A Dialogue On Personal Identity And Immortality Summary

For this paper I am going to argue that in “A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality” Gretchen Weirod was correct by claiming that personal identify cannot consist in the sameness of an immaterial, unobservable soul. My view is that one is who they are because of the brain/mind not their soul. (52)

I will begin by stating Weirods position towards Sam Millers claim. Weirod argues that because sameness of body and sameness of psychological characteristics, that doesn’t automatically mean sameness of person, one can’t claim they know who she is. If they do know who she is then personal identity doesn’t consist in sameness of immaterial soul. One doesn’t know if they have had the same soul all their life. In that sense, one doesn’t even know if other people have had the same soul all their life. Weirod states that the soul and mind cannot be the same thing because there is no way of proving it. Thus giving us her argument where sameness

of psychological characteristics or personal identity cannot mean sameness of immaterial soul.
Since we know that a person’s soul cannot be seen or touched how does one know it is the same to the person’s psychological characteristics.

Weirod says what if the soul changes daily or perhaps yearly, and that every time it changes its with a different soul that has similar psychological characteristics as the last soul, how would one be able to measure that, if the soul cannot be seen or touched? How would one know that their soul isn’t changing constantly if there is no way for them to find out or more importantly prove it? Weirod clearly states if the soul cannot be observed it cannot be associated with the body. In other words, soul has no identity. With that being said, Weirod claims that if there isn’t anyway of proving having a soul, there can’t be any prediction that the soul will be with her or in this case with anyone in the afterlife as it is with her and us now. That claim made by Weirod can be supported by her saying that when she dies she will be buried and rot away and perhaps there is no afterlife at all.

(320)
I’ve just stated Weirods position on the claim that Sam Miller made which was that personal identity consists in sameness of the immaterial, unobservable, invisible, untouchable soul. Now I will support Weirods position by saying that sameness of psychological characteristics can not be associated with sameness of soul because psychological characteristics can be measured while the soul can not. Psychological characteristics are a person’s belief, attitudes, and memories and the soul would be an immaterial part of a person that cannot be measured or proved its existence. Since one can be measured and the other can not they can not be claimed to be one.
My argument is if the psychological characteristics of a person comes from their mind or brain, and that part of the person’s body is damaged, the person should not change who they are because the soul is the same as the brain. However, because when the brain is damaged the person’s psychological characteristics are altered and the person is no longer who they were before, one can not say they have a soul. I believe that once the psychological characteristics of a person is gone, the person themselves are gone. Not physically but mentally speaking, they just stop being who they once were and its as if they never existed. Would a person with with no psychological characterizes, due to the damage, be considered the same person therefore having a soul, or because it is a different person, considered soul less. Opposers can claim that when the brain is damaged the soul of the person changes and so they are no longer who they were before because of the change of souls, assuming that the soul and the psychological characterizes of a person are one. Sam Miller claims that because he knows that his soul and his body have been consistent all his life that sameness of body is a sign that there is sameness of soul. Stating this he also agrees that because he knows himself he can apply this universally. This claim fails when Weirod responds by saying that sameness of person can be associated with sameness of body, however how can he know that it is also sameness of soul and if he is even in the position to say that his experience and thought can be applied universally. His judgment of his soul cannot be the same as anyone judgment around the world.
The new argument may be if the person actually does have a soul, how would one know how long that soul has stayed with the person. Weirod says that perhaps there may be a constant flow of souls through out bodies which have all inherited the same psychological characteristic from the previous soul. The next thing to find out would be when do the souls change, the rate they change to be exact. However, this argument also fails because as we know the soul isn’t measurable, therefore that claim cannot be proven. One would have to be able to measure the times the souls have changed and how often it changes, therefore proving all together that there is in fact a soul and that it is constantly changing as time goes by.
(534)
In conclusion I have provided Gretchen Weirods argument against Sam Millers claim. Weirod disagree with his claims because if a person has a soul, then why can’t it be seen or measured. Since it can’t be measure, one can’t say a person is associated with a soul, or that psychological characterizes and the soul are the same thing. I agree with Weirod that psychological characterizes and the soul are two different things that can’t be measure as the same. I believe that one is actually soul less and the mind/brain is the one doing all the work.