John Locke's Concept of a Persistant Self

In this essay I will first explain John Locke’s statement, “whatever has the consciousness of present and past actions is the same person to whom they both belong” (278). Then I will elaborate on the criteria outlined by Locke to describe the concept of a persistent self. Following the flushing out of Locke’s reasoning, I will delve into David Hume’s concept of the Self as a bundle of perceptions. The juxtaposition of these two propositions of the nature of self will show that John Locke’s idea of persistent self is flawed when examined against David Hume’s concept of self as a bundle of perceptions.

Locke states that, “whatever has the consciousness of present and past actions is the same person to whom they both belong” (278). What he means by this is that the self is persistent to the extent of the memories held by an individual. Locke believes the self to be an immaterial thing, external to the physical body.

Locke defines self to be, “a conscious, thinking thing which is sensible or conscious of pleasure and pain, capable of happiness or misery, and so is concerned for itself as far as that consciousness extends” (278). The self is self-interested and capable of self-identification. This differs from the concept of “man” which in Locke’s usage means others perception of an individual. For example, under Locke’s definition of self if one were to lose all of their memories, then they are not the same self as before, but they are the same “man.” Therefore, Locke acknowledges that the self is potentially subject to rapid, fundamental change external to any physical variation.

Locke’s definition of self lends itself to a chain view of self. The chain view of self can be used to extend the persistent self even ...

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...ntity. However, this is not the case because these changes constitute an entirely new boat as each part of it changes. The new boat is closely linked to the old, but the fact remains that with each of its new parts the boat’s original identity was fundamentally altered.

Upon examination of the concepts of diversity and identity, Locke’s statement that, “whatever has the consciousness of present and past actions is the same person to whom they both belong” (278), is shown to be flawed. Locke makes the mistake of confusing identity for diversity in his statement. He makes the mistake of logic which Hume outlines in his example of gradual change as illustrated by a boat undergoing repairs. By taking the varied forms of self which occur over time, and using their shared link of memory to call them one individual identity, Locke mistakes identity for diversity.