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Demarcation between science and pseudoscience
Science and pseudoscience easy
Scientific method essaiy
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It is important to distinguish forms of reasoning in science in order to distinguish between science and pseudo-science. This essay will explore the concept of the scientific method and how it utilises inductive reasoning, followed by an exploration of Karl Popper’s argument that when scientists explore their ideas through inductive reasoning, they make it impossible for science to hold any more credibility than pseudo-science. This will then be followed a dismantling of Popper’s argument and deductive reasoning proposal on the basis that inductive reasoning is justified, falsifiable, and allows for scientific progress. First, before exploring the possible reasons to dismiss inductive reasoning, it is worth understanding completely how it is applied and justified for application. A helpful argument in understanding induction itself is Russell’s, in which he gives the example that if we hear thunder, it is reasonable to conclude that preceding that thunder came lightning based on our experiences of these occurrences in nature. This idea of past experience is then used to justify the theory of induction, assuming that if we observe that A often happens in relation to B, then we can reasonably conclude that A and B are somehow connected. This also is how the scientific method essentially works. A theory is proposed, followed by an experiment to test said theory, and once the experiment has been repeated to ensure that we have reason enough to believe that A and B cause C, it is accepted as the truth. Thus, the scientific method is the application of induction into practice. In Karl Popper’s paper The Problem of Induction, however, Popper argues that induction is not adequate justification to warrant a reasonable conclusion. In fact... ... middle of paper ... ...g on the fact that we can breach these inevitable gaps of knowledge and still find a conclusion. As Kuhn comments, science requires a definitive paradigm in which we can commit to, because without it, there would be no scientific advancement. In this sense, the inductive reasoning used in the scientific method is justified, as our understanding of scientific truths and all scientific advancement relies on its existence. While Popper’s qualms about inductive reasoning appear to be justified, it nonetheless proves itself to be the less-problematic approach to scientific learning. This approach need not be flawless for it to be functional in its practical application in the world, and for us to justify its continued use. It simply needs to allow progress, which Popper’s overly-cautious deductive approach evidentially does not allow, at least not on a comparable scale.
Messenger, E., Gooch, J., & Seyler, D. U. (2011). Arguing About Science. Argument! (pp. 396-398). New York, NY: Mcgraw-Hill Co..
Carl G. Hempel was of the most influential proponents of what is now regarded as the classic view of explanation in science. In his work, Philosophy of Natural Science, he created the deductive-nomological model which is the following account of scientific explanation, where an explanation is set out as a formalized argument. This is the principle format for works such as Aristotle’s Physica, Ptolemy’s Almagest, Newton’s Principia and Opticks, Franklin’s Electricity, Lavoisie’s Chemistry, and Lyell’s Geology. Thomas Kuhn calls these achievements Paradigms. Through these paradigms normal science developed. In Kuhn’s book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, he argues that normal science in a way hinders the development of new phenomenon. He says that there must be a change in a paradigm to create a scientific revolution. Throughout this essay I will explain what Hempel’s model consists of and how it relates to Kuhn’s view.
When analysing science and the concepts and arguments relating to scientific theory, it is important to separate an argument that has its foundations in science and that which sounds scientific but really should be labelled as pseudo-science. The distinction between the two was first analysed by Karl Popper, who viewed scientific theory in terms of testability and falsifiability. By reviewing and analysing arguments for the intelligent design (ID) theory and Darwinism we can deduce whether or not these theories have solid arguments or if they fall under the category of unfalsifiable. Further analysis of the two theories arguments can help us see if they commit any fallacies and have rational arguments.
Since the mid-20th century, a central debate in the philosophy of science is the role of epistemic values when evaluating its bearing in scientific reasoning and method. In 1953, Richard Rudner published an influential article whose principal argument and title were “The Scientist Qua Scientist Makes Value Judgments” (Rudner 1-6). Rudner proposed that non-epistemic values are characteristically required when making inductive assertions on the rationalization of scientific hypotheses. This paper aims to explore Rudner’s arguments and Isaac Levi’s critique on his claims. Through objections to Levi’s dispute for value free ideal and highlighting the importance of non-epistemic values within the tenets and model development and in science and engineering,
ABSTRACT: My focus in this paper is on how the basic Bayesian model can be amended to reflect the role of idealizations and approximations in the confirmation or disconfirmation of any hypothesis. I suggest the following as a plausible way of incorporating idealizations and approximations into the Bayesian condition for incremental confirmation: Theory T is confirmed by observation P relative to background knowledge
The term inductive reasoning refers to reasoning that takes specific information and makes a broader generalization that is considered probable, allowing for the fact that the conclusion may not be accurate. An example of inductive reasoning is: All observed children like to play with Legos. All children, therefore, enjoy playing with Legos. Relying on inductive reasoning throughout everyday life is just a part of human nature. If someone were to take into consideration every plausible outcome of a given situation, they would never get anything done or been stricken with worry. The simple principle of induction (SPI) states that:
He feels that induction is a myth and that we cannot make inferences after one observation. Induction acts as tests of conjectures and that the inductive process cannot determine the criteria for demarcation. Induction only makes theories probable, rather than certain. Popper’s views regarding induction are that he is accepting of an empirical method for the use of testing, but does not believe that theories can be inferred through the use of induction. The fate of a theory is decided by observation and experimentation, or the empirical methodology and the result of the tests. Only the fact that a theory can be falsified should be inferred by induction (experimentation) and this “inference is purely a deductive one”. Popper discusses the role of deduction in his philosophy further by stating that deduction has a role in science. This role is to discover the implications that a theory represents so that we can criticize them accurately rather than to prove theories. One question that one might ask is how do we really go from an observation to a theory? A theory must allow for an explanation of the problem using the process of
Any hypothesis, Gould says, begins with the collection of facts. In this early stage of a theory development bad science leads nowhere, since it contains either little or contradicting evidence. On the other hand, Gould suggests, testable proposals are accepted temporarily, furthermore, new collected facts confirm a hypothesis. That is how good science works. It is self-correcting and self-developing with the flow of time: new information improves a good theory and makes it more precise. Finally, good hypotheses create logical relations to other subjects and contribute to their expansion.
In science, Hume recognized a problem with scientific causality. He saw science as being based on inductive reasoning, which results in generalized rules or principles.
...fore, I can conclude that my laptop will persist in the future. We can think that we justified our belief by providing these two premises as reasoning. However, we justified it though induction and Hume states that we have no reason in believing into the inductive argument. Our argument becomes a weak one, since the second premise is unsupported. The problem of induction raised by Hume is challenge to justified true belief account because it shows how our inductive argument about the future and unobserved does not provide a good support. Therefore, we cannot get a justified belief by applying inductive principle.
...undervalued the use of inductive reasoning, more modern logicians have embraced the value of this type of thinking and acknowledge that both inductive and deductive reasoning can be used to arrive at more thorough and accurate truths about our world and the situations that occur within it.
...h not justifiable enough to be relied. Even though the inductive reasoning has been a success in the determination of events and instances that have occurred in the past, philosophers still argue about its appropriateness, in the modern society (Earman, 2006, p.36). The problem of induction has been analyzed through various philosophical studies with the aim of finding a justifiable answer to the dilemma. The uncertainty of inductive reason forms the basis of myriad questions that engulf the justification of the approach. According to some philosophers, it is possible that some unknown phenomenon might occur, leading to justification with a known phenomenon. As aforementioned, falsification and irrationalism are some of the solutions to the induction problem. It is, therefore, imperative for individuals to falsify the beliefs through hypothesis and empirical testing.
After considering all the described points in this paper, it can be rightly said that there is a considerable difference between science and other types of knowledge.
The Deductive-Nomological (D-N) Model gives an account of explanation through its basic form, the Covering Law Model. The D-N Model asks the basic question “What is a scientific explanation?” The aim of this paper is to answer that question and further develop the definition of an explanation by problematizing the D-N Model’s account of explanation, providing a solution to one of those problems, and then further problematizing that solution. By examining the details of an example that the D-N Model explains well, we can see why this model was popular in the first place before describing two of its major problems. Then, by looking at Wesley Salmon’s account of scientific explanation, we can see just how problematic the flaws in the D-N Model
Philosophy is the study of simply questions and answers on broad topics such as the universe and our understanding of our place within it. Despite the fact these questions can seem far away from practical thought and a field such as science there connection with thought, knowledge, language and reality has provided a base for philosophy to extend to other academic fields such as science (Godfrey – Smith, 2003, p. 1,2). One question that shows the connection between the two fields is what is good science; this is the subject of both the work of Thomas Kuhn and Karl Popper. Kuhn and Popper are the most famous examples in the 20th Century of theories intended to show this but both take a different approach. Both look at what science should be and at what science is from a philosophical viewpoint but disagree on both points.