, as well as one opposition for which I gave a counter-objection. Additionally, I have explained the Compatabalistic and Hard Deterministic views to which I gave objections. In the end, whether it is determinism or indeterminism, both are loaded with difficulties; however, I have provided the best explanation to free will and determinism and to an agent being morally responsible.
The problem of free will and determinism is a mystery about what human beings are able to do. The best way to describe it is to think of the alternatives taken into consideration when someone is deciding what to do, as being parts of various “alternative features” (Van-Inwagen). Robert Kane argues for a new version of libertarianism with an indeterminist element. He believes that deeper freedom is not an illusion. Derk Pereboom takes an agnostic approach about causal determinism and sees himself as a hard incompatibilist. I will argue against Kane and for Pereboom, because I believe that Kane struggles to present an argument that is compatible with the latest scientific views of the world.
The choices an individual makes are often believed to be by their own doing; there is nothing forcing one action to be done in lieu of another, and the responsibility of one’s actions are on him alone. This idea of Free Will, supported by libertarians and is the belief one is entirely responsible for their own actions, is challenged by Necessity, otherwise known as determinism. Those championing determinism argue every action and event are because of some prior cause. This causation may be by an external driving force, such as a divine power, or simply a chain of events leading up to a specific moment. The problem is then further divided into those believing the two may both exist, compatibilism, or one cannot exist with the other, incompatibilism. In his work, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, David Hume presents an argument for the former, believing it is possible for both Free Will and Necessity to exist simultaneously. This presentation in favor of compatibilism, which he refers to as the reconciling problem, is founded on a fundamental understanding of knowledge and causation, which are supported by other empiricists such as John Locke. Throughout this paper, I will be analyzing and supporting Hume’s argument for compatibilism. I will also be defending his work from select arguments against his theory. Because causation and both conditions for human freedom exist, Hume is able to argue everything is determined and Free Will is possible.
Free will is the ability for a person to make their own decisions without the constraints of necessity and fate, in other words, their actions are not determined. Determinism is the view that the initial conditions of the universe and all possible worlds are the same, including the laws of nature, causing all events to play out the same. Events are determined by the initial conditions. Two prominent positions advocated concerning the relation between free will and determinism are compatibilism and incompatibilism. In this essay I shall argue that compatibilism is true. Firstly, I shall explain what compatibilism is and consider possible objections and responses to the theory. I shall then examine incompatibilism and evaluate its strengths and weaknesses and argue that compatibilism is a stronger argument and, as a result, show why it is also true.
Freedom, or the concept of free will seems to be an elusive theory, yet many of us believe in it implicitly. On the opposite end of the spectrum of philosophical theories regarding freedom is determinism, which poses a direct threat to human free will. If outside forces of which I have no control over influence everything I do throughout my life, I cannot say I am a free agent and the author of my own actions. Since I have neither the power to change the laws of nature, nor to change the past, I am unable to attribute freedom of choice to myself. However, understanding the meaning of free will is necessary in order to decide whether or not it exists (Orloff, 2002).