De Gaulle's foreign policy was possibly one of his most controversial legacies. He returned to power in 1958 with the determination to elevate France to a prominent international role. De Gaulle’s ultimate goal was to re-establish France’s standing as a first rate power that in the words of one historian, exemplified “independence and grandeur.” In his war memoirs, de Gaulle presented ‘une certain idée de la France’, it was his belief that France had a great destiny to fulfil: ‘All my life, I have thought of France in a certain way … France is not really herself unless in the front rank … Only vast enterprises are capable of counterbalancing the ferments of dispersal which are inherent in her people … In short, to my mind, France cannot be France without greatness’. This vision was the foundation of his foreign and defence policies.
His concept of a “European Europe” was tied to the notion of a Europe “from the Atlantic to the Urals.” The basic idea here was that the two hegemonic powers, America and USSR, would gradually loosen their grip over their respective scopes of influence in Europe; and Europe would gain independence. The Cold War initiated this vision and as a result he created enemies in Washington.
Collapse of colonial empire/force de frappe/multi-polar
In relation to de Gaulle’s desire to raise France to the status of a great nation, he believed that France should possess its own nuclear weapon, ‘force de frappe’. De Gaulle was in favour of a shift towards a multi-polar world of nation states in which middle-sized powers would play a greater role. In terms of policies and objectives, De Gaulle did not develop a compelling case. He did not articulate detailed plans of how international stability would ha...
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...orld order in which France would act as a great power. European states did not share his optimistic view of Soviet intentions. They believed a strong alliance with the United States was necessary to deter Soviet political ambitions and military capabilities. This view was reinforced in 1968 with the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.
Economic
France lacked the economic and financial foundation to compete against the United States and Soviet Union as the leader of a bloc of nations. Third World countries especially looked to the two superpowers for economic and developmental assistance, and they linked their political allegiance to the receipt of such aid. France, as a middle-class power with an average amount of resources, simply did not possess the means necessary to fulfil this role. This can be seen as a hindrance to the success of de Gaulle’s foreign policy.
...was not to preserve peace, but to preserve the sovereignty and independence of the states of Europe against potential aggressors. The basic rule was to ally against any state threatening domination. The weaker countries would seek alliance with the other weaker states. They would thus create a balance or counterweight against the state whose ascendancy they feared.
De Conde, Alexander. The Quasi-War: The Politics and Diplomacy of the Undeclared War with France
However, when confronted with a strict policy of appeasement, by both the French and the English, the stage was set for a second World War. Taylor constructs a powerful and effective argument by expelling certain dogmas that painted Hitler as a madman, and by evaluating historical events as a body of actions and reactions, disagreeing with the common idea that the Axis had a specific program from the start. The book begins with the conclusion of the First World War, by exploring the idea that critical mistakes made then made a second war likely, yet not inevitable. Taylor points out that although Germany was defeated on the Western front, “Russia fell out of Europe and ceased to exist, for the time being, as a Great Power. The constellation of Europe was profoundly changed—and to Germany’s advantage.”
As almost anyone with the slightest knowledge of European history can tell you, the French and the British do not like each other. Some French and British people still hate each other today for issues that occurred 100 of years ago. So on top of the conflict that is already present between France and Great Britain there is a new one in the pursuit of gaining more land and power for one’s cou...
A major part of this involves past actions between the two partners, and can one do with with little cost to themselves. In terms of past actions, France had little to rely on. France lost the Franco-Prussian war to Germany and was essentially destroyed by Germany in World War I. With Germany eventually crippled, France could easily enforce the Treaty of Versailles, but when Germany ran out of available payment, France could not force the Germans to pay anything else and so the economy collapsed. In response Great Britain and the United States send aid relief which caused the public to view the France as the bad guy. France decides to not to demand any more reparations, and will not demand any without the consent of the British, so in a sense the French just lost all of the credibility that they could have
Since “The Sun King” took the throne, France has been in debt, in a long series of wars, and restricted the rights of Frances’ citizens.
As a permanent member of The UN Security Council and one of the founding countries of European Union, France has very complex multilateral relationships.
...France paid more attention to what happened to the people and the tension between them and America.
This paper will explore the reasons behind Great Britain’s decision to turn against its ally France during the early years of World War II. More specifically, this paper will look deeper into why British Prime Minister Winston Churchill decided the best option for Great Britain, at the time, was to attack the French fleet located at Mers-el-Kébir on July 3, 1940. It will describe how Churchill’s decision to attack the French fleet at Mers-el-Kébir was detrimental to prevent Germany from completely turning the tide of the war in its favor. The attack of the French fleet at Mers-el-Kébir was truly devastating to France; however, this attack gave Great Britain the leverage it needed to stand its ground and to keep fighting in the war. This paper argues that Churchill ordered the attack
De Gaulle protested against America’s strong role in the organization and what he perceived as a special relationship between it and the United Kingdom. In a memorandum sent to President dwight D. Eisenhower and Prime Minister Harold Macmillan on 17 September 1958, he argued for the creation of a Tripartite directorate that would put France on an equal footing with the US and the UK. Considering the response to be unsatisfactory, De Gaulle began constructing and independent defence force for his country. He wanted to give France, into a larger NATO-Warsaw Pact War. In February 1959, France withdrew its Mediterranean Fleet from NATO command, and later banned the stationing of foreign nuclear weapons on French soil. This caused the United States to transfer two hundred military aircraft out of France and return control of the air force bases that had operated in France since 1950 to the French by
With all the glory and the splendour that some countries may have experienced, never has history seen how only only one man, Napoleon, brought up his country, France, from its most tormented status, to the very pinnacle of its height in just a few years time. He was a military hero who won splendid land-based battles, which allowed him to dominate most of the European continent. He was a man with ambition, great self-control and calculation, a great strategist, a genius; whatever it was, he was simply the best. But, even though how great this person was, something about how he governed France still floats among people's minds. Did he abuse his power? Did Napoleon defeat the purpose of the ideals of the French Revolution? After all of his success in his military campaigns, did he gratify the people's needs regarding their ideals on the French Revolution? This is one of the many controversies that we have to deal with when studying Napoleon and the French Revolution. In this essay, I will discuss my opinion on whether or not was he a destroyer of the ideals of the French Revolution.
“The Great Depression struck France later, but harder, than other countries” (European Response 116). The country was in deep trouble, but “France managed to maintain a false prosperity for a while because of its large gold holdings. By the early 1930s, it too suffered rising unemployment and budget deficits. Ministry after ministry took power, then collapsed within months” (European Response 116). Consequently, France endured disarray in the public and political instability which required the attention of France’s dynamic government and its resources. The French government was focused was on internal affairs and not international affairs, such as Germany’s military actions. With thought employed elsewhere, France was unengaged with the international events and entanglements of
... has been shown in 1792, there were many different individuals and groups which hoped to be strengthened by war. Napoleon had crushed opposition at home by his victories abroad. French foreign policy had become a reflection of the uncertainties of French government, France and the French people had acquired the reputation of being restless and dangerous as they involved the rest of Europe in their quest for a regime that would prove to be permanent and satisfactory. France had always been living dangerously.
This reform kept the basic parliamentary system of the 1958 Constitution intact, including the collective responsibility of the government to the National Assembly, but introduced the direct election of the president. This reform had long been sought after by President Charles de Gaulle and particular events in 1962 gave him the opportunity to propose a referendum to bring about such a change. The change was subsequently approved in the popular vote. President de Gaulle was returned to power in the first direct election in 1965 and he remained in office for another 4 years. De Gaulle’s presidential successors lacked his personal authority, but by then the expectation of presidential leadership had become the norm. As we have also noted, France came to be the ideational default case of semi-presidentialism. Therefore, when scholars pictured a semi-presidential regime, they pictured a post-1962 Gaullist-type system with a president with ‘quite considerable’ powers who was in a position to exercise decisive leadership, though in conjunction with a parliamentary-style prime minister who was fundamentally loyal but who also enjoyed at least some independent political authority by virtue of having the confidence of
Ludlow, N. P. (2007). European Integration and the Cold War: Ostpolitik-Westpolitik, 1965-1973. London: Taylor & Francis.