In “Consequentialism and Integrity,” Bernard Williams criticizes consequentialism on the ground that it is inherently unreasonable due to its insistence on negative responsibility, and as a result, denies the agent integrity. Peter Railton’s “Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality” is a response to Williams and a defense of consequentialism. In the following essay, I will explain Williams’s attack on consequentialism, and Railton’s argument that consequentialism need not deny the agent integrity. I will then consider an objection to Railton’s argument, and then evaluate a possible Railtonian response.
Williams identifies himself as a non-consequentialist not by offering a conflicting theory, but by pointing out the flaws of consequentialism. The crux of his argument is his rejection of what he calls negative responsibility: “for consequentialism, all casual connections are on the same level, and it makes no difference, so far as that goes, whether the causation of a given state of affairs lies through another agent, or not.”1 Williams posits that this insistence upon states of affairs reduces actors to causal nodes in a ‘state of affairs machine.’ To illustrate this point, he offers an example of Jim, a traveller lost in a South American jungle. Jim comes upon a town in which twenty of the residents are pressed against a wall, about to be executed by firing squad for daring to protest the government. The army captain present, Pedro, is unused to visitors, and being a hospitable man, offers Jim the opportunity to save the lives of nineteen of the villagers. However, to do so, Jim must take a gun and personally kill one of the residents.2
According to the consequentialist, the ethical so...
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...ibility to the drought-stricken people, but his obligation to his wife is a greater responsibility, for himself, Linda, and the institution of marriage. In other words, the ‘causal node machine’ is not limited to people; a sophisticated consequentialist would consider Juan and Linda’s marriage as a component in the machine.
In the above paper, I have explored Williams’s criticism of negative responsibility and consequentialism’s attack on integrity. I then moved on to Railton’s solution of sophisticated consequentialism as a reconciliation of consequentialism and integrity; I then proposed an objection to Railton on the grounds that embracing sophisticated consequentialism is a move away from consequentialism. Finally, I considered Railton’s probable response to that objection. The decision is now left to the reader as to the fruitfulness of my endeavor.
Rossian Pluralism claims that there are multiple things that we have basic, intrinsic moral reason to do, which he names as the prima facie duties. These duties are not real, obligatory duties that one must follow under all circumstances, but are “conditional duties” (Ross 754) that one should decide to follow or reject upon reflection of their circumstances. This moral theory has faced criticisms, most strongly in the form of the problem of trade-offs. However, I will demonstrate that the problem of trade-offs is an issue that can be neglected as a valid objection to Rossian Pluralism because it is applicable to other theories as well and it is a factor that makes a moral theory more valuable than not.
In “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility”, Harry Frankfurt attempts to falsify the Principle of Alternate Possibilities. The Principle of Alternate Possibilities is the principle where a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise. A person would be morally responsible for their own actions if done by themselves. If someone else had forced that person to do the action, then the person doing the action is not morally responsible. Frankfurt does not believe this to be true and that the person doing the action is morally responsible. Frankfurt’s objections towards the Principle of Alternate Possibilities shows the refutation of natural intuition and places moral responsibility upon those who deserve it.
In Utilitarianism For and Against by Bernard Williams, Williams has an argument that is based on the value of integrity. Integrity is defined as the quality of being honest and having strong moral principles or moral uprightness. In Williams argument he believes in certain circumstances utilitarianism requires agents to abandon their personal projects and commitments. This lead Williams to claim that utilitarianism is an attack on an agent’s integrity. In my essay I will explain Williams’s argument on utilitarianism and how he is lead to believe it is an attack on an agent’s integrity. I will also explain why he thinks it can force us to abandon our personal projects. Within my essay I will also explain the theory of right conduct explained by Timmons in the book Moral Theory. I will also explain the notions of personal responsibility explained by Williams, as well as the notion of personal projects and commitments and the notion of integrity.
In conclusion we can say that consequentialism is flawed in the fact that the borders of a wrongdoing, to bring about a better good, are limitless. We can conclude that evil wrong doing can be construed as bringing about a better happiness for what the evil doer contrives to be for the better good of the people. For the most part we have seen that deontology’s view of good will in the individuals act can lead to moral justification. The captain and his men must make this moral decision to kill or not, if they do kill the Indians, their actions must be left to higher authority to deal with.
Sally’s prescriptive moral theory combines two separate and unrelated principles to create an all-encompassing moral theory that can be followed by moral agents at all times. The first is rooted in consequentialism and is as follows: 1. Moral agents should cause moral pain or suffering only when the pain or suffering is justified by a moral consideration that is more important than the pain or suffering caused. The second is an autonomous theory, where other’s autonomy must be respected, it is 2. Moral agents should respect the autonomy of moral agents.
Agents vs Acts Louden opens this section with this statement: “… it is commonplace that virtue theorists focus on good and bad agents rather than on right and wrong acts.” This is a good th... ... middle of paper ... ...
Mill explained in his essay that according to Utilitarianism, the moral value of an action relies solely on the outcome of the event, making the theory consequentialist (55, Bennett). Furthermore, he believes that intentions behind actions are insignificant. The only thing that is important is the good deed. The issues that I have with this particular idea is th...
In this essay I shall explore the question of moral responsibility and free will, by looking at, and comparing, ideas that stem from a Kantian philosophical position, and those that stem from a naturalist philosophical position. I will also consider the implications that follow from each position, when considering the issue of punishment. Furthermore, I will show that although Kantian and naturalist philosophers typically differ in some aspects, such as their concept of the source of free will, they find themselves in much the same position when it comes to determining when moral responsibility is applicable. However, when we turn to applying moral philosophy to the important practical issue of punishment, the Kantian position becomes incoherent as soon as we consider the possibility that free will does not exist. Conversely, a naturalist position, particularly one of the consequentialist tradition, remains capable of answering such an important normative question, regardless of whether its notion of free will turns out to be correct or incorrect. Ultimately then, I will suggest that it is the naturalist philosopher who is in the better position to tackle the normative question of punishment, that arises in applied moral philosophy.
Punishment is the suffering, pain, or loss that serves at retribution. Others also say it is “the authoritative imposition of something unpleasant on a person in response to a behavior deemed to be wrong by an individual or group” (Hugo & McAnany, 2010). Some question when and why we should punish. Though easy to state, this question is difficult to answer and has lead to a variety of models of punishment. In Kant’s article Metaphysics of Morals, he discusses the importance of punishment and its correspondence to crime, the right to punish, and when to grant clemency. In this paper, I will refer to the articles Critique of Political Reason and Metaphysics of Morals, and I will discuss Kant’s perspective on crime, punishment, and justice. After, I will critique Kant’s perspective and explain the benefits and flaws about it. Last, I will end off by stating my own personal opinion on Kant’s perspective and why I disagree with it. Overall, in this paper, I will explain my disagreement with Kant’s doctrine on punishment due to the fact that I believe some forms of Kant’s punishment, are a violation of humanity.
Deontological moral theory is a Non-Consequentialist moral theory. While consequentialists believe the ends always justify the means, deontologists assert that the rightness of an action is not simply dependent on maximizing the good, if that action goes against what is considered moral. It is the inherent nature of the act alone that determines its ethical standing. For example, imagine a situation where there are four critical condition patients in a hospital who each need a different organ in order to survive. Then, a healthy man comes to the doctor’s office for a routine check-up. According to consequentialism, not deontology, the doctor should and must sacrifice that one man in order to save for others. Thus, maximizing the good. However, deontological thought contests this way of thinking by contending that it is immoral to kill the innocent despite the fact one would be maximizing the good. Deontologists create concrete distinctions between what is moral right and wrong and use their morals as a guide when making choices. Deontologists generate restrictions against maximizing the good when it interferes with moral standards. Also, since deontologists place a high value on the individual, in some instances it is permissible not to maximize the good when it is detrimental to yourself. For example, one does not need to impoverish oneself to the point of worthlessness simply to satisfy one’s moral obligations. Deontology can be looked at as a generally flexible moral theory that allows for self-interpretation but like all others theories studied thus far, there are arguments one can make against its reasoning.
What determines whether an action undertaken by any agent is right or wrong? Lon L. Fuller's 1949 article, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, provides a situation whereby the ethical definitions of right action are evaluated. The ethical study of right action consists of two major moral theories being de-ontological (backward looking/origin) and teleological (forward looking/ends). Both also have religious and non-religious strands. The de-ontological theory consists of the divine-command theory (religious) and Kantianism (non-religious), while the teleological theory is composed of natural-law theory (religious) and utilitarianism (non-religious). In this paper, all four strands of moral theory will be used to evaluate the Fuller article and decipher which moral theory best serves the argument whether the actions of the four defendants were ethically permissible given the situation. At the end of this paper, sufficient proof will be given to prove that the application of Kantian ethical theory regarding right action—the categorical imperative—with Christine Korsgaard's double-level theories is pertinent in bringing about a moral conclusion to the case involved.
A discussion of the justification of unusual consideration of human dignity in Fuller’s argument is a discussion of an exceptional connection between the internal morality of law and substantive morality. But the claim of anything like an exceptional connection here must rest on a proposition of the thesis that reads the internal morality of law as law’s moral element. This thesis primarily provides the framework to understand two key features of the moral element of law: the moral foundation of law and the moral task of law. If this thesis is accepted, then human dignity can be justified as relative moral fact to the moral element of law through the two keys feature of law’s moral element. In this
Pettit, Philip. “Consequentialism.” A Companion to Ethics. Ed. Peter Singer. Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 1991. 230-240. Print.
Punishment or penalty is the last end, which uses criminal addressing institutionalized, legally and legitimately to the offenses that they crack the legal order of society. The punishment is an evil that causes physical, mental and moral pain and why, precisely, requires, at least in the theoretical, justification, i.e., a set of moral and rational support, ethic-philosophical, and legal reasons. The ethic-philosophical dimension of the sentence exposes the classic modern philosophical debate between the retributivism and the preventive utilitarianism; in the discussion are in sight, mainly, the doctrines of Kant and Schopenhauer, two thinkers who have conflicting theories. The first, just the retributionist, and the second, utilitarianism preventions.
HIS essay presents the key issues surrounding the concepts of partiality and impartiality in ethical theory. In particular, it argues that the tension between partiality and impartiality has not been resolved. Consequently, it concludes that the request for moral agents to be impartial does demand too much. To achieve this goal, this essay consists of four main parts. The first part gives an overview of the concept of impartiality. The second deals with the necessity of impartiality in consequentialism and deontology. The third deals with the tension between partiality and impartiality (Demandingness Objection). Specifically, how a duty to perform supererogatory acts follows from impartial morality. The fourth and final part refutes positions that maintain that partiality and impartiality have been reconciled. Therefore, it demonstrates that current ethical theories that demand moral agents to behave in a strictly impartial fashion are unreasonable.