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Stress impacts on decisions
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The Causes of Space Shuttle Columbia Disaster
The Columbia Disaster was one of the most tragic events in space shuttle history. In 2003, space shuttle Columbia broke up as it returned to Earth, killing the seven astronauts. This essay will explain the major causes of the Columbia disaster which include technical issue and management issues, and illustrate how pressure impacts engineers work at NASA.
Technical issue of the Columbia disaster
The Space Shuttle Columbia disaster occurred when the orbiter disintegrated following the foam shedding, caused by the technical issue which included an inadequate understanding of foam properties as well as faulty design of the orbiter inadequate understanding of foam properties the properties of foam
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Management issue in the space shuttle Columbia disaster
Management issue was one of the major causes of the space shuttle Columbia disaster in 2003. Inadequate risk assessment and the flaw in organization culture accounted for implementation of the launch despite there were potential risks, resulting the disinfection of obiter.
Inadequate risk assessment the inadequate risk assessment which included normalisation of deviancewas one of the management issue causing the Columbia disaster. In the case of Columbia disaster, foam shedding had observed in many times in the previous flight, but it did not consider as a safety issue because the orbiter came back safely (Mannan 2012, p. 3093). It was a potential risk of the orbiter that foam shedding occurred during the launch even though it was a common phenomenon. But the engineers in NASA did not pay high attention to the potential risk. Also, extra assessment to test and analyse the property of foam did not apply. Then, engineers did not have inefficient evidence and concluded that foam shedding is acceptable based on strong belief and previous
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Due to the strict schedule, engineers had to complete the mission in a limit time (Guthrie and Shayo 2005, p.60). Engineers rush to launch the orbiter under schedule pressure in order to meet the launch pressure. The schedule pressure led to ignoring the importance of the foam strike on the previous flight and the acceptance of various problems caused by foam shedding.
It is hard to balance budget, schedule and risk at the same time. The pressure of budget and schedule increase the chance of neglecting the potential risks which was abnormal performance of different components, becoming a factor in causing the disaster.
Conclusion
Technical issue, management issue, and pressure are the main causes of Columbia disaster. Inadequate understanding of foam and faulty design cause the foam shedding. Also, the inadequate risk assessment and flaw in organization culture in NASA lead to the acceptance of foam shedding and impact the engineers’ final decision. Furthermore, engineers were under budget and schedule pressure to launch the orbiter, ignoring the potential
Engineers and scientists began trying to find what went wrong almost right away. They studied the film of the take-off. When they studied the film, they noticed a small jet of flame coming from inside the casing for one of the rocket boosters. The flame got bigger and bigger. It started to touch a strut that connected the booster to the big fuel tank attached to the space shuttle. About two or three seconds later, hydrogen began leaking from the gigantic fuel tank. About seventy-two seconds after take-off, the hydrogen caught on fire and the booster swung around. That punctured the fuel tank, which caused a big explosion.
All these factors combined lead to the crash of the aircraft. Structural and Mechanical Factors Small parts of the aircraft's number one engine pylon began to fall away shortly after takeoff. As the aircraft started its rotation, the entire number one engine separated from the wing. The engine flew up and over the left wing, falling to the runway below. In the process, it destroyed all of the hydraulic lines to the leading edge slats.
NASA has faced many tragedies during their time; but one can question if two of the tragedies were preventable by changing some critical decisions made by the organization. The investigation board looking at the decisions made for the space shuttle tragedies of the Columbia and Challenger noted that the “loss resulted as much from organizational as from technical failures” (Bolman & Deal, 2008, p. 191). The two space shuttle tragedies were about twenty years apart, they both had technical failures but politics also played a factor in to these two tragedies.
for the workers of the company. All the blame is not due to poor design and construction flaws, but to the oil companies for not teaching the employees about the system. This disaster could have been prevented if the engineers and oil companies were not blinded by their ignorant beliefs that the Ocean Ranger was unsinkable. Citations 1. http://www.canadianheritage.org/reproductions/21050.htm.
Lack of proper risk management process: NASA was using a simple risk classification system and the methods used were only qualitative. There was a lack of proper technical and quantitative risk management methods that could have helped them identify the risks and eliminate them.
It took NASA a couple years to resume its flight to orbit. The catastrophe of the space shuttle challenger shook them up and have rethink their procedures and methods of operation. NASA, improve or I should say worked on developing its shuttle management structure, its shuttle safety panel, critical review and hazard policy, communication, safety organization and many more.
The Challenger disaster of 1986 was a shock felt around the country. During liftoff, the shuttle exploded, creating a fireball in the sky. The seven astronauts on board were killed and the shuttle was obliterated. Immediately after the catastrophe, blame was spread to various people who were in charge of creating the shuttle and the parts of the shuttle itself. The Presidential Commission was decisive in blaming the disaster on a faulty O-ring, used to connect the pieces of the craft. On the other hand, Harry Collins and Trevor Pinch, in The Golem at Large, believe that blame cannot be isolated to any person or reason of failure. The authors prove that there are too many factors to decide concretely as to why the Challenger exploded. Collins and Pinch do believe that it was the organizational culture of NASA and Morton Thiokol that allowed the disaster. While NASA and Thiokol were deciding whether to launch, there was not a concrete reason to postpone the mission.
It’s very hard to say what steps, if any, could have been taken to prevent the Space Shuttle Columbia disaster from occurring. When mankind continues to “push the envelope” in the interest of bettering humanity, there will always be risks. In the manned spaceflight business, we have always had to live with trade-offs. All programs do not carry equal risk nor do they offer the same benefits. The acceptable risk for a given program or operation should be worth the potential benefits to be gained. The goal should be a management system that puts safety first, but not safety at any price. As of Sept 7th, 2003, NASA has ordered extensive factory inspections of wing panels between flights that could add as much as three months to the time it takes to prepare a space shuttle orbiter for launch. NASA does all it can to safely bring its astronauts back to earth, but as stated earlier, risks are expected.
Overall, the Columbia space shuttle contributed a great deal to space exploration, from its construction in 1981, to its destruction while reentering earth’s atmosphere in 2003. The Columbia brought a new era of space exploration, and during its twenty-nine missions had many firsts in space. The Columbia space shuttle was important to space exploration because it used new technology that changed space travel, completed missions that other spacecraft could not, and brought new people into space.
In 1986, the Challenger crew met at NASA's Kennedy Space Center for countdown training. The crew of this shuttle included two civilians and five astronaut members: “Teacher-in-Space” payload specialist Christa McAuliffe; payload specialist Gregory Jarvis; and astronauts Judith A. Resnik, mission specialist; Dick Scobee, mission commander; Ronald E. McNair, mi...
In conclusion, many contribution factors led to the Crossair flight 3597 crash but is mainly triggered by Crossair’s incapability of assessment, pilot error and lastly the air traffic controller. Analysis of a flight crash is important so that we will know the causes, thus being able tackle it, making sure that there are no other flight crashes like Crossair flight 3597.
After the accident, a full-scale investigation was launched by the United States National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). It concluded that the accident was caused by metal fatigue exacerbated by crevice corrosion, the corrosion is exacerbated by the salt water and the age of the aircraft was already 19 years old as the plane operated in a salt water environment.
Safety in the ethics and industry of aerospace technology is of prime importance for preventing tragic malfunctions and crashes. Opposed to automobiles for example, if an airplane breaks down while in mid-flight, it has nowhere to go but down. And sadly it will often go down “hard” and with a high probability of killing people. The Engineering Code of Ethics states first and foremost that, “Engineers shall hold paramount the safety, health and welfare of the public.” In the aerospace industry, this as well holds very true, both in manufacturing and in air safety itself. Airline safety has recently become a much-debated topic, although arguments over air safety and travel have been going ...
Rodney Rocha is a NASA engineer and co-chair of Debris Assessment Team (DTS). When possibility of wing damage appeared he requested an additional imagery to obtain more information in order to evaluate the damage. This demonstrates that he actually tried to resolve the issue. However, due to absence of clear organizational responsibilities in NASA those images were never received. Since foam issue was there for years and risk for the flights was estimated as low management decided not to proceed with this request. After learning of management decision Rocha wrote an e-mail there he stated that foam damage could carry grave hazard and have to be addressed. At the same time this e-mail was not send to the management team. Organizational culture at NASA could be described as highly bureaucratic with operations under standard procedures only. Low-end employees like Rocha are afraid to bring any safety-related issues to the management due to delay of the mission. They can be punished for bringing “bad news”. This type of relationship makes it impossible for two-way communication between engineers and managers, which are crucial for decision-making in complex env...
The primary cause is of airplane accidents does at some stage contain an element of a person being unable to discharge his duties correctly and in an accurate manner. More than 53% accidents are the result of ignorance or faults by the pilot during flight. Other staff is responsible for about 8% accidents. The most obvious errors by pilot are made during the take off or landing on the runway. Additionally errors can occur during the maintenance of the airplane outside the plane, whereby a lack of thorough inspection and oversight can lead to complication during mid-flight. Fueling and loading of the plane also sometimes create problems (Shapiro, 2001).