Chipyong-Ni Battle Analysis

In June 1950, following World War II, North Korea and China invaded South Korea and the Korean War began . Seventeen countries in the United Nations and the United States sent armies to help defend the people of South Korea. The Battle of Chipyong-Ni was an important battle and victory for COL Paul L. Freeman and the United Nations, especially after the defeat in the previous days before this battle. This battle is sometimes described as the Gettysburg Battle of that era . Even with the fear of being over ran by the Chinese, COL Freeman was extremely successful using mission command during his two-day battle at Chipyong-Ni.
Before the Battle at Chipyong-Ni, COL Freeman and the 23rd Regimental Combat Team had an important decision to make.

On February 1, COL Freeman and his troops had to set up a perimeter defense in order to secure Chipyong-Ni from the Chinese’s advances east of Seoul. Over the next couple of days, COL Freeman continued to reinforce their perimeter with artillery, tanks and engineer elements. COL Freeman’s regiment included three Infantry Battalions, the French Infantry Battalion and First Ranger Company. Attached was a unit from each of the 37th Field Artillery Battalion, 82nd Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion, and 503rd Field Artillery Battalion COL Freeman’s supporting units consisted of the 2nd Engineer Battalion and a platoon from the 2nd Medical Battalion. COL Freeman had about 4,500 Soldiers under his command.
A few days before the battle at Chipyong-Ni, the Chinese attached X Corps at Wonju causing the unit to repositioned south and leaving COL Freeman and his regiment behind enemy lines. The Chinese goal then, was to send the entire 39th Army with the support divisions of the 40th and 42nd armies, approximately 130,000 Soldiers were used, to encircle Chipyong-Ni.
During this battle COL Freeman did a great jobby taking prudent risk, while conducting a recon of the area, he decided to seize and secure the valley, due to the limited resources . In doing so, this allowed his perimeter to be only a mile versus seizing the mountainous terrain, which would have stretched his troops to cover almost 4 miles. COL Freeman knew the risk that the Chinese were coming due to the massive loss in the days prior . With the intelligence received from GEN Almond , COL Freeman, thusly continued to build and dig in around his perimeter . With the uncertainty that the enemy could completely surround his units, he ensured his crew-served weapons were strategically placed along his perimeter in order to ensure an assured victory.
He continued to effectively execute the elements of mission command when it came to his plans with keeping the Soldiers alive. The weather in Korea was extremely harsh during the winter. Soldiers received small heaters to stay warm prior to the battle. One Soldier wrote “The one thing we had in abundant supply is canned heat. Upon arrival, our sleeping bags were taken and issued two blankets. Sleeping bags keep troops just too dam warm, and men go to sleep when they get warm. And men who go to sleep are liable to end up with a bayonet up their ass ”. COL Freeman knew the risk of the cold, but knew the greater risk of Soldiers falling asleep in their fox holes would equal death.
During COL Freeman’s preparation, he displayed a great understanding to mission command’s principle for mission order.

COL Freeman took pride in communicating with his battalion commanders . This was extremely beneficial when it came to the day of 14 February 1951. On this day, COL Freeman called all his commanders in and briefed them on the mission ahead and gave them the warning that he believed the enemy would attack them at the weakest moment, at night. Included in his brief was information about the Chinese would attack their perimeter in overwhelming numbers as soon as night fell. The intelligence was beneficial for commanders so they could plan accordingly for the events of the evening . The Soldiers were even aware of the activities planned . One Soldier wrote “I have been told to keep my carbine on semi-automatic” which shows he knew the order and was awaiting to see the enemy to begin the engagement. The Soldiers knew the mission was to stand their ground and not waiver. When morning would come the air strikes would begin pushing back the Chinese and giving them time to

resupply.
COL Freeman also created a shared understanding under his command with his regiment and attached battalions, to include his coalition forces. The attack that night was so fierce, COL Freeman was injured by incoming mortar rounds . The wounds that COL Freeman received did not stop him to continue on and preserver . Selflessly he constantly did a battle field circulation in order to ensure his commanders and Soldiers were aware of his plan . In order to keep the Soldier’s morale at the highest, COL Freeman, while injured continued to survey the perimeter alone, it was stated that he was the determining factor that kept his regiment together.
Another example of this principle was with the French . There was an incident where the French Soldiers were burning fires throughout the camp the night before the battle. He spoke with the French Army GEN Ralph Monclar about how his Soldiers needed to put the fire out or risk reviling their position. In doing so, the small fires that were around the camp quickly went out. COL Freeman stated
“Perhaps earlier in the war they might have complained about the climb, but no longer. They have learned by then that the hard way was the better way; that those who stayed on the road were more likely to be ambushed and die .” With the previous battle at the Twin Tunnels, Soldiers had a shared understanding to listen to their officers and were not second guessing orders given by their commanders.
COL Freeman continued to display and use the principles of mission command while providing a clear commander’s intent. Even when there was a possibility of repositioning the forces south, the soldiers knew what the intent was. At first, the intent was to locate the Chinese army. COL Freeman had intelligence from GEN Almond that the enemy was located in the general area, but due to the mountainous terrain it was difficult to pinpoint the exact location. So in order to provide COL Freeman with additional information, he dispatched out a small recon team. The intent was to locate the enemy and provide a status report of the amount of enemy forces weapons and supplies and furthermore not to engage . This faction was successful and quickly briefed COL Freeman on the activities and that his fears of being completed surrounded was coming true .
COL Freeman’s intent was to seize and secure the city of Chipyong-Ni while providing each unit with their area of operation and sectors of fires within the perimeter. The perimeter was broken into a square and each unit knew the area of the perimeter to defend. Even when the Soldiers heard the area come under attack, each area held their position until further instruction. The units were well aware if they were to leave their area of operation the Chinese could have easily over ran their defensive position which would have caused ultimate defeat.
Throughout the battle COL Freeman had to face many decisions, especially with the mission command principle to exercise discipline initiative.

He struggled since 1 February with the decision to break contact or continuing to secure Chipyong-Ni. Especially after the battle in the Twin Tunnels. During that battle, he was furious with GEN Almond with his aggressive tactics. He felt as if he was causing them to lose too many Soldiers. He asked on many occasion to break contact and occupy land 15 miles South of Chipyong-Ni. COL Freeman exercised discipline while having his regiment stay at Chipyong-Ni and continue to build up their defense. Up to the day of the battle, COL Freeman was finally granted permission to leave, but felt it was too late and GEN Ridgeway wanted the Soldiers to stay and defend that area, while promising that reinforcements will be on the way. Even with the fear of losing Soldiers, COL Freeman continued to exercise discipline initiative throughout this

battle.
COL Freeman had great success in building a cohesive team. A Soldier wrote:
“I can do nothing but sit and stare up the draw and wish I had the confidence Colonel Freeman had shown as he was making rounds of the perimeter all by his lonesome .”
COL Freeman continued building a cohesive team, despite the near zero weather and the dimensioning supplies. His battle field circulation showed that he cared about his troops, especially because of the high causality rate during this war. The Soldiers were uplifted by his very presence on the battle field giving them that extra confidence and willingness to fight. Stories echoed through the regiment on how COL Freeman stood up to GEN Almond, telling him he was “playing into the Chinese hands. That he needed to learn to be modest and was stretching the soldiers thin .”
COL Freeman also continued to build trust and comradery with the French Army. The American Soldiers were happy to fight with them knowing that their flanks would be covered. GEN Ridgeway? spoke to congress and said “I shall speak briefly of the Twenty-third United States Infantry Regiment, Colonel Paul L. Freeman commanding, [and] with the French Battalion….Isolated far in advance of the general battle line, completely surrounded in near-zero weather, they repelled repeated assaults by day and night by vastly superior numbers of Chinese. They were finally relieved….I want to say that these American fighting men, with their French comrades-in-arms, measured up in every way to the battle conduct of the finest troops America and France have produced throughout their national existence.” COL Freeman’s superior recognized that this regiment would not have been successful without him.
In conclusion, COL Freeman was successful in using the principles of mission command. He was not afraid to speak his mind and look out for the wellbeing of his Soldiers. He was more concerned about taking the hard right over the easy yes and was aggressive when it came to protecting the lives of his Soldiers. His stand with the 23rd Regiment at Chipyong-Ni was a learning point for the United States and United Nations on how to fight the Chinese when they had the overwhelming numbers. With this battle the COL Freeman casualties were 51 killed, 250 wounded (including himself), and 42 missing. The ChinsesChinese had a loss with 1,000 killed and over 2,000 wounded. This was a turning point and a moral boost to the United Nations. The Chinese leadership stated:
In the conduct of the battle…battle command, we have underestimated the enemy. In view of their past characteristics in battle, we expected the enemy to flee at Chipyong-Ni, after the enemy at Hoengsong was annihilated.