Williams Arguments On The Concept Of Agent Regret

The second part of Williams’ argument revolves around the concept of “agent regret”. “Agent regret” differs from regret in two ways: Firstly, it focuses on the possibility of the agent acting differently. If something happens as a “consequence of one’s actions, the costs of it happening can similarly be allocated to one’s account” (125). Secondly, it is demonstrated by the desire to make amends. This stems from the recognition of individual responsibility.
Premise 1: Agent regret exists in cases of involuntary agency hence morality is subject to luck
William believes that agent-regret is so ubiquitous that it exists even in cases of involuntary agency, and that society finds this the norm rather than an aberration. To illustrate this premise,

Firstly, it is unclear whether true blamelessness can ever exist. It is likely that the sentiment of agent-regret exists because we recognize that there is something we could have done, even if we are not sure what that is. More importantly, even if we assume true blamelessness on the part of the driver, it is not true that agent-regret is a sentiment that always exists, or if it exists, that it will be the foremost consideration on the agent’s mind. Serial killers killing people in cold blood show that agent-regret may not always exist, even in cases of voluntary agency when society clearly regards the agent as blameworthy. Slightly more moderate cases are hit-and-run incidents. In the scenario presented by Williams, the lorry driver hits a child and stops in horror. Had he reasoned that he was not at fault and continued on his way without stopping, he would have been condemned by society as unfeeling and callous. If the presence of agent-regret is demonstrated by a desire to make amends, hit-and-run cases seem to imply that drivers do not feel any agent-regret at all. The other possibility is that said drivers do feel agent-regret, but that this sentiment is overridden by self-interested, practical concerns such as not wanting to deal with the victim’s family. Agent-regret does not seem to be as important as Williams characterizes it to

Williams’ argument is that agent-regret affects an agent’s moral view of his life, but this seems to hold true only if agent-regret correlates to blameworthiness, even in cases of involuntary agency. However, agent-regret can be present even in non-moral cases; this implies that agent-regret doesn’t inform an agent’s moral view of his life but is a sentiment like any other. For instance, in China, there are many cases of individuals getting sued for damages after stopping to help victims of accidents or crimes. If I were such an individual, I could regret stepping in to help because my actions – while objectively good – led to me getting sued. It is unlikely that my conceptions of myself or my moral worth will change from this incident. Moreover, in cases of involuntary agency, it is also unlikely that the lorry driver’s moral view of himself will change. He may strongly regret that he ran over the child, but as he is blameless, his internal moral assessment of himself as a good person is unlikely to change. Only the outcomes of his actions were affected by luck. Agent-regret seems not to be an evaluation of morality, but simply an irrational feeling of sadness or frustration at not getting what we wanted. In this case, agent-regret may be subject to luck, but this does not automatically mean that morality is also subject to