Air Defense Artillery (ADA)

Air Defense Artillery (ADA) has been used in multiple battles, from World War I to the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. Although, different names have been used to label Air Defense Artillery, they have always served the same purpose, to destroy enemy air threats. During World War II, Air Defense Artillery was known as Anti-Aircraft Artillery. This title continued, even through the battle of the Kasserine Pass. The day of 19 February 1943 began a wretched and depressing battle for America and its allies. Located in Tunisia, the Kasserine Pass is about a two mile wide gap in the Atlas Mountains, where some of the U.S II Corps and British military held off and defeated the Axis offensive. Experience was lacking for the Anti-Aircraft Artillery

units and due to that it would cost the units dearly during Kasserine Pass battle.
The positions that the Allied Forced in Tunisia occupied before the actual battle of the Kasserine Pass were desirable.

The positions that were held by the Americans were enviable, the line between the two Axis forces; von Arnim’s army in the north and Rommel’s in the south-central, were stretched thin and weak. The center of the Allied Forces with a significant strike would be able to pierce the defenses on the coastlines and separate them all the way to Sfax. The joint forces manned the line from the northern parts of the country to the south, with the British military undoubtedly the most prepared of the joint forces. The American military marched along with the joint forces all the way through the country of Algeria to gain control and hold strategic battle positions on the eastern part of Tunisia Dorsal Mountains. The American Army had never before engaged in any major encounters with the Germans, who would later be nicknamed “the first team”. The lack of experience will prevail once Von Angrnim’s army in the north attacks the center of the Allied Forces. A line that was enforced by the French and the American Forces failed to come to the aid of the French. The Joint Forces were not impressed by the lack of actions and effort the American Forces had shown, which created doubts within the British and French forces about their Allies of the New World. The lack of training on the maneuver and tactical side of the operations, not only left the American Forces

vulnerable to more attacks, but also the Joint Forces they were now allied with.
Airfields, supply depots and ports were some of the fixed installations that the Anti-Aircraft Artillery were tasked with providing air defense for. Anti-Aircraft Artillery had to expand greatly to meet its demands as a part of the mobilization of the war. The inadequate amount of AAA guns assigned to each unit was not broad enough to cover the vast sectors of air space required to protect ground assets against enemy air strikes. Many units were left unguarded from aerial attacks and were never given those capabilities.
The intent of the Allied commander was to pin the Axis Army in the south-central against the Mediterranean Sea, and force Rommel’s Axis army to surrender to Allied Forces. The two Divisions that were in the best position to confront and attack Rommel’s army were the 1st Armored Division and the 34th Division, however, neither of the Division had the ability to provide air defense due to not having any Anti-Aircraft Artillery units attached. The only Regiments that were able to provide air defense were portions of the 106th Coastal Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion, the 105th Coastal Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion, 443rd Coastal Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion and part of the 213th Coastal Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion, however, none of the assets were possessed by either Divisions.
On the 19th of February, German artillery began firing on engineers and infantry simultaneously flanking the defenses with infantryman. 1LT Madden, the air defense gun commander found his soldiers terrified and confused of the current situation so he moved their position to the rear. With gun fire and maneuvers increasing against their forcers, the Force Commander moved two more infantry battalion into the location. The Germans did not halt and began taking over with hurried pace, manning headquarters of the opposite force. Soldiers were retreating continuously but 1LT Madden had is few AAA guns hold-strong. Not long after this took place, the tank commander instructed 1LT Madden that his last tank was destroyed. Moving back the 1LT set his guns up behind the artillery. 200 Germans dressed as Americans moved in and assaulted them from within grenade range, once again forcing the AAA crews to retreat.
With the defenses failing, the US Army pushed in the 1st armored Division with help the British Army. Stuka dive-bombers began annihilating American artillery, so the 105th AAA and the 443rd AAA responded shooting down several Stuka bombers with their 50 cal. Machine guns. At this point they realized the power to destroy these planes was well within this weapons capabilities. Enthused by the destruction of enemy bombers and filled with adrenaline the AAA continued firing and landed multiple shots against friendly aircrafts. These actions left seven planes non-mission capable. Sadly this was not the only instance of friendly planes being shot down, as it happened again with infantryman shooting down another. Following these incidents the AAA guns were no longer able to fire upon enemy planes until attacked. With their new direction, friendly planes were relied on to assist and defend the pass. 1st Armored Division moved in and recaptured abandoned AAA guns giving them upper hand. From there they watched the Germans retreat allowed them to reclaim the land.
Miscommunication was a key take away from the battle of the Kasserine Pass. On numerous occasions the young officers lacked training and had a poor understanding of battlefield operations. The AAA did not receive clear guidance on their sectors of fire nor did they have clear instruction on the assets they would be protecting. This could not be faulted to the young officers as they were never taught the proper tactical battlefield operations. AAA headquarters was not in touch with guns on line, they did not receive friendly aircraft cover, and they did not have the advantage of early warning systems.
The battle of Kasserine Pass provided numerous lessons learned for the U.S.

Army. Unfortunately fratricide was a reoccurring issue during this battle as well. Due to the lack of training and knowledge of aircraft identification, American AAA gunners and infantryman shot down several friendly planes in the heat of this battle, including several easily identifiable P-38 fighter planes. Those mistakes could have easily been avoided had the soldiers of that time been instructed of proper identification of both friendly and enemy targets. The primary focus of the battle of Kasserine was that of a technical aspect, and in no form tactical. Aside from poor aircraft identification, there was also minimal training in combining air support with maneuvering ground troops on the battle field. This supreme poverty of training in turn led to yet more fratricide and loss of friendly life. A positive lesson learned was that the most effective means of Air Defense during the battle was the use of mounting two and four .50-caliber M2 machine guns on half-tracks. One aspect that proved to be ineffective was the 37mm guns, which failed to stop or destroy the German tanks. Aware of this fact, the U.S. Army began the development of armor piercing shells and anti-tank guns. The U.S. Army was mindful of the shortcomings during the battle of Kasserine Pass and only weeks after refined and revamped its tactics and strategies in air support, amour fighting, and artillery. Due to weapon

shortages during WWII, some Anti-Aircraft Artillery units would stack crates and boxes on trailers and emplace sticks to simulate a variety of their weapons during training. Inexperience with the actual weapon systems during training led to great deal of amateur performance and operation in actual combat situations such as Kasserine Pass. Lacking training ability is something that the U.S. Army of today does not take lightly, and has since implemented various advanced training tools such as the RT3 Lab to assist soldiers with realistic and accurate visual aids to identify and classify enemy threats.
The battle of Kasserine Pass was a tremendous and crushing blow for the U.S. Army, and especially the Anti-Aircraft Artillery units. Over six thousand casualties occurred during the battle including three hundred deaths, thousands wounded, and over three thousand soldiers missing in action. Over 180 U.S. Army tanks were also destroyed. Preparation, training, and communication are essential elements to successful and effective combat operations. These elements were absent at the battle of Kasserine and have resulted in drastic changes and improvements to the arsenal and doctrine of today’s U.S. Army Air Defense Artillery.