Jeffrey Kimball Vietnam Sparknotes

Jeffrey P. Kimball is Professor Emeritus of History at Miami University. He is the author of several books including other works on Nixon and Vietnam. This book is a study of Nixon’s direction of the Vietnam War.
The author argues that the madman theory was the central element in Nixon’s strategy for winning in Vietnam (p. xii). This madman theory took precedence over Nixon’s stated strategy of Vietnamization, triangular diplomacy and use of force. Kimball also contends that a peculiar relationship between Nixon and Kissinger existed during the war and influenced his strategy.
Throughout the book, the author describes the personal attributes of Nixon and Kissinger. Nixon, he says, is essentially a bad person with psychological flaws

who was perhaps mentally unstable. Interacting mainly with his inner circle, Nixon avoids people because he is physically awkward and somewhat ugly (p. 8). Nixon is a distorted character with a dark pit in his mind. He is a personification of his black id. Kimball also explores Nixon’s childhood and states that Nixon’s evil tendencies comes from his upbringing. Nixon is ruthless but prefers others to do his dirty work. Author states that Nixon has a personality disorder (p. 33). Nixon is paranoid, narcissistic, passive-aggressive, and a male-dominated capitalist who learned to be anti-communist early in his career. Nixon often remarks about how the hippies, homosexuals, dope users and liberals are ruining America.
Kimball writes that both Nixon and his chief Vietnam confidant, assistant for national security affairs, Henry Kissinger were psychologically scarred in their youth. Both were broody, insecure, paranoid and devious. The author cites Dana Ward, a psychohistorian who writes that Kissinger is a depressive personality, exhibits multiple symptoms, has an undervalued self-worth, is a compulsive risk taker, has an inability to emphasize, is a risk taker, and strives for supremacy (p. 71). Kissinger also has an open disdain and condescending attitude towards the Vietnamese.
Both Kissinger and Nixon thought alike. With Nixon being the ruthless leader and Kissinger a great bureaucrat. Nixinger was the term used to describe how closely Nixon and Kissinger worked throughout Nixon’s presidency. Nixon owes his career to Eisenhower and was Ike’s prat boy. Kissinger owes his career to everybody he had kissed up to in the past. They believe that power rules the world of nation states. Americans in general are too idealistic. They had a peculiar relationship which influenced the strategy used by Nixon during the Vietnam war. Kissinger is by far the biggest contributor to the development and execution of Nixon’s strategy. They often had disagreements yet Nixon relies heavily on Kissinger throughout his presidency. They both want the U.S. out of the war, but feel that force was the best option to gain an exit on favorable terms.
As vice president, Nixon was influenced by Eisenhower’s use of the threat of nuclear weapons to bluff his way to successful outcomes against world powers. Nixon himself carries Eisenhower’s warning to China in 1955 that the U.S. would nuke them if they threatened peace in the Pacific (p. 22). He observes how Eisenhower uses threats coupled with diplomatic resolve to preserve South Vietnam from the first Indochina war, resulting in Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) agreement (p 26). Eisenhower’s nuclear threat to Soviets over East Germany appeared unpredictable and irrational. This type of threat suited Nixon’s personality.
Nixon ran for the presidency on a campaign promise to end the Vietnam war. Nixon knew the war could not be won but wanted the war to continue so he could use it in a manner that was politically advantageous to him. Kissinger pretends to leave the Republican party to participate in the Johnson administration’s 1968 Paris Peace negotiations. Kimball states that Nixon has Kissinger sabotage the negotiations by convincing South Vietnamese President Thieu to withdraw from the agreement. It is possible that LBJ could have ended the war had it not been for Kissinger’s interference.
Throughout Nixon’s administration, both he and Kissinger formulate several strategies to get the U.S.

out of Vietnam. All share a common theme of Vietnamization, triangular diplomacy, and threat of force to coerce the North Vietnamese to accept terms favorable to Nixon’s administration. Vietnamization was a carryover from LBJ’s presidency. Simply put, it was a program to set conditions where the South Vietnamese could stand on their own with minimal or no U.S. support. Triangular diplomacy involved public and secret peace negotiations with Hanoi. Central to these negotiations is the involvement of the Soviets and Chinese in the peace deals. Added initiatives were linkages, or carrots and sticks for trade negations and arms control in exchange for help from the Soviets or Chinese to get Hanoi to the peace table (p 75). Force was used to compel the North Vietnamese into accepting U.S. terms. Unlike LBJ’s use of gradual escalation of force, Nixon intended for this force to be overwhelming. Nixon also needed to demonstrate to America that he was ending the war. To this end he gradually withdraws U.S. military ground forces throughout the remainder of the

war.
The author argues use of the madman theory usurped all other efforts in Nixon’s Vietnam direction.

Unpredictability and unreasonableness with respect to the use of force are the key aspects of this theory. Nixon wants negotiators to perceive that he is crazy and will use any force available to him to achieve his goal. Kissinger is the good cop; Nixon is the bad cop. The principal threat is the use of excessive force (p. 76). The author sees Nixon’s dark personality, his black id, as compelling Nixon to increase use of force when he should have accepted peace terms.
The author details four years of Nixon and Kissinger waging a war of wills against the North Vietnamese. Neither side concede sufficiently for both to agree to terms. The author describes how Nixon and Kissinger maneuver through domestic and international politics to arrange an acceptable peace settlement. At times Nixon’s motivations were centered squarely on his reelection bid. Nixon is constrained by domestic political concerns to end the war. He has to gradually reduce of U.S. troops, and place the burden on the South Vietnamese while still actively fighting the

North.
He increases the use of force through bombing of North Vietnam and expansion of the war to bordering Laos and Cambodia. But the North Vietnamese persist and increase their own use of force. Both sides actively ramp up the fighting while negotiating. Nixon also faces major crisis both at home and abroad. Including a rival political attack with the release of Top Secret reports on the previous administration’s studies on Vietnam. Nixon’s response to the release of the Pentagon Papers eventually sets in motion the Watergate scandal. Despite the lack of success in Vietnam, and numerous crisis incidents home and abroad, Nixon is reelected. With his second term secure, Nixon finally is able to settle on peace terms to end the formal involvement of the U.S. in the Vietnam war.
The author does not demonstrate that Nixon’s madman theory, as named, is even a concept consciously used by Nixon. The author posits that this theory was developed by Kissinger who heard it at a lecture at Harvard. Nixon was influenced by Kissinger and Nixon’s own experiences working for Eisenhower who, used the threat of nuclear war to bluff his way through crisis. Nixon realizes he cannot seriously consider nuclear weapons because of the Soviet’s nuclear capability. He also cannot risk a ground invasion of North Vietnam for fear of drawing China into the war. His options are somewhat limited with respect to demonstrating a credible use of force. Thus, he relies heavily on U.S. airpower to project his unpredictable, excessive force.
Kimball states that Nixon calls his approach of unpredictability and unreasonableness the madman theory (p.23). Kimball later contradicts himself by pointing out that there is no actual account of Nixon ever terming his use of force, the Madman theory (p. 77). He states that even though there is no direct record of a madman theory it essentially was what Nixon was using. Kimball also notes several excessive force options that Nixon does not approve.