Mounsey Vs. Ellard Case Study

Discussion

The issue is what duty of care did C.D. Management owe to Richard. Mounsey v. Ellard, held that a landowner owes a duty of reasonable care to all lawful visitors. 363 Mass. 693, 707 (1973). The Court stated “that there is significant difference in the legal status of one who trespasses on another's land as opposed to one who is on the land under some color of right-such as a licensee or invitee.” Id at n.7. Although the general rule for care owed to trespassers is to refrain from willful, wanton, or reckless conduct. Schofield v. Merrill 386 Mass. 244, 245 (1982). Mounsey allowed for the possibility of exceptions when dealing with trespassers, “The possible difference in classes of trespassers is miniscule compared to the

Massachusetts General Law Chapter 231 Section 85Q says that a landowner may be liable for physical harm suffered by child trespassers on their land, only if all five criteria are met. Condition ‘A’ states, “The place where the condition exists is one upon which the landowner knows or has reason to know that children are likely to trespass.” Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231 § 85Q. Condition ‘B’ discusses whether or not the landowner knows or has reason to know that an unreasonable risk of death or serious bodily harm will result. Id. Condition ‘C’ focuses on whether or not the child due to their age is not aware of the risk that is present. Id. Condition ‘D’ says compares the burden of eliminating the condition to the level of risk posed to the children. Id. Finally, Condition ‘E’ states that the landowner fails to use reasonable care to eliminate or protect the children. Id. Richard’s case fails on condition ‘A’ as C.D. Management had no reason to foresee that children would trespass in their basement laundry room, as there were only laundry machines in the basement and C.D. Management had no reason to believe that a child would trespass there. C.D. Management could reasonably foresee that someone wanting to do their laundry would trespass in their basement, but Richard Melville was not in their basement to do his laundry. The Soule case created common law about this issue, “There is a

They may want business held liable for foreseeable third party criminal attacks on trespassers. To prove their point they may look at the dissent written by Justice Liacos in Schofield v. Merrill, 386 Mass. 244 (1982). An adult trespasser wanted to recover for damages he suffered on the defendant’s property. He jumped into a quarry filled with water and injured himself; there were no warning signs near this quarry. Id. at 245. The court denied the plaintiff’s request, reiterating that the foreseeable trespasser exception only applies to children, not adults. Id. at 254. Justice Liacos’ dissent said that extending the common law to include foreseeable adult trespassers would be a natural-and-limited extension of legislative policy. Id. at 255. The Melvilles may point to that line and say that their extension would be natural and limited. The Massachusetts Court dealt with this issue saying parties are only held liable if the injury was foreseeable. Whittaker v. Saraceno, 418 Mass. 196, 200-201(1994), McKinney-Vareschi v. Paley, 42 Mass.App.Ct. 953, 954 (1997). In Whittaker, a court barred a tenant from recovery because the criminal act was not foreseeable. The facts in this case are very similar to ours. An unknown third party approached a woman, blindfolded her, brought her to an underground parking garage, and raped her. Id. at 197. There previously had been evidence of theft