Euthyphro's Definition Of Piety

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In this paper, I am going to show how Socrates rejects Euthyphro’s definition of piety as what is loved by all the gods; I will call it the god-loved, and how Euthyphro fails to give an account of piety.
Socrates first asks Euthyphro “is the pious loved by the gods because it’s pious? Or is it pious because it’s loved?” (Euth. 9e). Seeing Euthyphro is confused with the question, Socrates goes on and asks the question more clearly as he states the difference between a thing that is being carried and carrying, a thing that is being seen and seeing. (Euth. 10a). Socrates’s goal here is to point out that there is some difference between a thing that is doing the action and a thing that is being done the action to, like there is a difference …show more content…

So, we have four propositions like this: (1) The pious is being loved by the god because it is pious. By substituting god-loved for the pious, we then have (2) the god-loved is being loved by the god because it is god-loved. And (3) The god loved is loved because it is being loved by the gods, if we were to replace the god-loved with the pious in (3) we then have (4) the pious is pious because it is being loved by the god. But then we see the contradictions here. (2) contradicts (3) and (1) contradicts (4). The god-loved in so far is god-loved because it is being loved, just the apple in so far is an eaten thing because it is being eaten. It’s not the case that the god-loved is being loved because it is god-loved, just like it’s not that the apple is being eaten because it is an eaten thing. Same thing applies for (1) and (4), the pious in so far is being loved because it is pious, it’s not that the pious is pious because it is being loved. This is why Euthyphro is wrong for identifying pious with …show more content…

The pious is loved by the god because it is pious, there is something in the nature of being pious which makes the gods love it. However, this is not the case for the god-loved, the thing is said to be god-loved because it is being loved by the god. The difference here is, the nature of the pious is independent of anything, the pious has a quality of being loved by the gods, but even if the god didn’t love the pious, the pious would still be pious. This is the opposite case for the god-loved, whether a thing is god-loved does depend on whether the gods really love it. If the gods decided not to love it, then that thing would no longer be god-loved. The nature of pious never changes, regardless of the circumstances; the affect or quality of the pious, which is being god-loved, does change, it relies upon the gods. Therefore, when Euthyphro says the pious is what all the god loves, he is giving an affection of being pious, not the nature of pious, and Socrates is looking for the answer of the latter one. After all, it is clear to see that why Euthyphro has not given out the definition of pious from the statement “the pious is loved by the gods because it is pious”. The statement explains nothing about what is pious. We can ask the question: why do the gods love it? The answer would be: because it is pious. Then we may ask: why is it pious? This question

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