The nature of COIN is not to fix, but to preserve or claim the state’s authority. It is a form of “counter-warfare” that morphs in response to changes in the character of an insurrection, meaning that the narrow and technical meaning of COIN relies on the definition of insurgency. The strategy in COIN must changes and adapt to the type of insurgency. There have been many approaches to COIN, where some have failed and few have won. The objective of COIN is to obtain enough intelligence to identify the insurgents that hide among the population. Securing and isolating the population from insurgency is a key strategy in COIN. States that provide awareness through the use of propaganda and having a daily interaction with the population which can help the …show more content…
In both cases you are dealing with civilians. In COIN war trying to win the population and coercing them in an attempt to isolate them from insurgents is quite difficult. Punishment strategy and brutality will kill large body of the population, but it can make clear the authority of the state. Machiavelli states that selective brutality is necessary to make it apparent who is in charge. Selective violence can pose your authority and will. How much violence is enough? And what works and doesn’t work differ from country to country. Countries that result to brute force want to stay in power and in many cases such like the counterinsurgency strategy in Vietnam, where the US lost the war because they assume only one type of model. The US was unable to clearly identify the root of the situation. The US different understand its adversary and its environment. The US was unable to analyze and identify the type of insurgency it faced as a result the US was unable to implement a model fix to that type of insurgency. Unable to identify its adversary made the war more costly and ineffective. Brutally can be the only alternative when your adversary are funding
Kelly, D. M. (2011). The Kunar Adt and the Afghan Coin Fight. Bloomington: AuthorHouse. Retrieved November 05, 2010, from books.google.co.ke/books?isbn=1456753045
The failure came from inside the United States. There were a lot of protests against the war. Those protests included moms who had their sons on the battle field, the people who found war was a waste of their tax revenue and the people who favored peace. That was too much for a president to calm down his citizens, and be in charge in a war in another country at the same time. The war did not get enough support from the Americans. Another matter was that the United States did not have the right strategy in this war. They took actions slowly and indecisively. Instead of fighting North Vietnam andVietcong by itself, which might lead to victory, the U.S wasted their effort on the weak Saigon government. The failure in the Vietnam War proves that the power and influence of the United States is not limitless. The United States has its steady place in the world order, but there is nothing for sure in this world of diversity. Therefore, the United States has to adapt itself to the development of the world not as a flawless country, but as a developed
The Vietnam War was one of the most prolonged wars in US history. Although there were no exact dates, it is believed that US involvement lasted for around 20 years. The US went into this war hoping they could stop the spread of communism and defeat the northern Vietnamese. The battles were like nothing they had seen before and it was very difficult for the soldiers to differentiate between the enemies and civilians. To make it even more difficult for the soldiers, their “information was based on faulty intelligence”. Võ Nguyên Giáp, a northern Vietnamese general, believed that the US and the southern Vietnamese had an unstable relationship. He hoped that through the Tet Offensive the US would believe they were no longer worth defending. Fighting was done using guerrilla warfare which blurred the lines of legitimate and illegitimate killings and this had effect of bringing peoples morales down. Support for the war had always been split but this battle caused even the government to reconsider their involvement. The Tet offensive changed the US's attitude towards the Vietnam war by leading to further anti-war protests, a credibility gap in America, and for President Johnson to negotiate peace and not seek reelection.
The Outsiders by S.E. Hinton proves the point that violence can be justified if necessary. To inflict change in their lives people often fight with violence instead of peace to evoke change. The world strives for change everyday whether or not you like it. How the people create a change in society whether they use peace or war, it is up to them to decide how to modify our ever changing world. Violence and fight between the Socs and Greasers tells us that both can be justified if it inflicts positive change in society. ‘
Violence in all of its manifestations is based on an exercise of power. It represents a means to gain power, to maintain power, or as a response to a threat to one's power. As long as a society maintains the legitimacy of social hierarchies, of the right of some people to have power over others, there will be violence. One can either seek to diffuse the concentration of power or to control violence. By its very character, the attempt to control violence is self-defeating. The control will itself become violent.
the role of the state and also from the perspective of how the decision to fight impacts the
Have you ever wondered what events, conditions, and leadership decisions caused America to be unsuccessful in the Vietnam War? The way that the war was fought favored the Northern Vietnamese and was a big factor in giving the Viet Cong an edge over the Americans. The tactics that the Northern Vietnamese used, the number of soldiers that the United States sent over plus the conditions they were put into, and the changing of US Presidents part way through the war all play vital roles in making Vietnam unachievable. The Northern Vietnamese Army, NVA, used many war tactics that helped them with the war but the most notable was the use of guerrilla warfare. “By 1961, guerrilla warfare was widespread in South Vietnam” (Anderson).
'We Fought a military war; Opponents our Fought a political one. We sought physical attrition, Opponents Aimed for our psychological exhaustion. In the process, we lost sight of one of the cardinal maxims of guerilla war. The guerilla wins if he does not lose, the conventional army loses if it does not win. The North Vietnamese used their forces the way a bullfighter uses its cape - to keep us lunging into areas of marginal political importance. ' (Kissinger, 1969, 214)
The North Vietnamese Communist leadership's ability to reassess and adapt during the Vietnam War was reflected in how well they combined guerilla and conventional operations to achieve their strategic goal of unifying Vietnam under communist rule. Throughout the conflict, the Viet Cong (VC) were employed to conduct guerilla operations while North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and VC "main force" units were used to transition to conventional operations. Guerilla operations enabled Hanoi to inflict a steady flow of casualties on US forces which increased anti-war sentiment in America. NVA and VC main force conventional operations reinforced the US Army's conventional approach to the fight which caused the Americans to alienate the people of South Vietnam. By alienating the South Vietnamese people, the Americans enhanced the VC's ability to conduct guerilla operations and control rural population centers which weakened the credibility of the Government of South Vietnam (GVN). The combined effects of guerilla and conventional operations supported the North Vietnamese strategy of a protracted conflict that was sure to weaken the resolve of the United States and eventually defeat the GVN.
The truth of the matter is that violence is such an effective and valuable means of settling differences that most governments demand to have a monopoly on its use.
...milar restrictions in their operations, and this ultimately led to the U.S. defeat. Perhaps if President Johnson and his politically oriented advisors would have listened to and followed the advice given by the military advisors actually in-theatre they would have been able to develop rules of engagement that aided supported the U.S. forces more fairly and allowed more freedom in tactics and thus resulting in the war being won. In the aftermath of this war US policy makers and in fact whole governments came to the same realisation. Once a situation has devolved to the point where war is seen to be the best action taken, the politics must be et aside and the proffessional war fighters be allowed to take the lead in order to gain a favorable outcome.
Among many reasons, one of the two biggest factors in the loss of the war was America’s foreign policy and how bad the US underestimated how important freedom and independence was to the people of Vietnam. On top of that, the US used the wrong military strategy, instead of focusing on limiting collateral damage, the US used heavy artillery that killed citizens and alienated would-be supporters. There was political corruption in South Vietnamese governments, which meant that they could not build an alternative to the NLF. At home, the public opinion of the war was decreasing at a constant rate and demonstrations were at an all time high. Everything that could go wrong did go wrong, and these problems all contributed to a Vietnam tour that went horribly wrong and an attitude among the American people that was growing ever doubtful of their government.
...their power willingly. Violence must be utilized to achieve freedom, to pry it from the hands of those that hold it and give it to those that seek it.
Thinking historically while conducting counterinsurgency in the 21st century poses questions regarding how to develop political and strategic plans. This bibliographic essay will examine the political and military aspect of fighting counterinsurgent warfare by 20th century theorists Galula’s, “Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice” and Trinquier’s, “Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice”. Strategy in fighting guerilla wars will be discussed by comparing conflicts in battles and ideologies from the past to current day. Moreover, ways to avoid the one size fits all war mentality when combating modern day insurgents will be recommended.
Terrorist organizations have been committing atrocities against innocent civilians throughout the world for hundreds of years. Terrorism has evolved in many different forms and from various motivations such as religious protest movements, political revolts, and social uprisings. Regardless of the motives for terror, the problem is the financing of terrorism and terrorist organizations themselves. Recent global terrorist attacks using high technology and extensive networks have shown that money is essential to provide the means behind all terrorist activities. Individual terrorists plan terrorist operations and require resources to live, prepare, and implement their plans. The use of money laundering and financial support schemes are the root of the cause. If money laundering were curtailed or even eliminated, and financial supporters of terrorism were identified terrorism would decrease dramatically. To achieve these goals would take monumental efforts. The United States, United Nations and all sovereign nations would need to take cooperative action that has never been accomplished. Terrorism, its' history, concepts, reasoning, methods, and financial roots are object of this research.