Alternate Possibilities And Moral Responsibility Harry G Frankfurt Summary

Harry G. Frankfurt presents her main thesis on ‘’Alternate possibilities and moral responsibility’’ by claiming that the principle of alternate possibilities is false, because he believes that a person is morally responsible for what he did, only if he could not behave otherwise. Frankfurt ensures that what this principle is establishing is an illusion, morally speaking.
He continues his statement, arguing that it is not valid to think that the circumstances that led a person to do something turn it impossible to avoid doing so, because for example a person can do something because circumstances prevented him from doing anything else, and that does not mean that the circumstances have been the reason of his acting. In order to analyse deeply

moral responsibility, Frankfurt offers a methodology in order to support his thesis and he suggests starting by describing the Jones’s example:
Jones decides to do something based on certain reasons, but then someone threatens him, and this person will fulfil his threat unless Jones does exactly what the threatening asks.

So, is Jones morally responsible for what he does? Frankfurt describes three different ways to play the role and reaction to the situation:
1. Indifference: Jones does what he does regardless of the situation and its decision is expected to act as the menacing, but because he already made a decision. Therefore it was not the threat that led him to act, it was his decision. In this case there is moral responsibility and no coercion.
2. Hasty decision: Jones did what he was asked for fear because he was extremely terrified thinking only of the threat, that is to say, he decided for his own reasons (fear). So, in this case, there is moral responsibility because the reason is not coercion.
3. Surprise: The threat impressed him but he had already decided to do what was asked. So he was not motivated by the threat (not coercion), because he acted on his own decision, that is to say, he is subjected to moral

responsibility.
Once we have seen Frankfurt’s main argument for his thesis, I’m going to set out my assessment of it. After explaining these examples of coercion, I would like to say that although a person is coerced, he has moral responsibility for what he does, if what he does is not moved by coercion.
Frankfurt begins by stating that the principle is wrong, because when a person makes the decision to perform the action, regardless of the threat (coercion) is acquiring all the moral responsibility.

If the person is threatened to suffer punishment, and he is terrified by the punishment, this does not mean that "could not have done otherwise," there is still the possibility that defied the threat and receive punishment (decision). This is not contrary to the principle, because the principle absolves someone of responsibility, in the case that the person could not have done otherwise.
In this case he may decide to do something else, so the subject is immersed in the principle of alternative possibilities, acquiring the moral responsibility for his actions, because he could have done otherwise. So, clearly, the moral responsibility is cancelled only when the person doesn’t do the action on their own.
As Frankfurt, I also think that the principle should be re-routed in order to the moral responsibility can be cancelled only if the person acted because he could not do otherwise. This new direction is not inconsistent if we hold that, being consequential with the previous approach, there is correlation between moral responsibility and determinism. This idea is supported because if there was causal determination for an action done by one person, then it is correct to say that the person acted in consequence of the causes that

determined.
I think this position is linked to the phrase "he could have done otherwise", because if the action is causally determined, it means that the person could not do otherwise; then moral responsibility does not come into discussion if the person was causally determined to do what he did.
To conclude, the principle should change and give someone a moral responsibility only if he could not do otherwise; thus moral responsibility and determinism are compatible.