F-22 Raptor Fighter Program: A Case Study

In April of 2009, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates announced the termination of the F-22 “Raptor” Fighter program. His action stopped production at 187 F-22s and ended a procurement process that spanned 28 years with an original goal of manufacturing 750 airplanes. The decision to end F-22 production was an initial step to reduce defense budgets and begin a reformation of the acquisition process. Several diverse and compelling factors contributed to this decision that collectively make it seem long overdue in retrospect.

The foremost factor in the decision was the program’s uncontrollable expenditures, which made it an obvious target in the quest to reduce defense acquisition spending. Additionally, security assessments revealed no immediate

need to continue the F-22 fielding and the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program would fulfill the requirement in time. Finally, as combat actions in Iraq were ending and those in Afghanistan transitioning, the non-defense priorities of newly elected President Obama required major defense budget reductions. The F-22 program, among others, led to sweeping changes in the acquisition process. An analysis of each factor in the decision to cease F-22 production follows a brief overview of the program.
Initially conceived in 1981, the F-22 Raptor would be an innovative fifth-generation fighter intended to advance U.S. air superiority well ahead of potential adversaries. Key F-22 performance objectives included cruise speeds of up to 1.5 Mach without afterburners, unmatched acceleration and maneuverability, low radar signature, and reduced deployment and maintenance logistics. The acquisition of a fighter with these characteristics was a priority during the height of the cold war but the need diminished significantly over time. The intent was to gain a “first sight, first shoot, first kill” capability which was considered crucial to gaining control of airspace. During the life cycle of development, the F-22 ultimately achieved many of the original performance parameters. Unfortunately, this procurement program is best known for its poor financial management and it highlights the need for defense acquisition reform.
Budget escalation plagued the F-22 development program from its inception and was the primary factor in the decision to halt the aircraft production line. The root cause of the unpredictable costs to develop the Raptor was that its design and performance parameters relied upon immature technologies. The program began in 1981 and the procurement concept, completed in 1986, projected nine years and $12 billion to develop the aircraft. That initial projection would procure 750 F-22s and completely replace the F-15 fleet. The prototypes first flew in late 1990, which was mid-way through the projected development timeline. Because of budget concerns, the intended procurement dropped to 648 aircraft in 1991 and further down to 339 in 1997 at the end of the original production timeline. In 2005, development costs exceeded $26 billion as the F-22 achieved initial operating capability.
Another aspect that caused budget growth during F-22 development was the continual delay in meeting milestones on schedule. Original projections of the time required to develop the innovative technologies were severely optimistic. The time necessary to achieve maturity of the stealth, propulsion, avionics, and aerodynamic technologies and apply them to the airframe was inconceivable at the program onset. As these delays compounded, program budget limits established by the Office of the Secretary of Defense required decreases in the number of aircraft acquired. The decision to end production in 2010 resulted in just 179 full production model F-22s. Each aspect of the advanced fighter required far more resources and time than expected resulting in a corresponding negative impact on the program overall.
The more than twenty years required to develop the F-22 brought about the need for a comprehensive modernization program at an additional costs of almost $12 billion. This modernization was necessary to update many of the aircraft systems based on 1980s technology. This three-stage upgrade made necessary improvements to the electronics and networking capabilities as well as armament and radar enhancements. The additional expense of modernization as the aircraft rolled off the assembly line further exasperated the program budget and highlighted the overall program length. Technology development, delays, and modernization drove the cost of F-22 development and production over $66 billion and resulted in its overlap with the Joint Strike Fighter program.
Fifteen years after the start of the F-22 program, a second fifth-generation fighter entered the acquisition process. Development of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) started in 1996 with the intent to produce a family of fighter aircraft. By producing three variants, the JSF would meet the strike fighter needs of all three U.S. services and many allied partners. With an expected delivery of 2,443 aircraft when production is completed, the F-35 brings an unprecedented level of commonality between the Air Force, Navy, and Marine forces. The JSF also benefits from technology development that began with the F-22 but has been matured and updated by two decades of improvement. The multi-role functionality and current technology design of JSF made continued production and modernization of the F-22 unappealing to Department of Defense (DoD) leadership.
Not only is the F-35 a more efficient solution to meet the fifth-generation fighter requirement; it also more closely matches the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) strategy. In this guidance, Secretary Gates directed the fielding of a high volume of fifth-generation fighters. These aircraft, he stated, must be both land and ship based with multi-role capability, adaptability, and have a long operational reach. The JSF also provides a capable platform to counter the growing anti-access threat as required by the QDR.
Additionally, the F-35 enhances Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities in support of updated strategy and future operations. With at least eight allies participating in JSF development and production, it is ideally suited for training and advising partner forces as directed by the QDR. Although not immediately available in large numbers, the F-35 would be fielded prior to any potential adversary could threaten air superiority. To comply with emerging strategy and priorities, the decision to end F-22 production was partly due to its overlap with the JSF development.
DoD expectations of reduced defense budgets under President Obama also played a role in the decision to end the Raptor program.

After taking office in 2009, the new president presented priorities that would require reduced defense spending. This process of establishing new priorities likely began immediately after his inauguration and the 2010 National Security Strategy documents this shift. In the opening remarks, the President declares his focus on building strength at home through economic growth and national debt reduction. He also places priority on health care, education improvement and the pursuit of green energy with only cursory remarks on defense capability. Although it may not have been the President’s intent, messages like these prompted DoD leaders to closely examine budgets and identify areas of substantial savings. Under this scrutiny, the F-22 production and modernization program, at more than double its original projections of costs and time, stood

out.
Upon review, the Raptor program also brought attention to severe shortcomings in the acquisition process as a whole. Secretary Gates announced in an April 2009 press conference that defense leaders must end programs that significantly surpass their budgets. He insisted that future acquisitions rely on advanced technology and not simply support the pursuit of it. The Secretary also introduced the requirement to intensely oversee the acquisition process and guard against unrealistic goals, timelines, and budgets. He mandated adherence to established milestones and development of independent cost estimates to provide validation throughout the process. Several of these concepts would have resulted in major changes during the early stages of the Raptor development program.
The F-22 program developed as a way to take maximum advantage of developing capabilities to ensure U.S.

dominance in the skies. Unfortunately, the immature nature of key technologies and a lack of stringent financial management led to egregious budget overruns. The same factors also more than doubled the time required to reach initial operating capability and drove a reduction in the number of aircraft purchased. By the time of the decision, the more modern and highly adaptable F-35 JSF overshadowed F-22 production. The JSF would be available in sufficient numbers and in time to match any major air superiority threat. Incidental to the F-22 review, wide-sweeping reformation of the entire acquisition and contracting process began. Ultimately, the F-22 Raptor provided a foundation for advanced aviation technologies but at a cost that was too great to

endure.