Wait a second!
More handpicked essays just for you.
More handpicked essays just for you.
Ethics and science
Ethics in natural sciences
Ethics in natural sciences
Don’t take our word for it - see why 10 million students trust us with their essay needs.
Recommended: Ethics and science
The philosopher Gilbert Harman argues for skepticism about morality, claiming that moral observations are not reliable and shouldn’t be trusted since the is no good reason to believe otherwise. By holding this view there is then a lack of evidence for or against moral disagreement. I will argue that Harman’s argument is a good one. In this essay I will explain Harman’s argument, I will then propose objections to show how it might fail and argue why as to why the criticisms wouldn’t succeed.
According to Harman observation requires belief and while physical facts can help explain the things we observe, moral facts don’t. On his paper he attempts to differentiate observations in science from those in ethics to support skepticism about moral facts. He explains that when we judge a situation in ethics we move directly to the moral judgement, we see a situation as wrong as a direct observation that the act itself is wrong with no required reasoning. Therefore, our judgements reflect our own moral framework, not the right or wrongness of the act.
…show more content…
As presented in class, Harman theorizes that we can have knowledge of moral facts only if we can test moral claims about observational evidence.
To do so, an observation must count as evidence by supporting the claim that P if the best explanation of what caused the observation includes the fact that P. So we can have knowledge of moral facts only if it is possible for there to be an observation such that the best explanation of what caused the observation includes a moral fact. It is not possible for there to be an observation such that the best explanation of what caused the observation includes a moral fact. Hence, we cannot have knowledge of moral
facts. Harman’s argument appears to be valid, so the only way to show it fails would be to find fault on one of the premises which would affect how sound the argument is. The third premise which will be discussed is that which says that moral facts do not play a role in the explanation of our moral observations. An opposing argument could be that which considers that moral facts are not explanatorily irrelevant. Harman’s evidence requirement where the belief of the existence of moral facts is justified if and only if moral facts provide reasonable explanations of moral observations depends completely on the denial of the idea that moral facts have explanatory powers. For example, one might say slavery is immoral because it is immoral. That is, the wrongness of slavery forms part of the explanation for why we believe that they are wrong. So, the fact that a situation is wrong can explain why we think is wrong. Another objection can be directed towards the clarity of the argument itself. In his paper Harman is not clear when presenting his ideas and when discussing moral explanations. In the topic of scientific observation and ethical observation, he explains in a manner how moral observations are not reliable because an observation must count as evidence by supporting the claim that P if the best explanation of what caused the observation includes the fact that P and moral observations do not. However, even if observation cannot help to explain moral beliefs does it follow that we can have no knowledge of moral facts. Harman’s opinions can be seen as being an absolutist claim where scientific observation is the only form of observation that exist and therefore leads all aspects of observation.
Finally, in Beckwith’s fourth point, he evaluates the absurd consequences that follow moral relativist’s arguments. In his final critique, Beckwith uses typical philosophical examples that Mother Teresa was morally better than Adolf Hitler, rape is always wrong, and it is wrong to torture babies. Beckwith argues that for anyone to deny these universal claims is seen as absurd, yet it concludes with moral objectivism that there are in fact universally valid moral positions no matter the culture from which those individuals
In “Toward a Universal Ethics,” written by Michael Gazzaniga, a question is posed to coax his audience toward a science based ethics. “The question is, Do we have an innate moral sense as a species, and if so, can we recognize and accept it on it’s own terms? It is not a good idea to kill because it is not a good idea to kill, not because God or Allah or Buddha said it was not a good idea to kill.”(Gazzaniga, 420 para. 6). Gazzaniga answers the question for us, but he was wrong to assume that the brain’s systematic response to moral situations means that science should dictate ethics and morality. Instead, ethics and morality should be considered a part of humanity, which is influenced and balanced by many things including science, religion, and individual
It is crucial that every belief must be thoroughly explored and justified to avoid any future repercussions. Clifford provides two examples in which, regardless of the outcome, the party that creates a belief without comprehensive justification ends up at fault. It is possible to apply the situations in The Ethics of Belief to any cases of belief and end up with the conclusion that justification is of utmost importance. Justifying beliefs is so important because even the smallest beliefs affect others in the community, add to the global belief system, and alter the believer moral compass in future decisions.
(1) Schafer, Karl. "Assessor Relativism and the Problem of Moral Disagreement." The Southern Journal of Philosophy 50.4 (2012): 602-20. Web.
The question of what constitutes morality is often asked by philosophers. One might wonder why morality is so important, or why many of us trouble ourselves over determining which actions are moral actions. Mill has given an account of the driving force behind our questionings of morality. He calls this driving force “Conscience,” and from this “mass of feeling which must be broken through in order to do what violates our standard of right,” we have derived our concept of morality (Mill 496). Some people may practice moral thought more often than others, and some people may give no thought to morality at all. However, morality is nevertheless a possibility of human nature, and a very important one. We each have our standards of right and wrong, and through the reasoning of individuals, these standards have helped to govern and shape human interactions to what it is today. No other beings except “rational beings,” as Kant calls us, are able to support this higher capability of reason; therefore, it is important for us to consider cases in which this capability is threatened. Such a case is lying. At first, it seems that lying should not be morally permissible, but the moral theories of Kant and Mill have answered both yes and no on this issue. Furthermore, it is difficult to decide which moral theory provides a better approach to this issue. In this paper, we will first walk through the principles of each moral theory, and then we will consider an example that will explore the strengths and weaknesses of each theory.
In this paper, I will argue that Kant provides us with a plausible account of morality. To demonstrate that, I will initially offer a main criticism of Kantian moral theory, through explaining Bernard Williams’ charge against it. I will look at his indulgent of the Kantian theory, and then clarify whether I find it objectionable. The second part, I will try to defend Kant’s theory.
Moral relativism is a widespread theory that can be used to explain the differences among cultures and their ethics and morals. Ruth Benedict describes relative morality as a concept based specifically on the ethics of a culture and how they are related to those of other cultures. He argues that many cultures are so contrasting when it comes to specific areas of culture and lifestyle that they cannot be unified under one universal moral code that governs all of humanity. Conversely however, James Rachels, author of Elements of Moral Philosophy, does not subscribe to the theory of moral relativism. Instead, he believes that all cultures have some values in common - that there is less disagreement among cultures than moral relativists like Benedict make out. Rachels and Benedict are quoted in The Moral Life, using an array of examples to support their assertions. In my essay I aim to argue that moral relativism does in fact exist, but not to the extent that Benedict holds, or to the extent that Rachels has argued its non-existence.
The nature of morality is believed to have been heavily impacted by the enduring history of religion, yet philosophical conflict has arisen of over differing interpretations of Socrates question of whether ‘our moral virtues were designed as good by an omnipotent God, or whether they are good because God recognizes them as good.’
I argue that persons are unlikely to have moral knowledge insofar as they lack certain moral virtues; that persons are commonly deficient in these virtues, and hence that they are regularly unlikely to have adequate moral knowledge. I propose a version of this argument that employs a broad conception of self-worth, a virtue found in a wide range of moral traditions that suppose a person would have an appropriate sense of self-worth in the face of tendencies both to overestimate and underestimate the value of one’s self. I begin by noting some distinctive features of this argument that distinguish it from more common arguments for moral skepticism. This is followed by an elucidation of the virtue of self-worth. I then consider some connections between self-worth and moral knowledge and, more briefly, the extent of self-worth among persons. Finally, I respond to the objection that the argument is incoherent because it presupposes moral knowledge that it later undermines.
6. The Elements of Moral Philosophy; 3rd edition ©1999; Rachels, James; (McGraw-Hill Companies; ISBN: 0-07052-5609). pp. 20-36, pp.175-193.
Harman, G. (2000). Is there a single true morality?. Explaining value and other essays in moral philosophy (pp. 77-99). Oxford: Clarendon Press ;.
Moral arguments for the existence of God are based on the premise that if God did not exist, then objective moral values and duties would not exist. As objective moral values and duties do exist, it can therefore be assumed that God exists. The moral argument claims that morality would not exist without God; morality and a moral law are the result of God. The moral argument has had a great cultural impact, as many religious people believe that religion and morality are intrinsically linked. The cultural importance of the moral argument has meant that it has been an argument explored by many different philosophers and theologians (Evans 2014, p. 1).
This essay will show that ethical considerations do limit the production of knowledge in both art and natural sciences and that such kind of limitations are present to a higher extent in the natural sciences.
Arthur, John, and Scalet, Steven, eds. Morality and Moral Controversies: Readings in Moral, Social, and Political Philosophy. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall. Eighth Edition, 2009.
When considering morality, worthy to note first is that similar to Christian ethics, morality also embodies a specifically Christian distinction. Studying a master theologian such as St. Thomas Aquinas and gathering modern perspectives from James Keenan, S. J. and David Cloutier serve to build a foundation of the high goal of Christian morality. Morality is a primary goal of the faith community, because it is the vehicle for reaching human fulfillment and happiness. Therefore, great value can be placed on foundations of Christian morality such as the breakdown of law from Aquinas, the cultivation of virtues, the role of conscience in achieving morality, and the subject of sin described by Keenan.