Socrates 'Euthyphro': A Philosophical Study

This philosophical study will define the relationship between morality and religion in the Socratic dialogue of the Euthyphro by Plato. The primary argument put forth by Socrates is to determine the causality of morality/piousness in and unto itself or by the approval of the gods. Socrates attempts to question the moral and religious authority of Euthyphro, which defines the important originations of the “moral good” through the command of the gods. However, Socrates defines the original presence of the morality/piousness before the gods can “approve” or disapprove” of its goodness. This is the theoretical position of denying the issue of "divine command” of the gods’ existence before morality/piousness, which Socrates refutes in the arguments

of Euthyphro. In essence, the problem of “divine command” will be analyzed to define the relationship of the “moral good” and the role of gods in the Euthyphro by Plato.
The relationship between the “moral good” and religion is an issue of causality when determining which comes first in defining what is “pious” in the dialogue between Socrates and Euthyphro. In this debate, the originations of the “moral good” are defined by the piousness of the gods as a form of approval as a religious conviction on the part of Euthyphro. In this manner, Euthyphro states: I would certainly say that the pious is what all the gods love, and the opposite, which all the gods hate, is the impious” (Plato 173). This statement infers that the gods command moral and pious behavior because they approve of it, which suggests that they wield some type of overarching power to define the rule of moral conduct. However, Socrates views this argument as being erroneous because the a priori existence of the “pious” is not created by the gods, but only approved by the gods: “It is loved then because it is pious, but it is not pious because it is loved” (173). This aspect of the dialogue defines the ambiguity of causality between religion and morality, since it begins to redefine the limitations of the god’s power to “approve” piousness or impiousness as a definition of the moral good. This argument is the platform in which Socrates begins to unravel the relationship between religiosity and moral goodness, which Euthyphro has taken for granted as a theory on divine command.
The further development of Euthyphro's assumptions on the approval of the gods expands on the mysteries of piety and the “moral good”, which baffle the younger man. Socrates dispels the notion of the “god-beloved” notion of godly approval by getting Euthyphro to admit the ambiguous relationship between the moral good as a form of piousness and the issue of divine command from the gods. In this manner, the definition of what is pious is put into question because Euthyphro’s argument assumes that piousness is what the gods approve of, instead of defining what is it in and unto itself:
If the pious were loved because it was pious, the god-beloved would be loved because it was god-beloved, and if the god-beloved was god-beloved because it was loved by the gods, the pious would also be pious because it was loved by the gods; but now you see that they are in opposite cases as being altogether different from each other (Plato 175).
This opposing argument, put forth by Socrates, defines the pre-existing quality of piousness that the gods claim to “love”, but it does not define what piousness is in and unto itself. Therefore, the “moral good”—as defined by piousness—is merely loved by the gods, yet Socrates is making the claim that Euthyphro is merely following religious doctrines, instead of finding what the “moral good” means for himself. In this manner, Socrates challenges Euthyphro to see the contradicting aspects of causality for piousness and divine command, which make this discerning quality in the argument: “”The one [piousness] is of a nature to be loved because it is loved, the other is loved because it is of a nature to be loved” (Plato 173). In this manner, Socrates dissolves Euthyphro’s assumption that he knows the moral good/piousness, since he cannot defined what piousness is in relation to his own re-assumed conviction about the power of divine command through the gods. In this manner, the origins of the “moral good” dispel the notion of the causality of piety through the approval of the gods.
In one way, the rejection of a “divine command” argument illustrates Socrates’ attempt to show Euthyphro that morality must be learned by a personal and individual investigation of moral conduct, which does not presume a godly or religious authority that must be followed blindly.

Certainly, Socrates’ arguments about the limitations of godly knowledge of the “moral good” devolve the idea of divine command as a cause of piety, but more importantly, it defines the philosophical evaluation of piety as a way to educate Euthyphro to analyze his pre-assumed beliefs with greater conviction. In this dialogue, the issue of the “moral good” becomes a more complex relationship between Euthyphro’s religious and moral perception of philosophy: “I told you a short while ago, Socrates, that it is a considerable task to acquire any precise knowledge of these things” (177). This new perspective defines the effectiveness of Socrates’ argument to dispel the overly confident assumption that the gods approve of piety, since piety has its own unique qualities that need to be defined. This moral and religious relationship is ambiguous because Socrates has opened the possibility of Euthyphro coming to his own conclusions about the gods and the “moral good”, which should be presumed by religious doctrines or in the divine command of the

gods.
In conclusion, the causal relationship between morality and religion has been defined in the dialogue that occurs between Euthyphro and Socrates in the Euthyphro by Plato. The ambiguous definition of piety as a source of the “moral good” is typically defined by Euthyphro's instance that godly approval of piousness/morality is a form of causality. However, Socrates illustrates the greater likelihood that “piety” existed before the gods, since they choose to love it, and therefore, approve of it. More so, Socrates makes no claims of knowing the causal nature of piety or the “moral good”, but he is willing to encourage Euthyphro to make his own conclusions about the originations of these beliefs. This ambiguous dialogue about the relationship of religion and morality is crucial, since Socrates does not want Euthyphro to simply take gods for granted, and to blindly follow the dictates of moral behaviors without questioning their validity as knowledge. These is the important relationship between morality and religion, which is defined by Socrates’ philosophical interrogation of Euthyphro on the questionable causalities of the “moral good” and the role of the gods in dictating these pious behaviors.