Elements of Alpha Company, 3rd Battalion, 172nd Infantry Regiment were in hot pursuit of a Special Forces A-Team of unknown origin at least that’s what they believed. They believed they had chased them into a box canyon with sheer cliffs on all sides that they couldn’t possibly climb to escape. Alpha’s Company Commander held back not wanting to enter the canyon immediately he was well aware that his men were prior to the event were part timers in the guard. His assumption that if this was a Special Forces A-Team it was their profession and a very dangerous group of men. He knew the make-up of an A-Team which primarily consisted of thirteen men and that would be against his two hundred-fifty man Company. Although the greater numbers …show more content…
The Platoon Leader and Platoon Sergeant turned a blind-eye to the problems in first squad and wanted to two NCO’s to resolve it themselves, which was a failure of leadership on their part. Staff Sergeant Patel was the leader of second squad he was also another NCO that had no combat and infantry experience. He was an NCO in the regular Navy, got out, and enlisted in the Army National Guard letting him maintain his previous Navy rank as there was no real break in service. He too was set to go to Fort Benning to the Infantry School along with SSG Wilcox which didn’t happen. The key difference between the two NCOs was that SSG Patel recognized his weaknesses and had no problem following the lead of his assistant squad leader Sergeant Wolf. Sergeant Wolf served in Iraq as a Specialist and served as an assistant squad leader when his squad leader had stepped on an IED killing his thus moving him up in the pecking order. Although, not a great deal of leadership experience as an NCO Sergeant Wolf did have some which was a lot more than SSG Patel
The 23rd RCT received the mission to defend Chipyong-Ni in an attempt to bait the CCF to attack with a large force that could be defeated, but the RCT was at 70% strength following the battle at Twin Tunnels (some units were at 60%). The RCT received intelligence reports of multiple CCF Divisions marching towards Chipyong-Ni. COL Freeman requested the RCT be allowed to pull back 15 miles to prevent encirclement and was approved by MG Almond, but was overturned by LTG Ridgway. LTG Ridgway, the newly assigned Eighth Army Commander, did not allow retreat and always wanted to make contact with the enemy. He relieved his G-3 on the spot for giving him retreat contingency plans.
... patrols and his men had very little trust in him because he would not do anything that he was asking them to do. He was however a good leader in that he did not give up on his men like SFC Gallagher did. He had a plan going into the situation and did not let his inexperience detour him. He knew the platoon he was going to was a problem platoon and he accepted the challenge and attacked it head on. He held the men to a higher standard than they had been in the past and tried to pick them up and dust them off. He aided 1LT Norton in reviving 1st platoon and building their morale back up, they were just getting back on their feet when the incident at JSB happened where two soldiers went missing and then the rape and murder was investigated effectively ending 1st platoons deployment, but nonetheless SFC Fenlason was there through it all and stuck with his platoon.
The book Black Hearts by Jim Frederick is an in-depth narrative about the 1st platoon, Bravo Company 1-502nd Infantry 101st Airborne Division deployed to Iraq in 2005. The leadership failures documented in this book range all the way from the general officer level down to the lowest private. LT general Ricardo Sanchez failed to understand the climate his command group was entering as they were deployed into Iraq. From then on the entire leadership failures continued to compound upon each other with improper time to plan. It is customary to have a six month lead time to have a proper battle hand off when preparing to take over an AO from another unit. To compound this problem, the entire time the 502nd was in pre-deployment training, they were preparing for the rigors of urban combat. In reality, they were given six weeks to recon their new area of responsibility and were going to a countryside crafted by the heavens for guerilla warfare. As Colonel Ebel said in the book, “It is not going to be an easy road. They are not even sure of what they have in the area. It just feels bad. We can expect a real fight.”
We all know that from the beginning, Marines are engrained with the mindset to “never back down” regardless of circumstances and regardless of all odds. This is one of the many reasons Marines have become known as the most elite fighting force today. However, imagine this: in your unit there are eighty-nine wounded, twenty-six dead and three are missing. Everywhere you turn there are the bodies of Chinese casualties; later you find out it was over two-thousand confirmed casualties to be exact. To any normal person, this would probably be quite a shocking sight, but as the book “The Last Stand of Fox Company” by Bob Drury and Tom Clavin expresses, to the 10,000 Marines in Fox Company, 2nd Battalion, Seventh Marine Regiment, this grew to be the usual for them.
Band of Brothers is a fascinating book that captures moments lived by soldiers during World War II. It specifically relates to the History of a small unit of paratroopers known as Easy Company, 506 Regiment, 101st Airborne. It is a story that follows the company from its inception to the capture of Hitler’s nest. It begins with the training of these soldiers at Camp Toccoa, Georgia. The 140 members of easy company who were young men from different social levels were physically and mentally trained. This particular company had an extremely harsh training, but many believe it is because of this training that they were considered as one of the best rifle companies in the army.
The drought was near historic high levels for the time of year. In the moments before the entrapment on of the squads and the crew boss trainee were working with a fire engine and its three person crew when a spot fire erupted right next to the road. The seven Northwest Regular Crew number six and a engine crew got in there vehicles and drove south past the fire along the edge of the road. While driving they radioed the other 14 crewmembers who were working north further up the river about the dangerous situation. The 14 crewmembers and the incident commander and two Northwest Regular number six squad members were suppressing spot fires between the river and the road ¼ mile north of the first squad when they were informed of the situation that was threatening there es...
Team leaders again represent that commanding leadership of their troops and will have to report that to their commander and so on and so forth. We risk not only one soldiers life, but the many others who need that soldier to have their battle buddies back in the face of combat. The keys to a solider system are the policy letters and army regulations that dictate every given bit of information on the army and its moral history. Within each article and sub articles the information is pertinent to the success of the soldier and shares the history as well, this can provide lessons to those who instruct other soldiers in training.
As a young Lance Corporal, my first impression of the NCO’s around the Recon Company was varied. As I got to know the others in my platoon, one started to stand out in my daily interactions, SSGT Moeller. He had just gotten off crutches, after a parachute accident broke his tibia and fibula, sitting on the catwalk icing his ankle. When I asked why he was icing his ankle he told me he had just finished an 8-mile run. Now, this was from an injury that should have caused months of painful rehab before running would have been possible, but here he was, sacrificing personal comforts, trying to get back to mission fitness. His reasoning being, he was scheduled to be the Assistant Team Leader (ATL) on the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit(MEU) and didn’t want to miss his chance for Afghanistan. It was at this moment that I got my
The men of Reserve Police Battalion 101 were just ordinary men, from a variety of backgrounds, education, and age. It would appear that they were not selected by any force other than random chance. Their backgrounds and upbringing, however, did little to prepare these men for the horrors they were to witness and participate in.
1. Summary: On 17 April 2018, I was ordered by COL O’Connor to conduct further analysis during the active investigation process for FLIPL #102. My conclusion remains unchanged in which, to recommend financial liability is assessed to SFC Picart for the loss of $78K worth of USG equipment. Ultimately, this investigation reveals that SFC Picart’s actions of simple negligence, caused by his failure to enforce effective accountability and safekeeping practices to include, key witness sworn statements further corroborates that SFC Picart failed to follow CPT Reid’s directives (instructions). Hence, SFC Picart’s substandard leadership skills, as a Senior NCO (by soliciting assistance from untrained personnel) his actions were contrary to the commander’s directives (instructions) for this task to be performed by the 67th Rear Detachment Supply Team (trained 92A NCOs/Soldiers) were contributing factors that have likely resulted in the loss of USG equipment.
While the conflict stemmed mainly from the Senior Master Sergeant and the female airmen, it created a toxic environment in the small unit. The Senior’s harsh treatment and lack of empathy toward the airman eroded the trust of the entire unit. Her mistrust of the entire detachment sent her into isolation and her performance in other duties also began to suffer. This further strained relationships with her coworkers who felt as if they were picking up her slack.
SMA William A. Connelly, he was a tanker and a very confident and strict CSM, when he was assigned to his first duty station, his battalion Commander did not want him, and he talks the Commander “The Department of the Army, not the battalion commander, had assigned him there and that the commander would have to have the orders changed if he did not want him as his sergeant major” (Elder et al 2013, p. 129). After the incident everything was on a good
Since the Army puts everything down on paper, from how to perform maintenance on an M4 weapon (“Rifle…”, 2003, para. 1.4) to how to write a letter to your commander (“Preparing…”, 2001, p. 30), a good NCO must know and follow the rules and instructions that apply to him or her on a regular basis. For example, a good NCO must be able to correct a soldier’s uniform to the exact standard. In order to order a soldier to tuck in his or he...
Corporate Social Responsibility is the management’s obligation to protect and promote the welfare of its stakeholders, financially or otherwise. This can be done by creating jobs, providing basic resources to the stakeholders, providing access to education, using naturally resources sustainably etc. Corporate Social Investment (CSI) is the actual resources that are invested in these stakeholders in form of money, skills and tangible resources such as land, machinery etc. (Yvette Russell et al 2013)
When a Soldier walks into a training session and does not even see, their own NCO’s receiving the same training, how much stock do you expect for the Solder to take? How much value do you think the Soldier sees in said training? Let us compare it to a Soldier who is counseled for poor performance on an Army APFT but the NCO Counseling is out of shape himself, or has not been seen taking an APFT in three years. Soldiers today more than ever need social proof before they believe something. We are a show me now generation, and if you want Soldiers to take SHARP Serious they must first see leader