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The british views of hitler
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The view of appeasement has been debated amongst historians. Richard Overy agrees with the appropriateness of the foreign policy during 1936-1938 in terms of Britain’s economic conditions and interest. While, historian R.A.C Parker disputes the view that appeasement was the only policy to pursue where alternatives to appeasement should have been considered. In contrast Martin Gilbert holds a different view as he suggests that Chamberlain was right to adopt the policy of appeasement because it was the conventional and sensible option as the policy was continued by Chamberlain predecessors. In addition, Gilbert evokes a more balanced view, disputing that appeasement was unsuccessful during 1938 particularly with the Munich crisis . Appeasement …show more content…
refers to the verb appease meaning to satisfy and agree to the demands of individuals . This became the British foreign policy in 1936-1939 as the foreign policy is when the government tries to secure its interests and encourages international work to improve common issues of development of the economy, trade and climate that the country face . The basis of British Foreign policy during 1936-1939 was implemented to maintain peace amongst countries because it seemed the most favourable option and to avoid another destructive war such as the First World War. Appeasement appeared appropriate due to Britain’s circumstances during the 1930s as they were economically and militarily weak so, Britain was unable to fight a war earlier than 1939.This can be supported by levels of British military aircraft production, as in 1936 Britain had only 1,877 combat and non-combat aircraft compared to Germany who had 5,112 . Therefore, if Britain had gone to war earlier than 1939, they could have been at a disadvantage because the aircraft numbers were lower than Germany’s. Hence, appeasement was a suitable policy to pursue because up until 1939 Britain was behind Germany’s rapid military and economic recovery. So earlier confrontation toward Germany from Britain could be considered suicidal. As it was not until 1939 to 1940 where Britain had achieved 15,049 aircraft production in contrast to Germany 10,247 as Britain was strong enough to fight. Therefore, appeasement was sensible and pragmatic as arguably the policy allowed Britain time to rearm and regain economic strength. However, to some extent appeasement may have not been entirely appropriate in terms of Britain’s economic and military position. As there were stages during 1936-1939 where Britain may have been able to oppose Germany instead of continuing to adopt appeasement. Although, appeasement was suitable as a basis of British foreign policy during British economic struggle. As Britain were in huge war debts of over £850 million to USA . Despite this they still deposited money into military expenditure during 1936- 1939 . This could suggest that Britain was economically preparing for a possibility of war where they could have rearmed at a faster rate than Germany and may have deterred Hitler to reconsider his aims. Appeasement was sensible and appropriate because it matched British position in international affairs.
However, there are several points to discuss on whether appeasement should have been abandoned earlier for example key points such as firm action against Germany’s occupation of Rhineland, negotiations of Czechoslovakia and Sudetenland could have deterred Hitler. The appropriateness of appeasement can be disputed in terms of occupation of Rhineland in 1936. The Rhineland was included in the treaty of Versailles where Germany could not regain or place troops in that region. However, Hitler violated this rule of the treaty and sent over 20,000 soldiers to the Rhineland to rearm and grow . As France and Britain did not intervene against Hitler. This meant that early intervention from Britain or France could have prevented Hitler to expand his army. As Hitler had less German troops to occupy Rhineland if France confronted them. So, Hitler sent troops to remilitarise the area to expand on their army. Whereas, France could have defeated Hitler’s soldiers. However, the French government was hesitant to challenge German troops without the aid of Britain. Therefore, this implies Hitler’s aims were as of an opportunist where, it can be considered that Hitler was testing whether the French and British army would respond to Hitler’s clear defiance against the treaty of Versailles. Thus, a firmer stance instead of appeasement could have been …show more content…
made. Furthermore, appeasement was considered suitable and favourable amongst the British public and government opinion.
For instance, the policy of appeasement was hugely agreed on in terms of public opinion. Evidence supports that this view on appeasement was settled amongst the public as Chamberlain acknowledged the strong view of maintaining peace with European countries. This can be considered as the Locarno pact in 1925 was signed by Germany, France, Belgium, Great Britain and Italy to secure post war settlement . Therefore, the aims of the British foreign policy were to adopt a middle position of conciliation amongst Europe. The public polls around 1936- 1938 presented that people opposed a potential outbreak of war. This was influence by the devastation of the First World War as there were approximately 900,000 people killed in WW1. Therefore, many people including Chamberlain himself wanted to avoid another war . Particularly Chamberlain personal experience of having to lose a cousin in WW1 also contributed to the continuation of appeasement as a basis of British foreign policy. On the other hand, there was a change in public opinions polls as newspapers showed that the public was unsure if appeasement would guarantee peace. In addition, the public polls during 1936 to 1938 did not fully represent the actual opinions of the public against a possibility of war. Therefore, the true view on appeasement amongst Britons must not be fully representative of the appropriateness
of the policy. Ultimately, appeasement was an appropriate policy to adopt as it suited Britain’s position. However, Britain could have asserted a stronger stance against Hitler’s opposition to the treaty of Versailles. Therefore, at the point where Hitler was demanding more from Chamberlain appeasement should have been abandon
In the aftermath of World War I, literally tens of millions were mortally wounded and missing, there were devastating effects on morale and view towards war, which would make most any weakened society apprehensive about having to go there again.... ... middle of paper ... ... The appeasement’s offered by Europe, specifically France and Britain, may have accelerated the push by Germany, Italy and Japan to eventually form the Axis to become the aggressors to launch World War II.
In order to stop the fighting between countries, Europe needed to put some actions into effect because appeasement was not working. Germany proved that by disregarding the Versailles Treaty. According to Hitler after disregarding the Versailles Treaty, “I look upon this day as marking the close of the struggle for German equality status…the path is now clear for Germany’s return to European collective cooperation” (Document 3, 1936) This quote explains a vast difference between Hitler’s and the other European countries' views. With Hitler’s affirmation to make Germany equal and even more powerful than the other European countries, the other European countries would have to set up collective security because they would have very little insight on what Hitler would be planning; leading to more destruction. Now, Europe would be more prepared if Hitler decided to attack. A quote from Winston Churchill explaining why collective security is the right answer is, “…I think all of the opportunities to stop the growth of Nazi power which have been thrown away. The responsibility must rest with those who have control of our political affairs. They neither prevented Germany from rearming, nor did they rearm us in time…Thus they left us in the hour of trial without a strong national defense or system of international security” (Churchill). That quote explains how collective security is the best answer to stop war and the destruction Hitler is
It failed to produce the desired results, but rather added fuel to the fire. At the Munich Conference the Big Four discussed the demands for the territory of Czechoslovakia and ultimately gave into Hitler’s request. While many people like Neville Chamberlain argued that appeasement was the best option Winston Churchill viewed it as a consequential decision. Churchill stated that he, “thinks of all the opportunities to stop the growth of Nazi Power which have been thrown away.” No action was taken to establish the security of Czechoslovakia making the Nazi’s more powerful. Appeasement did not defer the hostility that the desire for expansion brought on, but made it escalate. When Ethiopia was invaded by the Italians the emperor, Haile Selassie, was denied assistance from the Leage of Nations. He warned them what would happened if the aggressors were not stopped and wrote, “It is us today. It will be you tomorrow.” Haile Selassie knew that aggressors were going to continue to seek for more land and that any nation could be attacked next. Not only was appeasement an effort to satisfy the demands of dissatisfied powers in hope of maintaining stability, but it was also the disregardance of possibly serious conflict. The League of Nations incapability to be a forceful united front allowed for the Axis Powers to become even more willing to break boundaries. Appeasement was used to be the path of least resistance, but it would never stop the
Roosevelt paved the United States’ path from isolation to power. When World War II broke out in Europe, the country was largely isolationist. “Isolationist rhetoric reflected real public sentiment, as Roosevelt knew” (Renka, The Modern Presidency…). Roosevelt, however, seemed a step ahead of the nation. He stood firmly against Hitler and strove to align the United States with Western democracies and to strengthen the military (Greenstein 20). In 1938, Roosevelt’s foreign policy speeches began to reveal an obvious swing away from isolationism (Renka, Roosevelt’s Expansion of the Presidency). When Churchill reported in 1940 that the United Kingdom could no longer afford to pay for American weapons, Roosevelt used this opportunity to increase the United States’ influence in European affairs and lean his country slightly away from isolationism. Knowing Congress would oppose a loan to the United Kingdom, he created an entirely new program he called “lend-lease” (Greenstein 20).
Despite Germany’s withdrawal from the League of Nations in 1933, their rearmament program which directly violated the Treaty of Versailles and Italy’s occupation of Ethiopia in 1935, Britain continued to appease the leaders in order to avoid conflict. Firstly, Britain was suffering from an economic crisis following the Wall Street Crash and the Great Depression making it extremely vulnerable in the event of a war. Additionally, Britain couldn’t reach out to anyone for support; the USA practiced isolationism and communist Russia wouldn’t make a good ally. Furthermore, the British people were against another conflict and were still recuperating from World War I. The aforementioned reasons explain the rationale behind British appeasement policy in the
World War One was greatly influenced by many factors, and in many ways. National interest ignited the mistrust and insecurities within nations, which in turn led to the creation of strong alliances and immense military forces. The growing suspicion Britain had of Germany only heightened the wariness and uncertainty of nations. The means, by which individual nations dealt with the issues within themselves, and outside of their boundaries, in the years preceding World War One, were irrational and improperly thought through. Nations fell into a strong ultra nationalistic point of view, and acted in a way which expressed interest in themselves only.
Waters, Christopher. "The Menzies Government and the Grand Alliance During 1939." Australian Journal of Polotocs and History 56.4 (2012): 560-573.
Yet during the time appeasement seemed to be logical, as stated in document 8 only the German people could take away Hitler’s power which is why the League tried to appease to Hitler. Also the League feared that if they defeated Germany, Russia would take over most of Europe in their absence. While those are good reasons to try to appease to Hitler, the League of Nations forgot one important detail, Germany wasn’t afraid of the League. Neville Chamberlain the prime minister of Britain was an avid supporter of appeasement, yet even he said he would fight Germany if they were trying to dominate the world by fear of its force according to document 5. What Chamberlain failed to notice was that is what Germany was trying to do.
In a political context, appeasement is the idea of pleasing an enemy in order to avoid conflict, such as war. This is what Neville Chamberlain, the British Prime Minister, decided to do with Hitler in 1938 to avoid another European war. Some argue that appeasement was not a good idea because it gave Hitler what he wanted, but in other ways it was a very strategic move. Appeasement delayed war and showed that European countries could be responsible about political issues before jumping to conclusions. It also gave the countries more time to build up their armies to be prepared for any type of conflict. It was a fair thing to do because Germany had lost so much due to the Treaty of Versailles and deserved to recover. Appeasement was not a mistake because in the end everything turned out for the better.
Historians are often divided into categories in regard to dealing with Nazi Germany foreign policy and its relation to Hitler: 'intentionalist', and 'structuralist'. The intentionalist interpretation focuses on Hitler's own steerage of Nazi foreign policy in accordance with a clear, concise 'programme' planned long in advance. The 'structuralist' approach puts forth the idea that Hitler seized opportunities as they came, radicalizing the foreign policies of the Nazi regime in response. Structuralists reject the idea of a specific Hitlerian ideological 'programme', and instead argue for an emphasis on expansion no clear aims or objectives, and radicalized with the dynamism of the Nazi movement. With Nazi ideology and circumstances in Germany after World War I influencing Nazi foreign policy, the general goals this foreign policy prescribed to included revision of Versailles, the attainment of Lebensraum, or 'living space', and German racial domination. These foreign policy goals are seen through an examination of the actions the Nazi government took in response to events as they happened while in power, and also through Hitler's own ideology expressed in his writings such as Mein Kempf. This synthesis of ideology and social structure in Germany as the determinants of foreign policy therefore can be most appropriately approached by attributing Nazi foreign policy to a combination as both 'intentionalist' and 'structuralist' aims. Nazi foreign policy radicalized with their successes and was affected by Hitler pragmatically seizing opportunities to increase Nazi power, but also was based on early a consistent ideological programme espoused by Hitler from early on.
However, when confronted with a strict policy of appeasement, by both the French and the English, the stage was set for a second World War. Taylor constructs a powerful and effective argument by expelling certain dogmas that painted Hitler as a madman, and by evaluating historical events as a body of actions and reactions, disagreeing with the common idea that the Axis had a specific program from the start. The book begins with the conclusion of the First World War, by exploring the idea that critical mistakes made then made a second war likely, yet not inevitable. Taylor points out that although Germany was defeated on the Western front, “Russia fell out of Europe and ceased to exist, for the time being, as a Great Power. The constellation of Europe was profoundly changed—and to Germany’s advantage.”
Throughout history, negotiation has been a powerful tool used by world leaders to avoid violence and solve conflict. When negotiation succeeds all parties can feel that that have achieved their goals and met their expectations, but when negotiations go awry countries and relationships can be damaged beyond repair. The Munich Agreement of 1938 is a primary example of this type of failure, which was one of the catalysts to the start World War II and Czechoslovakia’s loss of independence. The Czech people were greatly overlooked during this agreement process, which still in some instances affects the country today. The 1930s were a challenging time for Europe and the powers within it due to the aftermath of WWI and the worldwide economic depression. Meanwhile, Fuhrer Hitler and the Nazi party were continuing their domination of Europe and threatening to invade Czechoslovakia, which many felt would most likely incite another World War. To prevent this England, France, Italy and Germany entered into an agreement, which would allow Germany to seize control of Sudetenland and is today known as the ‘Munich Pact’. Sudetenland had a large German population and its borders were in strategically strong areas for the German military. For negotiations to be successful there are many components that one must be aware of such as personalities of all parties, end goals of each person and the history from the country. England led the process with an appeasement policy as an attempt to mollify Hitler and the Nazi party and prevent war, which this pact did not. The Munich Pact is a perfect example of how negotiation can fail when all of the pieces do not fall correctly into place.
The end of World War One in 1918, was the reason that the Treaty of Versailles was signed and it was also the shadow of the Russian Revolution. There were three very important politicians that led this all. They were David Lloyd George, Georges Clemenceau and Woodrow Wilson. Most of them wanted to see the destruction of Germany but some like Lloyd George, were more cautious. There is some truth to the fact that opposition forces helped to defeat the treaty, but over all it was Wilson's stubbornness that led to its defeat in the Senate. Wilson's righteous views of his efforts were so strong that not even the advice and urging of his closest confidants could sway his stance.
Taubman, William. Stalin's American Policy: From Entente to Detente to Cold War. New York: Norton, 1982. Print.
In conclusion, the policy of appeasement was described by some scholars as ineffective. The fact that the policy of appeasement failed to avert World War 2 is a direct justification that it was a wrong-headed policy. The policy allowed Germany to reconstruct its military slowly and eventually was prepared to go into war to defend its military triumph. Chamberlain was aware of Hitler’s ambitions, but thought that the best alternative to deal with his ambitions was negotiations. This was a misguided move which the world is able to learn from.