The Undeclared War With France

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The Undeclared War With France At the end of the 18th century, an undeclared war was going on between the United States and France because of the recent XYZ affair; triggering a positive reaction by Federalists like Fisher Ames to convince the authorities to make the war official. Not knowing what to do, President John Adams appointed former-President George Washington as commander of the army to hopefully resolve the issue with France through diplomacy (as was Washington's stance). A close friend of Essex Junto, a group of influential Federalists, Fisher Ames stood out as an offensive speaker to positively press forward with the idea of declaration of war against France. After all, they had begun to cheat the United States from its international trades with them, press their laws on the United States when it had not agreed to abide by them, and even destroy United States merchant and military vessels with the intent to convert its crew for its own bidding. There was no way an upstanding man would allow these events to occur without at least attempting to pursue a formal and just war with the parties involved, even if it included constant urging to all in power to make such actions occur. It had seemed that ambiguity was arise in the forming nation, and was still establishing a central ideal for political issues to which it had no precedent. Would the strategy be to declare to the public a message of brutal warfare against a savage nation? Or the protection of the United States and its freedoms by a self-defensive action of declaring war against its former ally? Both would be approached vigorously by Ames to attempt to inform the public and gather a central and nationalized view in order to succeed against these heinous a... ... middle of paper ... ...mes. Spying and internal affairs were not looked upon by the general citizens as it had not occurred to them that any such actions could be taking place in their sovereign state, but it was pointed out by Ames that internal foes could do twice as much war to them as an open war, and urged them to once fight for their own battles, instead of shying away from them. The hope of peace was strong enough to furnish the popular influence and delusion of the citizens and distracted them in the exercise of duty (De Conde). 4 Ames, Seth. Works of Fisher Ames. Boston, 1854, Vol. I, pp.232-235. Bowman, Albert. The Struggle for Neutrality: Franco-American Diplomacy during the Federalist Era. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1974. De Conde, Alexander. The Quasi-War: The Politics and Diplomacy of the Undeclared War with France 1797-1801. New York: Scribner's, 1966.

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