Columbia Accident Essay

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The Columbia Accident: An Analysis of the Growth and Demise of Administrative Power

Overview
On February 1, 2003, seven astronauts perished as the Space Shuttle Columbia (STS-107) disintegrated over Texas upon reentry into the Earth’s atmosphere. During Columbia’s launch on January 16, 2003, a briefcase sized piece of foam insulation from the external fuel tank struck the left wing and led to much discussion amongst NASA administrators and engineers during the 16 day mission (Howell, 2013). The use and misuse of administrative power during these 16 days and prior to the launch of the fateful mission has produced many debates about what went right and what went wrong at NASA.
Background/History
In April of 1992, Daniel S. Goldin was appointed …show more content…

This was clearly demonstrated in the Columbia accident on the part of each key member of the Space Shuttle team. Sean O’Keefe wanted to carry on Daniel Goldin’s philosophy of “faster, better, cheaper” remaining consistent with President Clinton’s federal plan of maximizing the efficiency of the U. S. Government while reducing the economic burden to the taxpayers (Stillman & Casamayou, 2010). Unfortunately with that philosophy becoming the expectation rather than the goal, the allowances for delays in task completion were minimal. Managers did not want to hear about potential safety concerns that jeopardized shuttle launches or interfered with scientific research. Both of these issues were possible with the frequent “foam strikes” noted during shuttle launches. Unfortunately, when reading an e-mail from J. “Steve” Stich from Johnson Space Center Mission Control to Columbia Shuttle Commander Rick D. Husband, you find that this allowance had led to a change in the mentality of safety consciousness. Stich stated, “debris…came loose and subsequently impacted the orbiter left wing” (2003). He further stated that “Experts have reviewed… and there is no concern for RCC or tile damage.” This sounds promising to a crew that is in outer space and knows that damage to the RCC (Reinforced Carbon-Carbon) on the shuttle’s underside could surely mean catastrophic failure (Dumoulin, 2014). The problematic statement was “We have seen this same phenomenon on several other flights and there is absolutely no concern for entry” (Stich, 2003). This wasn’t the case as many engineers and safety managers did not agree with this assessment. They had even gone as far as to request satellite photographs of the hull of the Columbia to be obtained by the Department of Defense to rule out significant

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