Dying Alone Chapter 1 Analysis

Chapter 1: Dying Alone: The Social Production of Isolation

Living alone, being isolated, being reclusive, and being lonely are four separate conditions:

Living Alone – Residing without other people in the household

Being Isolated – Having limited social contact or ties

Being Reclusive – Confining oneself to the household

Being Lonely – The subjective state of feeling alone regardless of whether you are by yourself or around other people

HEAT WAVE is a book about the weather and social living conditions that were present in Chicago, Illinois, on July 14, 1995. Chapter 1 focuses on the issue of a “good death” – what Americans perceive as a healthy lifestyle that leads to a comforting end. In this chapter, the life of Joseph Laczko is examined.

Laczko was a 68-year-old man of Hungarian descent whose isolated life contributed to his death from this excessive heat. He chronicled his life through letters that illustrated his routine of collecting a neighbor’s unwanted mail, as well as recording the weather (94 degrees) and news stories of interest to him. What stands out in the letters is his loneliness, his feeling of being cut off from any real friends or family. This chapter also makes it clear that he was one of many who lived this way.
Seniors involved in active social networks tend to have better health and longer lives. Isolates and reclusive are more difficult to study because they have fewer social ties with friends or neighbors. Urban critic Jane Jacobs states: “It took a lot of effort to make people this isolated” (Klinenberg 1219 of 7206). Sociologist Elijah Anderson supports the idea that social avoidance and reclusive behavior have become protective strategies for city residents whose concentration in high crime neighborhoods places them in harm’s way. The excessive heat brought this condition of isolation to light and remains a problem in this country.

Chapter 2: Race, Place, and Vulnerability – Urban Neighborhoods and the Ecology of Support
This chapter documents a study conducted on July 21, 1995, by the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. The researchers had to compare matched pairs consisting of one heat wave decedent and one survivor of similar age during this heat wave. The research staff, which included roughly 80 participants, “decided to visit and inspect 420 pairs of victims.” (Klinenberg 1838 of 7026). They also had to interview a friend, relative, or neighbor who knew the social networks, medical conditions, and daily routine of the participants. What the study did not do was move beyond obvious risk factors to identify the probability of which residents could survive the heat.
The study showed that the highest heat related death rates were the south and west sides of the city where the city’s African Americans have been concentrated and segregated. Jane Jacobs draws a distinction between high density and overcrowding, which suffocates residents and stifles community life. Jacobs also alluded to the fact that residents of city neighborhoods without comfortable and secure streets, which would draw people out, are more likely to suffer from literal isolation and social distance.

Chapter 3: The State of Disaster City Services in the Empowerment Era
This chapter deals with city governments, which often fail to recognize the danger of extreme heat until an emergency arises. When the heat moved into Chicago, the city’s supply of ambulances and paramedics proved insufficient. There were five key features, which proved consequential during the heat crisis:
1. The delegation of health and support services was not attuned to the needs of the community. (Klinenberg)
2. The lack of an effective organizing system contributed to a lack of accountability. (Klinenberg)
3. The lack of political will and public commitment to provide resources for these people did not help the situation. (Klinenberg )
4. An expectation that the people helped would be active consumers did not happen. (Klinenberg )
5. Public relations and image concerns deflected from the city’s real concerns. (Klinenberg )

Chapter 4: Governing by Public Relations
When the city neglected to follow its guidelines, “the administration accomplished a textbook public relations program to deny the severity of the crisis.” (Klinenberg 164). When reporters asked about the city’s support programs for the elderly, Human Services Commissioner Daniel Alvarez knew neither how many cooling centers the city had opened nor how the government would help the elderly get them. Alvarez blamed the victims of the heat waves for their own demise.
Budget expert Jacqueline Leavy argues that the city uses the media selfishly to make themselves look good; good public relations and good government are not always apparent.

City Hall needs to deflect criticisms and become more accountable. Image is not more important than action.

Chapter 5: The Spectacular City News Organizations and the Representation of Catastrophy

This chapter focuses on the reframing of the news and information about the heat wave. Writer Phyllis Kaniss noted that journalists are reluctant to criticize a source that has provided them with information in the past. Often the fascination with getting a story takes precedence over criticizing those who could help, but don’t.

Klinenberg mentions, “by the summer of 1999, Chicago was better prepared for the heat, pamphlets about heat risks were everywhere in the city and the media provided accurate health warnings.” (Klinenberg 4505 of 7026) The Department of Public Health developed a system for coordinating emergency medical services and the Department on Aging expanded its network of isolated seniors, educating participants about seasonal survival strategies.

This book shows the importance of tending to our aging population, particularly those who live alone, like Joseph

Laczko.