Alistair Horne's 'The Price Of Glory'

The Price of Glory Response Paper

One may argue that in order to fully understand the horrific realities of the First World War, then attention must be paid to the bloodiest battle of the bloodiest war, the Battle of Verdun. In his skillful narration of the battle, The Price of Glory: Verdun 1916, Alistair Horne describes Verdun to be the First World War in microcosm, “an intensification of all its horrors and glories, courage and futility” (Horne 327). Naturally, the death toll at Verdun was astounding, with 700,000 total casualties and 300,000 dead, the vast numbers undoubtedly triggered the questioning as to how a single battle, which notably only lasted for ten months, caused such carnage? In analyzing the significance of the battle,

in light of the unparalleled bloodshed, a few decisive factors set forth in Horne’s book can go a long way as to understanding the First World War as a whole. Through an analysis of France and Germany’s tactical doctrines, the symbolic importance of Verdun, the maturation of firepower on the Western Front, as well as the soldiers motivation for combat, will shed light on Verdun’s true significance. The Battle of Verdun truly does embody the horrors and glories of the First War’s tragic legacy, essentially it was a battle that changed everything, in a war that changed everything, and yet solved nothing.
In order to understand the tactical doctrine of both the French and German armies, there must be an emphasis on significant events leading up to the outbreak of World War I itself. Looking at the history of both France and German prior to 1914 can give great insight into what would shape each side’s methods and tactical operations. Understandably, however, is Horne’s lack of attention to Germany’s tactical doctrine, which will be explained in greater detail later. Horne begins his book with a synopsis of France post 1870, following their defeat in the Franco-Prussian War. As it will be indicated later, the disparaging defeat in 1871 would play a major role in shaping France’s tactical doctrine for combat. Particularly after 1871, the defeated French were stripped of much more than a few profitable territories, arguably the nation’s worst loss was not tangible, it was their morale. After 1871 the nation would be hampered with the debt of war costs and an expensive reparations bill. However, as it would turn out, the French were able to rise from the ashes and in a rather timely manner had the last of the reparations paid off by 1873.
Luckily, at the turn of the twentieth century, a rejuvenation in the nation’s morale would not be difficult to accomplish. France had joined in on the trend of massive expansion and colonial acquirement, and in addition with a period of roaring industrialization, the nation would soon recover its confidence. Horne explains that “nowhere was the renaissance more striking than in the army” (4). During this time, the French military was controlled by both the de Grandmaison doctrine, as well as military leaders who were convinced that a weak offensive strategy was the reason for the nation’s damaging defeat in 1871. From this military philosophy, came the development of the tactical doctrine “Attaque à outrance,” the translated meaning being equivalent to “fight excessively” or “attack to excess.” A foolish doctrine in hindsight, however under the command of offensive-minded leaders such as Foch and Joffre, the French military was drunk on a cocktail of morale and resentment which unfortunately hindered their ability to foresee that a nation’s spirit would be no match for the developing technologies on the Western Front.
This is not to say that the mindset of the German military was any different, a battle of attrition or “fight to excess” was the groundwork for Germany’s tactical doctrine.

However, a notable difference that Horne establishes while describing the German General Erich von Falkenhayn as “ruthless [he] lacked the tenacious purpose” (32) will reflect heavily on the German’s tactical doctrine. An agreeable assumption as to Horne’s lack of detail in Germany’s tactical doctrine, as compared to the French, is in fact the lack of purpose, because there is not much to be said about an army fighting for the sake of fighting. In the third chapter, Horne is in no way reserved in his portrayal of Germany’s General Falkenhayn. Horne paints General Falkenhayn as a commander with a weak vision for strategic warfare and a man crippled by an indecisive demeanor. Naturally, the third chapter gives a great deal of attention to Falkenhayn’s infamous memorandum to his Kaiser. The point taken from Falkenhayn’s lengthy memorandum is of course his proposal of an attack on Verdun, in order to “bleed them to death” (36). However, the memorandum does more than simply voice an objective, the context of the letter can be read as a demonstration of Falkenhayn’s senseless vision for strategy. Falkenhayn had some elusive scenarios for what he wished to achieve, yet no clear strategic objective, which would come back to haunt the German

side.
For the German army and particularly Falkenhayn, an attack on Verdun was not an intent to capture, but rather an intent to instigate. In staging a full-fledged attack on Verdun, Falkenhayn contested that because of the fortresses’ symbolic significance to the French, they would be obligated to do everything in their power to defend it. However, Germany’s plan to “bleed France white” was flawed and this was shown in France early neglect of the fortress. Under the command of Joffre, it was ordered that Verdun be stripped of its ammunition, as it would be put to greater use elsewhere. It was apparent that Verdun did not hold as much significance to the French as the Germans would have liked to assume. Nevertheless, the battle was still one of excess, yet the result was not what Germany could have expected. It seems that as the battle progressed, the purpose of a victory at Verdun became more about defeating the enemy than actually protecting the site of Verdun for its symbolic meaning. Horne hits the nail on the head in explaining that “no situation is more lethal than when an issue assumes the status of a symbol” (225).
After the outbreak of World War I, it would become increasingly, as well as tragically, apparent that heavy artillery ruled the battlefield, and this can be seen by simply looking at the total number of casualties resulting from the Battle of Verdun. The maturation of firepower during this industrial age would indefinitely effect the Western Front in World War I as well as the future of warfare itself. An early effect can be seen in a shift of tactical doctrines, such as the French’s abandonment of “Attaque à outrance” upon the outbreak of the war. This movement from offensive to defensive strategies would benefit the French military in the long run, but it would also please the man who would become a commander at Verdun, Philippe Pétain. Pétain stood out early in his military career for blatantly opposing the French military’s pledge to “Attaque à outrance” after the Franco-Prussian war. Pétain was not consumed by the nonsense strategies of the de Grandmaison and was one of the first to recognized that a purely offensive strategy would ultimately be useless without the heavy artillery to support it. Pétain had a theory that “one does not fight with men against material” because a battle of attrition was not meant to be fought with an infantry, it needed to be fought with guns (138).
It is reasonable to say that when Germany staged their attack on Verdun in 1916, they had the upper hand in regards to modern firepower. From the massive 420-millimeter mortars (“Big Berthas”) to the long-range 150s, all the way to 77-millimeter field guns, the Germans appeared to hold the advantage in the category of weaponry. Even more vital to the possession of advanced firepower, would be an efficient method in mobilizing it, which the German military excelled in. With these factors combined, it is exceptionally odd that the Battle of Verdun was not an instantaneous victory for the Germans, in fact there was no true victor, a point that will be revisited later. However, it seems that the Germans were in a much better place to adapt to the rapid innovations of weaponry, so one must ask, how it is that Germany staged the attack on Verdun to in order to “bleed France dry” but ended up white as a ghost themselves?
In hindsight, it may be hard to see the Battle of Verdun as anything more than a contest of which country could hold their breath the longest, and one can assume that is why the word “futility” is used in describing the battle.

Still, the number of casualties calls for a much greater understanding for the Battle of Verdun and those who fought in it. Lieutenant Georges Gaudy described what he witnessed when his regiment returned from their fighting near the Fort Douaumont in May and the description of his regiment is disturbing in every sense of the word. Lieutenant Gaudy writes that although his men had stone-cold expressions on their faces, “they wept in silence, like women” (188). Horne’s intimate portrayal of the soldiers who experienced the horrors of Verdun first-hand raises the question as to why the French continued to defend and why the German’s continued to attack because by the late spring, the gap between the level of anguish on each side was becoming increasingly narrow and soon that gap would not even be distinguishable. As for the motivations for both armies, prestige and morale played a large role in the sustained endurance and this can be linked back to the ideals of nationalism. In the first three months, the French had lost important fortresses surrounding Verdun, namely Malancourt on March 31st, Haucourt on April 5th, and then Bethincourt on April 8th (165). With these early defeats, it is thought provoking as to why the French continued to fight.

Horne insinuates each side had attached themselves to the notion that their enemy was worse off than they were, and this was a dangerous assumption to have. However, one may also assume that perhaps the French displayed such longevity because these losses were only forts surrounding Verdun, not the fortress of Verdun itself. Leadership also played a major part in the duration of the battle, Horne explains the event in late June when Pétain feared that the Right Bank of the Meuse would be weak against a German attack and a break-through would have grave consequences to French artillery, due to the fact that one-third of the French’s guns were positioned there (289). Pétain shared this fear with Joffre who would condemn him for it, because what kind of message would this send to the people of France, if their military was to initiate a voluntary withdrawal? Unfortunately, it may be fair to say that each side feared the question that would come if they were to surrender first, the question being, how can these sacrifices be justified if we simply give up?

In looking at the territorial outcomes of the ten months at Verdun, or lack thereof, the battle may appear pointless due to the fact that almost all the ground taken by the Germans early in 1916, was recaptured by the French by the end of the year. A fair assumption as to the lesson that can be taken away from the Battle of Verdun, is that a military strategy based solely on attrition warfare is a horrendous, as well as senseless tactic, with unforgiving consequences to a military’s resources and manpower, as it may be seen by looking at Germany’s tactical doctrine. The idea of a “Pyrrhic victory” was felt on both sides , however it can be argued that the French felt the burden of Verdun and its unrivalled carnage more than Germany had. Although each side lost an unimaginable number of men, France was also a smaller country than Germany, therefore the French experienced their losses on a much higher scale. The maturation of firepower on the Western Front truly changed everything and it wasn’t just heavy artillery that inflicted extreme casualties, it was also the flamethrowers brought to the battlefield by the Germans and possibly the most horrifying new innovation that appeared on the Western Front, again thanks to the Germans, was phosgene gas, a physiological weapon in its own right.