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Organizational behaviour at different levels
Organizational behaviour at different levels
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Our world is filled with complex systems which defy reductionist understanding. Systems ranging from the self-organization of life and emergent intelligence to the chaos of fluid dynamics and dripping faucets. Just as surely as these systems exhibit a synergistic process of generating information they share some analogous processes on their most basic levels. A shared characteristic is a sensitive interaction between activities on the low organizational levels (microscales) with the structure of the system as a whole (macroscale). Such a system retains a large portion of the information which is lost as noise in a less dynamic macroscopic organization; the behavior of the small scale structures does not “cancel out”. For instance a system such as a container …show more content…
In this analogy for the mind, Hofstadter describes a sophisticated intelligent ant colony composed of automaton ants. It is the way in which these imbecile insects are organized and the way in which they can carry and transmit information on the most basic level which allows for the emergent intelligence and unpredictability of the colony herself. Ants organize themselves into teams due to evolutionary mechanisms of common interest, when there is some environmental reason to do so, such as when there is a large piece of food to be collected. When these teams form the constituent ants act in concert and move together through the colony. Once the environmental cause of their organization no longer exists the teams dissipate, but the affect of their team may last much longer. The brief synchronized movement of the ants acts as a kind of impulse or signal which can effect other parts of the colony. These signals interact with other signals from other teams and may even organize themselves into teams of signals all the way up to affecting the entire colony (Hofstadter
The inspiring documentary film, E.O. Wilson—Of Ants and Men, showcases biologist Edward Osborne Wilson’s passion for preserving the biodiversity of our natural world. E.O. Wilson not only values the fascinating creatures (particularly ants) that he comes across during his research and in his daily life, but he also takes action and participates in the Gorongosa Restoration Project at Gorongosa National Park in Mozambique, Africa. The destruction of Gorongosa demonstrates the call for us—Homo sapiens—to realize how critical it is to concern ourselves with protecting the very ecosystems that have molded us into the complex species that we are; according to E.O. Wilson, “We adapted over millions of years to wild environments…We really need them” (CITE?). The better effort we make to understand that we are a part of this large, interdependent ecological community, the better equipped we become in not only being
Most seventh graders know the principle that oil and water don’t mix. No matter how much the solution is shaken or stirred, the water will settle to the bottom and the oil will rise above to the surface. These attributes describing water and oil directly describe the relationship between Spurgeon and Ray, the two main characters in ZZ Packer’s “The Ant of the Self.” Spurgeon, the “water” and intelligent son of Ray Bivens Jr., finds himself carrying the burden of supporting his self-centered, inappreciative father, the “oil,” on his shoulders. Oblivious to his son’s needs as well as others in the story, Ray tramples over the true meaning of an intimate relationship and worsens or even crumbles his existing ones.
Metaphysics is the search for an ultimate principle by which all real things and relations are ordered. It formulates fundamental statements about existence and change. A reversible (absolute) causality is thought to be the ultimate of reality. It is argued that a real (causal) process relating changes of any nature (physical, mental) and any sort (quantitative, qualitative, and substantial) reverses the order of its agency (action, influence, operation, producing): real causation must run in the opposite direction, or change to the opposite effect. A reversible process is a cyclical process, and all cyclical processes are reversible. The world is becoming active because it produces reversible processes; reversible processes organize the world. The world is the totality of interrelated cyclic processes occurring with all kinds of agents (objects, substances, and things).
Leibniz does occasionally draw the distinction in terms of structural complexity, claiming that natural machines, since they were built by God, are infinitely more complex than the machines that we make. This might appear to undermine my claim that Leibniz's distinction cannot (unlike similar distinctions drawn by his contemporaries) be understood simply in terms of varying degrees of structural complexity. However, I shall contend that his formulation of the distinction in terms of structural complexity presupposes a more basic difference between natural and artificial machines, a difference that can only be adequately characterized within his metaphysics.
Therefore, the human organism although made of multiple “swarms,” is different from other organisms or programs because of the capacity to make conclusions and make illogical and “unnatural” decisions not based on the rudimentary interworking of the brain cells. Therefore although multi agent distributed parallel processing programs, can produce emergent behavior that could possibly be equated to our illogical decisions and creativity, human behavior, although somewhat emergent, stems from a deeper consciousness not generated by the interactions of brain
It could be argued that the most extensive of these theories is Cattell, Horn and Carroll’s (CHC) approach, as it comes from a combination of the three’s work. This essay will explore how the approach came to be, how well it works as an explanation for intelligence and if the theory is well supported.
"Artificial Intelligence and Consciousness." Encyclopedia of Consciousness. Oxford: Elsevier Science & Technology, 2009. Credo Reference. Web. 26 April 2011.
"AAAS Board Resolution on Intelligent Design Theory." AAAS. N.p., 2002. Web. 7 Nov 2010. .
7) The Systems View of Life , includes discussion of how creativity is fundamentally built into all living systems -by Fritjof Capra, theoretical high-energy physicist and author. Capra studied with Werner Heisenberg at the University of Vienna. He does research at the Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory and lectures at the University of California, Berkeley.
The modern field of cognitive science combines research from fields such as computer science, psychology, linguistics, and neuroscience in order to study the processes of the mind. Using a framework of representational structures and operational procedures, cognitive science has been able to make significant contributions to the study of cognition and information processing. This interdisciplinary approach has been so successful that its application has been extended to areas like metaphysics, which was once considered to be outside the realm of empirical study; theorists hope that cognitive science may provide insight into questions related to the fundamental nature of existence, such as the debate between free will and determinism.
From the anatomy of a human, the social life of insects, and the way the world functions are all interconnected through complex system science. By taking fractal geometry and implementing it into larger unmanageable scales can help provide further more in depth information pertaining to not just that individual but also the system as a whole.
Howard, T , Rifkin, J. Entropy: A New world View. 1980. New York: Bantam Books. Print.
ABSTRACT: Most versions of the knowledge argument say that if a scientist observing my brain does not know what my consciousness 'is like,' then consciousness is not identical with physical brain processes. This unwarrantedly equates 'physical' with 'empirically observable.' However, we can conclude only that consciousness is not identical with anything empirically observable. Still, given the intimate connection between each conscious event (C) and a corresponding empirically observable physiological event (P), what P-C relation could render C empirically unobservable? Some suggest that C is a relation among Ps which is distinguishable because it is multi-realizable; that is, C could have been realized by P2 rather than P1 and still have been the same relation. C might even be a 'self-organizing' process, appropriating and replacing its own material substrata. How can this account explain the empirical unobservability of consciousness? Because the emotions motivating attention direction, partly constitutive of phenomenal states, are executed, not undergone, by organisms. Organisms-self-organizing processes actively appropriating their needed physical substrata-feel motivations by generating them. Thus, experiencing someone's consciousness entails executing his or her motivations.
The traditional notion that seeks to compare human minds, with all its intricacies and biochemical functions, to that of artificially programmed digital computers, is self-defeating and it should be discredited in dialogs regarding the theory of artificial intelligence. This traditional notion is akin to comparing, in crude terms, cars and aeroplanes or ice cream and cream cheese. Human mental states are caused by various behaviours of elements in the brain, and these behaviours in are adjudged by the biochemical composition of our brains, which are responsible for our thoughts and functions. When we discuss mental states of systems it is important to distinguish between human brains and that of any natural or artificial organisms which is said to have central processing systems (i.e. brains of chimpanzees, microchips etc.). Although various similarities may exist between those systems in terms of functions and behaviourism, the intrinsic intentionality within those systems differ extensively. Although it may not be possible to prove that whether or not mental states exist at all in systems other than our own, in this paper I will strive to present arguments that a machine that computes and responds to inputs does indeed have a state of mind, but one that does not necessarily result in a form of mentality. This paper will discuss how the states and intentionality of digital computers are different from the states of human brains and yet they are indeed states of a mind resulting from various functions in their central processing systems.
From the first imaginative thought to manipulate nature to the development of complex astronomical concepts of space exploration, man continues to this day to innovate and invent products or methods that improve and enhance humankind. Though it has taken 150 million years to reach the present day, the intellectual journey was not gradual in a linear sense. If one were to plot significant events occurring throughout human existence, Mankind’s ability to construct new ideas follows a logarithmic path, and is rapidly approaching an asymptote, or technological singularity. This singularity event has scientists both supporting and rejecting the concept of an imaginative plateau; the largest topic discussed is Artificial Intelligence (A.I.). When this technological singularity is reached, it is hypothesized that man’s greatest creation, an artificial sapient being, will supersede human brain capacity.