Comparing Freud's Explanation of Dreams and Davidson's Theory of Action

Comparing Freud's Explanation of Dreams and Davidson's Theory of Action

In The Interpretation of Dreams (henceforth ID) Freud claims that "the

dream is a wish-fulfilment" (der Traum ist eine Wunscherfüllung) - an

assertion which constitutes not only the title of one of the central

chapters of the book, but also one of its main theses. But what

exactly does defining the dream as the fulfilment of a wish imply?

What relation do dreams bear to desires? And how can a wish be

fulfilled in (or through) a dream? In this essay, I would like to

examine Freud's claim in his own terms, as well as in the light of the

philosophy of action, particularly that of Donald Davidson. On a

related note, I will also make an excursion into Tamas Pataki's ideas

regarding intentional character of mental phenomena.

To begin with, the fulfilment (Erfüllung) brought about by dreams must

be sharply distinguished from the satisfaction (Erfriedigung) achieved

through action in waking life. According to Freud, dreams arise as a

response of the sleeping mind to a desire which it is unwilling or

unable to satisfy, precisely because of its sleeping state. This

response consists in the purely mental enactment of the situation

desired, in such a way that the reality beyond the dream remains

unaffected. It is in this aspect that the fulfilment and the

satisfaction of desires differ for Freud: for although they are both

triggered by the subject's wish or desire, satisfaction entails the

actual modification of the state of things in reality, whereas the

fulfilment brought about by dreams only takes place in the sleeper's

mind. But this is a strange notion indeed - why w...

... middle of paper ...

... "Actions, Reasons, and Causes", in D.

Davidson (2001) Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford: OUP.

Freud, Sigmund (1913) The Interpretation of Dreams, translated by A.A.

Brill. New

York: Macmillan.

Hopkins, James (1982) "Introduction" to R. Wollheim and J. Hopkins

(eds.)

Philosophical Essays on Freud, Cambridge: CUP.

Lennon, Kathleen (1994) "Reasons and Causes", in S. Guttenplan (ed.) A

Companion

to the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Blackwell.

Pataki, Tamas (2000) "Freudian wish-fulfilment and sub-intentional

explanation", in Michael P. Levine (ed.) The Analytic Freud,

London: Routledge.

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[1] And indeed at the root of representational judgement itself, as

Freud claims in his short text on denial (Die Verneinung).