Arguments against Moore's Beliefs of Moral Intuition

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In this paper I plan to argue against Moore’s beliefs of moral intuition. I will show that while there may be something that is moral intuition, it is not a set of standards that can be directly applied to every single person. I will show how there are difference scenarios and situations that one must take into account before making and argument using moral intuition.

The first argument that I will bring up is that of cultural relativism. It is widely accepted that different cultures, whether that be as simply as regional or global, have different ways of viewing life. While one culture may find one thing to be socially acceptable another may find the same to be completely taboo.

To begin this argument I would like to cite the works of Richmond Campbell in “Moral Epistemology”(Campbell 2003.) In this he states that “Moral knowledge exists, but moral facts are relative to the social group in which moral sensibility is formed with the result that no moral truths are known to hold universally.” While it may be fair to judge someone of your own culture off of your moral intuition, the statement above shows that you cannot equally transfer this moral judgment to another culture. Campbell uses the argument of a woman wearing a veil over her face. He says that while in one culture this may be morally wrong, in another there is nothing wrong with it. (Campbell 2003.) Through the eyes of your average American this would seem morally wrong. By doing this you are shaming a woman, or hiding her from the world. But, you must look at this through the context of the culture. In the countries that this ideology originated there is nothing wrong with a woman covering the majority of her body. In these cultures women tend to be much more mode...

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...n (Alexander.)

Following the logic above you can gain, oddly enough, that following moral intuitions, is actually morally wrong. I say this because leaning on moral intuition alone goes against both beneficence and self-improvement in regards to prima facie duties.

Works Cited

Campbell, R. (2003, February 4). Moral Epistemology. Stanford University. Retrieved May 1, 2014, from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-epistemology/

Intuitionism. (n.d.). Intuitionism. Retrieved May 2, 2014, from http://www.philosophy.uncc.edu/mleldrid/SzCMT/intuit.html

Alexander, J., & Weinberg, J. (2009, January 1). The "Unreliability" of Epistemic Intuitions . . Retrieved May 2, 2014, from http://www.siena.edu/uploadedfiles/home/academics/schools_and_departments/school_of_liberal_arts/philosophy/Alexander%20&%20Weinberg.The%20Unreliability%20of%20Epistemic%20Intuitions.pdf

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