Throughout Beyond Nature and Culture Philipe Descola presents an ontological fourfold seeking to describe and account for the continuities and discontinuities experienced by humans and non humans. In other words, he lays out a new approach to making the empirical completely intelligible. Included in his model are what he calls the four modes of identification; naturalism, animism, totemism, and analogism. He distinguishes between these four modes of identification by describing whether the “interiorities” and “physicalities” of humans and non humans are similar or dissimilar to one another (interiority consisting in the universal belief that a being has characteristics that are internal to it or that take it as their source). Animism being an identification of similar interiorities, but dissimilar physicalities. …show more content…
Analogism being an identification of dissimilar interiorities and physicalities; and Totemism being an identification of similar interiorities and physicalities. He also lays out six modes of relations; which are exchange, predation, gift, production, protection, and transmission. These six modes outline the ways in which humans are able to establish connections with one another and the entities that they encounter. Descola uses acquired cognitive schemas to describe the capacities that make things like collective knowledge and culture possible. He defines them as “psychic, sensorimotor, and emotional dispositions that are internalized thanks to experience acquired in a given social environment (pg. 103).” These schemas allow use to organize our perceptions and feelings, and structure how we interpret situations and events in terms of a shared
The first part of the text involves the analysis of race theory. Taylor opens the book by taking time to clarify human forms in such a way that simplifies the too-often rudimentary things which distinguish race from other notions. Taylor makes a point to thoroughly explain how philosophy, concerning race, “involves studying the consequences of race-talk, the practices of racial identification for which race-talk provides the resources” (p. 11). In other words, Taylor takes up the task of evaluating the meaning assigned to physical bodies by people. He does so by first answering the c...
Jesuit philosopher Pierre Teilhard de Chardin (1881-1948) believed that humankind follows a certain evolution of mind and body. This process involves a beginning (komogenese), a development (biogenese), and then a peak (noogenese) in which humans reach an Omega Point of higher being. Though his ideas were actually applied on a much broader scale of humanity over a large timespan, the theory can be applied to the individual’s process of human development. Single humans begin as common clones of one another. From this commonality many examine their lives and develop the things within them that make them uniquely them. This development of the self only can be ended at death when the individual converges upon an Omega Point in which he has an elevated understanding of and meaning for life. The characters Edna from The Awakening and Mrs. May from ”Greenleaf” encounter a similar human development in which an individual is formed with an understanding of life. The means by which they achieve this differ greatly.
Physicalism, or the idea that everything, including the mind, is physical is one of the major groups of theories about how the nature of the mind, alongside dualism and monism. This viewpoint strongly influences many ways in which we interact with our surrounding world, but it is not universally supported. Many objections have been raised to various aspects of the physicalist viewpoint with regards to the mind, due to apparent gaps in its explanatory power. One of these objections is Frank Jackson’s Knowledge Argument. This argument claims to show that even if one has all of the physical information about a situation, they can still lack knowledge about what it’s like to be in that situation. This is a problem for physicalism because physicalism claims that if a person knows everything physical about a situation they should know everything about a situation. There are, however, responses to the Knowledge Argument that patch up physicalism to where the Knowledge Argument no longer holds.
The only logical conclusion to derive from this observation is that what we consider to be ourselves is not our bodies. As a result, an individual’s personal identity cannot be rooted in just his or her body, unlike what body theorists would like to
Descartes makes a careful examination of what is involved in the recognition of a specific physical object, like a piece of wax. By first describing the wax in a manner such that “everything is present in the wax that appears needed to enable a body to be known as distinctly as possible” (67), he shows how easily our senses help to conceive our perception of the body. But even if such attributes are modified or removed, we still recognize the changed form, as the same piece of wax. This validates Descartes’ claim that “wax itself never really is the sweetness of the honey, nor the fragrance of the flowers, nor the whiteness, nor the shape, nor the sound” (67), and the only certain knowledge we gain of the wax is that “it is something extended, flexible, and mutable” (67). This conclusion forces us to realize that it is difficult to understand the true nature of the wax, and its identity is indistinguishable from other things that have the same qualities as the wax. After confirming the nature of a human mind is “a thinking thing” (65), Descartes continues that the nature of human mind is better known than the nature of the body.
The term ‘analogy’ is very vague in nature, but when used in this context, we assume that the behavior of other people is in many ways analogous in reference to causes. These causes being behavior directed from sensation or thought. It is apparent and observable that people or beings other then I behave in ways in which we behave when placed in different situations. For example sadness or the nature of anger or happiness can be seen in others. Others then can and do react to different causes similar to the way in which I do as well. Another consideration is that of shared experience. Russell uses the example of two friends having a conversation in which memoirs are explored. These two individuals have shared experiences together. They eventually discover that each other’s memories aid each other in recalling information forgotten with time. (Russell 89)
In today’s society, the mind is a set of cognitive elements which enable an individual’s consciousness, perception, thinking, judgement, and memory. In addition, without our minds and/or conscious experiences, a person would not be able to understand what makes them who they are. Similarly, in Thomas Nagel’s essay “What Is It Like to Be a Bat,” Nagel claims that even though there is something it is like to be an organism, humans are not capable of fully knowing what it is like to be a bat. In addition, Nagel supports his claims through the importance of an organism’s conscious experiences, memories, and knowledge, which allow an individual to identify themselves. Therefore, in this paper I will discuss Nagel’s argument, which I believe to be true, based on the idea that human beings do not have the ability to understand and/or know what it is like to be another organism without having the same conscious experiences as one another.
Otto describes non-rational experiences as mysteries, which are a fundamental aspect of all religions. To these mysteries he gives the name “numinous,” and explains that “the nature of the numinous can only be suggested by means of the special way in which it is reflected in the mind in terms of feeling,” (Otto 12). Otto argues that our feelings of the numin...
Animalism bases its conclusion on personal identity that the bodies must have the same material body. It fails to address the mind of the bodies at both time t and t*. Also, though the body stays qualitatively identical (same properties); it’s not numerical identical (same substance). Nevertheless, psychological continuity focuses on the mind of the person but not its body. It suggest that
What is personal identity? This question has been asked and debated by philosophers for centuries. The problem of personal identity is determining what conditions and qualities are necessary and sufficient for a person to exist as the same being at one time as another. Some think personal identity is physical, taking a materialistic perspective believing that bodily continuity or physicality is what makes a person a person with the view that even mental things are caused by some kind of physical occurrence. Others take a more idealist approach with the belief that mental continuity is the sole factor in establishing personal identity holding that physical things are just reflections of the mind. One more perspective on personal identity and the one I will attempt to explain and defend in this paper is that personal identity requires both physical and psychological continuity; my argument is as follows:
Piaget argued that cognitive development is based on the development of schemas. This refers to a psychological structure representing all of a person’s knowledge of actions or objects. To perform a new skill which the person has no schema, they have to work from previous skills that they have. This is called assimilation, where they have pulled previous schemas together then adapted and changed them to fit their task through accommodation.
In a time where science and materialism reign, the topic of the soul is rarely mentioned, ostensibly left in the past with the philosophers of old. Nichols, however, candidly broaches this difficult topic and gives new life to the argument that humans do indeed have an immaterial, immortal soul. Nichols summarizes several popular arguments for the existence of the soul as he builds his own argument, which discusses a soul as limited in relation to its environment as well as a soul that is one with the mind and a controller of the body. He discusses both the strengths and challenges to his argument, offering rebuttals to the challenges. Because this soul is the organizing principle of the body it is involved in the Resurrection as well, bridging the gap between the material and spiritual worlds. However, I disagree with Nichols’ assessment, instead choosing the side of materialism where an immaterial soul does not exist.
The relationship of the human soul and physical body is a topic that has mystified philosophers, scholars, scientists, and mankind as a whole for centuries. Human beings, who are always concerned about their place as individuals in this world, have attempted to determine the precise nature or state of the physical form. They are concerned for their well-being in this earthly environment, as well as their spiritual well-being; and most have been perturbed by the suggestion that they cannot escape the wrongs they have committed while in their physical bodies.
But, “human persons have an ‘inner’ dimension that is just as important as the ‘outer’ embodiment” (Cortez, 71). The “inner” element cannot be wholly explained by the “outer” embodiment, but it does give rise to inimitable facets of the human life, such as human dignity and personal identity. The mind-body problem entails two theories, dualism and physicalism. Dualism contends that distinct mental and physical realms exist, and they both must be taken into account. Its counterpart (weak) physicalism views the human as being completely bodily and physical, encompassing no non-physical, or spiritual, substances.
...have struggled with the nature of human beings, especially with the concept of “self”. What Plato called “soul, Descartes named the “mind”, while Hume used the term “self”. This self, often visible during hardships, is what one can be certain of, whose existence is undoubtable. Descartes’s “I think, therefore I am” concept of transcendental self with just the conscious mind is too simplistic to capture the whole of one’s self. Similarly, the empirical self’s idea of brain in charge of one’s self also shows a narrow perspective. Hume’s bundle theory seeks to provide the distinction by claiming that a self is merely a habitual way of discussing certain perceptions. Although the idea of self is well established, philosophical insight still sees that there is no clear presentation of essential self and thus fails to prove that the true, essential self really exists.