In the basement vault of The International Bureau of Weights and Measurements in Paris, held in a pressure sealed, climate controlled, laser sensitive bell jar along with 5 other identical sister-prototypes, lies a chunk of metal which seems of no importance whatsoever. This piece of platinum is in fact the Kilogram. A kilogram is currently defined as the mass of the International Prototype of the Kilogram, IPK for short– an actual molded piece of platinum alloy. As such, this piece of metal is the only thing in the world with a mass of exactly one kilogram. If someone were to alter the weight of IPK, the weight of everything else in the world (yes, every single piece of existing matter) would ultimately be changed by definition! Needless to say, IPK is rarely taken out or touched by human hands. However, every few decades, IPK gets weighed (relative to its’ sister prototypes and identical models shipped to countries around the world.) The problem is, that the weights of IPK and its’ replicas are not constant. In the past 90 years, these prototypes have differed in weight by about 50 micrograms (Fox, American Scientist). If the weight of IPK is changing, then by definition, the definition of the kilogram itself is in turn also changing. The reason for this weight loss phenomenon is still unknown; however, one thing is certain– the mass of IPK, and in turn the measure of the kilogram itself, is not stable!
In order to fix this discrepancy, scientists around the world have set out to redefine the definition of the kilogram to be based not upon an object itself, but rather something that’s built into nature– something that will always remain constant. A perfect element to use for this definition is solid silicon-28, an isotope of s...
... middle of paper ...
...am is not by any means disregarding hundreds of years of science and tradition, but rather the complete opposite! The redefinition would simply improve the current definition, respecting the old tradition, while using it as a foundation on which to base the new advancements. The new definition would be more exact, more easily calculable, and more reliable. Most importantly, it will eliminate the physical object altogether, building the definition into nature itself and ensuring constant stability. However, we can only improve if we aren’t afraid of change. As C. Joybell said “We can't be afraid of change. You may feel very secure in the pond that you are in, but if you never venture out of it, you will never know that there is such a thing as an ocean, a sea. Holding onto something that is good for you now, may be the very reason why you don't have something better.”
m= 10km2 x 1000m x 1000m = 107m2 107m2 x 15= 1.5 x 1.8m3 = 1.5 x 1011kg
The Gravimetric Stoichiometry lab was a two-week lab in which we tested one of the fundamental laws of chemistry: the Law of Conservation of Mass. The law states that in chemical reactions, when you start with a set amount of reactant, the product should theoretically have the same mass. This can be hard sometimes because in certain reactions, gases are released and it’s hard to measure the mass of a gas. Some common gases released in chemical reactions include hydrogen, carbon dioxide, oxygen and water vapor. One of the best methods for determining mass in chemistry is gravimetric analysis (Lab Handout).
Barbara Montero is an associate professor of philosophy at the City University of New York. In her article “Post-Physicalism” she aims to convince people, mainly physicalists, to begin thinking of the mind/body problem from a new perspective. Montero reasons that the term “physical” is too difficult a term to define, which leads to a serious flaw of the direction of physicalist arguments. Her main idea is that the mind/body problem is really the problem of finding a place for mentality in a fundamentally nonmental world, not a fundamentally physical world. Directing the question towards “Is mentality a fundamental feature of the world?”, in her opinion, relieves the conflict between naturalism and ontological significance, and paves the way
* Note the mass down in the table at the end of the first page.
The amazing transformation the study of physics underwent in the two decades following the turn of the 20th century is a well-known story. Physicists, on the verge of declaring the physical world “understood”, discovered that existing theories failed to describe the behavior of the atom. In a very short time, a more fundamental theory of the ...
d. a. a. a. a. a. a. a. a. a. a. a. a. a. a. a. a. a. a. a. a. a. a. a. a. a. a. a. a. a. a. a. Is Science Autonomous? American Psychologist, 23, 70. Retrieved February 13, 2011, from http://journals.ohiolink.edu/ejc/article.cgi?issn=0003066x&issue=v23i0001&article=70_isa&search_term=%28title%3D%28is+science+autonomous%29%29 Messenger, E., Gooch, J., & Seyler, D. U. (2011). The 'Standard' of the 'Standard'. Arguing About Science -.
Using the previously calculated Kf, the molar masses of unknown substances A, C, and D were able to be calculated. However, given that the original Kf was slightly larger than the theoretical value, the molar
Accordingly, all that is needed for an individual to possess and maintain his personal identity are certain mental capacitates for having conscious experiences, the examples of thoughts and sensation are given, and the ability to perform intentional actions. It this portion of the theory, a departure from the traditional Aristotelian view of substances is made. The original viewpoint of Aristotelian forms can apply only to inanimate objects, which have no personal identity, in this dualist theory, if the arguments illustrating that two people can be the same person, even if the is no continuity between the physical matter of each body are correct. Consequently, for two substances to be considered the same, in this reformed view, they
Book XII of the Metaphysics opens with a clear statement of its goal in the first line of Chapter One: to explore substances as well as their causes and principles. With this idea in mind, Chapter One delineates the three different kinds of substances: eternal, sensible substances; perishable, sensible substances; and immovable substances. The sensible substances are in the realm of natural sci...
The mind-body problem has kept philosophers busy ever since Descartes proposed it in the sixteenth century. The central question posed by the mind-body problem is the relationship between what we call the body and what we call the mind—one private, abstract, and the origin of all thoughts; the other public, concrete, and the executor of the mind’s commands. Paul Churchland, a proponent of the eliminative materialist view, believes that the solution to the mind-body problem lies in eliminating the single concept that allows this problem to perpetuate—the folk psychological concept of mental states. Churchland argues that the best theory of mind is a materialistic one, not a folk psychological one. Unlike other materialist views such as identity theory, Churchland wants to remove the idea of mental states from our ontology because mental states cannot be matched 1:1 with corresponding physical states. This is why Churchland’s view is called eliminative materialism—it is a materialistic account of the mind that eliminates the necessity for us to concern ourselves with mental events. At first this eliminative materialism appears to be a good solution to the mind-body problem because we need not concern ourselves with that problem if we adopt Churchland’s view. However, there is a basic flaw in his argument that raises the question of whether we should actually give up folk psychology. In this paper, we will first walk through the premises of Churchland’s argument, and then we will explore whether Churchland does a suitable job of justifying our adoption of eliminative materialism.
. Its most famous defender is Descartes, who argues that as a subject of conscious thought and experience, he cannot consist simply of spatially extended matter. His essential nature must be non-m...
Physicalism of the human mind is a doctrine that states that the world is ‘entirely physical’, and can be described in various ways. One way it can be described is that minds, mental properties and mental processes are visibly not physical phenomena. Terms such as “mind,” “thinking,” and “feeling” do not play in the theories of fundamental physics. For example, in this slim sense of “physical,” a lung is not a physical object, inhalation is not a physical property and diffusion is not a physical process; as in the terms “lung,” “inhalation,” and “diffusion” do not have a role in the theories of fundamental physics. Acknowledging that mental phenomena are not physical in this slim sense is not vastly acknowledging. However, certainly there is an open sense of the word “physical” in which a lung, inhalation, and diffusion are certainly physical phenomena. Physicalism of the human mind proclaims that human minds, mental properties and mental processes are physical in this open sense of “physical.” A clear open sense of “physical” is contentious in the philosophy of the mind. A common view is: “An individual item (e.g., object, property-instance, or process) is physical in the broad sense if, and only if, it meets either of two conditions: (1) it’s an item of a kind that can in principle be defined in the distinctive vocabulary of fundamental physics; or (2) it’s a physically realized item of a functional kind.” The first condition is straight forward, but the second condition evidently demands clarification. Accordingly, a “functional” kind of thing is one in which its existence entails in the actuality of “something or other” that encounters a convinced measurement where the structure and functioning of the “something or other” does not matter as long as it encounters the functioning in request. For instance, a lung is a functional kind of object in my sense. Therefore,
Many accounts support the possibility for objects genuinely to persist yet change their intrinsic, natural properties. Intuitively we think that it would be possible: the assumption that this claim is true, Loux argues, ‘underlies some of our most fundamental beliefs about ourselves and the world around us’ (1998: 203). In this essay I shall focus solely on the account of David Lewis’s ‘Doctrine of Temporal Parts’ that it is possible for objects to persist through change by having different temporal parts. By briefly examining intrinsics and extrinsics and the problem of change you will be able to see how successful Lewis’s solution is to this problem, before viewing some weaknesses of the account and then ultimately concluding that Lewis solution successfully achieves the possibility that objects genuinely persist yet change their intrinsic, natural properties.