The War Powers Resolution was the result of a consistent and ongoing power struggle between the President and Congress in the United States. The Constitution of the United States lays out the powers of the different branches of government. These branches are specifically designed to check each other to create a balance of power. In regards to foreign security affairs, Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution states that the Congress has the power to declare war, maintain the army and navy, and control war funding. Under article II, section 2 the President is the Commander and Chief of the Army and Navy. The President can also veto a declaration of war made by the Congress which must be overturned by a 3/4ths vote by the Congress. The Presidential veto power was also used to create a hurdle for the Legislative branch in passing this policy. However, as this essay will establish, the Congress was able to pass the bill despite the opposition from the Executive branch. The War Powers Resolution is a controversial piece of legislation because it challenged the power of the President as the Commander and Chief of the army and navy. This challenge was perpetrated by Congress in order to check this power of the President and strengthen the significance of the right to declare war.
The War Powers Resolution took place in the context of the Cold War and the Vietnam War during the 1960s and 70s. The United States was supporting the South Vietnam troops in a battle against the Northern state of Hanoi. The controversy over the American involvement in Vietnam was heightened by the seeming lack of transparency in government. Two Presidents, Lyndon B. Johnson and Richard Nixon, used their Constitutional authority as Commander and Chief to bypa...
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Grimmett, Richard F.“The War Powers Resolution: After 30 Years.” CRS Report for Congress. March 11, 2004. https://www.fas.org/man/crs/RL32267.html.
Marder, Murry. “Nixon Opposes Repeal of Tonkin Resolution: Administration Opposes Senate Repeal of Tonkin Gulf Resolution.” The Washington Post. December 18, 1969. http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.library.ubc.ca/docview/143683440.
McMahon, Robert. “Balance of War Powers: the U.S. President and Congress.” Council of Foreign Relations. September 2013. http://www.cfr.org/united-states/balance-war-powers-us-President-congress/p13092#p5.
Stephen L. Carter, “The Constituionality of the War Powers Resolution,” Virginia Law Review, Vol. 70, No. 1, February 1984, http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.library.ubc.ca/stable/1072825.
U.S. Constitution. http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/Constitution_transcript.html
After an analysis of the preliminary speeches Former Senator Robert C. Byrd gave in the early 2000s one may deduce that the senator had the welfare of his fellow Americans in mind as the copious amounts of people around the world might be effected by this war. These speeches are in regard to the grand dilemma that presented itself over a decade ago. This conflict happened to be whether or not we ought to go to war with Iraq. The vein of the initial speech, Rush to War Ignores U.S. Constitution, is cautionary. Byrd is attempting to emblematically pump the breaks on the notion that we have a duty to wage war. In the second speech A Preordained Course of Action on Iraq, Byrd continues to convey his disapprobation as well as recurrently referencing
(Sell Lecture Notes, p.6) Congress shares responsibility with the president in declaring war, negotiating treaties with other countries and proving funds for soldiers and weapons. This is when conflicts come to head. The Vietnam War is a perfect example of this conflict, when the President waged war without a formal declaration of war from Congress. Because of this Congress then passed the War Powers Act in 1973. (Sell Lecture Notes, p.2) The Presidency has many responsibilities and powers.
Yanak, Ted, and Pam Cornelison. "War Powers Act." The Great American History Fact-Finder. Dec. 1 1993: n.p. SIRS Issues Researcher. Web. 07 May. 2014.
Vasquez, John A. "The Probability of War, 1816-1992. Presidential Address to the International Studies Association, March 25, 2002, New Orleans." International Studies Quarterly 48.1 (2004): 1-27. Print.
On August 7th, 1964, the Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, granting President Johnson a legal guideline for the prosecution of the war. The Constitution establishes the President as commander-in-chief of the armed forces, but to balance and check this power the Constitution invests Congress with the power to declare war. Morse disapproved of the open ended nature of the approval and accused Congress for giving the President and the military a “blank check” which would be paid for with taxpayer’s money and citizens’ lives. All other senators, aside from Wayne Morse and Ernest Gruening were in favor for the joint resolution that promised “to promote the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia”. The Tonkin Gulf Resolution stated that “Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repeal any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent any further aggression.” Morse was mostly alone in his opposition to President Johnson’s Vietnam policy, as he was a senior member of the
Weiler, Lawrence D. The Arms Race, Secret Negotiations and the Congress, Iowa: The Stanley Foundation, 1976.
When the War Powers act was created in 1973, it was intended to check the president’s power. As the bill past it resulted in the President and Congress coming to a joint resolution where both have judgement in the Armed Forces. When the United States commits to an armed conflict without the consent of the U.S Congress. There is many talk that is the War Powers act is it constitutional or not? I believe that it is constitutional because the act check the power of the Executive branch with Legislative branch. But how does the the act attempt to limit the power of the president?
In 1973, during the height of the Vietnam War, president vetoed the War Powers Resolution. Congress then answered back by overriding the veto to put in place the new legislation called the War Powers Act of 1973. This act set in motion congress’ foot hold in any future military undertakings by requiring the president to have all the information received via the United Nations or North Atlantic Treaty Organization to be reviewed prior to authorization of funds or movement of forces into hostile environments. Establishing the War Powers Act of 1973 ensures that war powers are divided, that Congress and the president have the responsibility to ensure the upmost security of our nation, and adds growth to presidential power.
The U.S. Constitution gives Congress and the president different responsibilities and duties over military powers, but there have long been disagreements about where one's war powers begin and the other's ends. The U.S. Constitution allows the president to wage wars as commander in chief while Congress has the power to declare and fund wars. Experts agree that presidents can order U.S. troops to fight when the country is attacked or attack appears probable but chief executives from both major parties often differ with Congress over their ability to initiate military force in other combat situations.
What Kimball does demonstrate is that Nixon was more than willing to use force to attain his goals in Vietnam. That these goals often were intertwined with Nixon’s domestic political agenda is clearly evident. His desire for a decent interval is an example of this. Decent interval is the establishment of conditions to preserve the South Vietnamese government after a U.S. withdraw. The interval had to be of sufficient time to allow for Nixon to exploit his successes on the U.S. domestic political front. He demonstrates that, by in large, Nixon and Kissinger kept to the same strategy of Vietnamization, triangular diplomacy and use of force. The Enemy’s political will is an obvious factor for Nixon not achieving his goals. However, in the author’s view, Nixon should have capitulated at the first set back and exited Vietnam altogether. That he did not, that he persisted in his strategy, that he continued to use force, the author attributes to Nixon’s black id following the madman theory.
The author details four years of Nixon and Kissinger waging a war of wills against the North Vietnamese. Neither side concede sufficiently for both to agree to terms. The author describes how Nixon and Kissinger maneuver through domestic and international politics to arrange an acceptable peace settlement. At times Nixon’s motivations were centered squarely on his reelection bid. Nixon is constrained by domestic political concerns to end the war. He has to gradually reduce of U.S. troops, and place the burden on the South Vietnamese while still actively fighting the
Nye, Jr., Joseph S. “Hard and Soft Power in American Foreign Policy.” In Paradox of American Power. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. 4-17. Print.
There are two provisions of the War Powers Resolution that were designed to limit the President’s war making power. The first provision is if the President sent troops into combat, he or she must notify the Congress within 48 hours. This limits the President’s powers over war making because the President must receive Congress’s approval to continue to have troops in.
Some people believe that The War Powers Resolution is fine and is completely constitutional. Anyone who argues that The War Powers Resolution is constitutional states that it recognizes congressional authority provided by article I, section 8, clause 11 of the United States Constitution. The argument is that The War Powers Resolution is not constitutional because it exercises the war powers. It is, however, constitutional because it describes the war powers (Carter, 1984). While recognizing what is said in the United States Constitution, the idea that the War Powers Resolution balances the war powers of both the President and Congress is what drives this belief that it is, in fact, constitutional. Some believe that The War Powers Resolution
Gabriel, K.(1969), The politics of power: Allied diplomacy and the world crisis of 1943-1945, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, p.4.