Flew's Argument

One major critic of Locke’s account is Antony Flew who offers two objections in his article “Locke and the Problem of Personal Identity”. The first objection, which he attributes to Bishop Butler, suggests that by defining personal identity in terms of consciousness Locke has in effect created a circular argument. The second objection concludes that “Locke’s criterion is at the same time both too strict in blackballing and too lenient in admitting candidates.” Although I contend that both objections are flawed, the scope of this paper shall only be to evaluate and respond to the first of these objections.
In order to demonstrate that Flew’s objection is flawed, I shall proceed by briefly summarizing Locke’s position put forward in the Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Then I shall consider in detail the first criticism offered by Flew. As a result of this examination, I shall argue that Flew’s restatement of Locke’s central thesis relies on terminology obtained through an incorrect interpretation of Locke’s position. Furthermore, I shall show that Flew’s criticism relies on an argument by

Bishop Butler which conflates an epistemic and an ontic issue. Finally, I shall argue that the charge of circularity, if still an issue, is insignificant in this case.
I. LOCKE’S ACCOUNT OF PERSONAL IDENTITY
In Book II, xxvii, of the Essay Concerning Human Understanding Locke offers an account of personal identity (II, xxvii, 9), in which his general account of identity is embedded (II, xxvii, 3).

Unique to Locke’s view is the notion that the criteria for identity vary depending on what kind of thing is being considered. Thus, the identity conditions for one kind of thing do not need to be same for another kind. As examples, he distinguishes between the identity conditions of masses of atoms and those of living things. According to Locke, a mass of particles is dependent upon the identity of the particles or atoms composing it. As such, this mass persists only as long as no addition or subtraction of matter occurs. In contrast, he argues that living organisms appear to lose or gain particles of matter as they grow and yet still remain the same organism. As Locke

states:
In the state of living creatures, their identity depends not on a mass of the same particles, but on something else
He reaches this conclusion by recognizing that while the organization of particles constituting an acorn remains the same over time, its particles do not. An acorn gains and loses particles as it matures into an oak tree, but Locke suggests that we would not want to consider the acorn and the oak tree as two different organisms. Therefore, living beings must not retain identity in the same way as inanimate matter. Instead he maintains that the persistence conditions of a living thing must be tied to the organization of its atoms partaking in one life. As long as an organism maintains a continuous life, it remains the same organism. Persons, however, are not considered by Locke to be living organisms, but rational thinking things. Thus, they have different conditions for identity. The identity of a person consists solely in consciousness. In other words, having a sense of self or the ability for a person to ‘consider itself as itself’ is only made possible through consciousness. Locke remarks:
For, since consciousness always accompanies thinking, and it is that which makes every one to be what he calls self, and thereby distinguishes himself from all other thinking things, in this alone consists personal identity, i.e. the sameness of a rational being.
But what about material changes to a body? Locke emphatically denies any connection between a change in matter, or substance, and a change in personal identity. Suppose someone loses a limb. Locke’s position maintains that although the limb is detached and can not communicate with her consciousness (i.e. be felt), her personal identity remains the same because her consciousness has not changed. In other words, regardless of the physical change one may go through, such an injury does not alter one's personal identity, provided one maintains the same consciousness. As Locke asserts:
[A]nd as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past action or thought, so far reaches the identity of that person; it is the same self now it was then; and it is by the same self with this present one that now reflects on it, that that action was done.