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The ultimatum game is a scientific study that provides insight into the human condition through converging aspects of adversity and fairness, in wealth distribution. Observing past studies and analysing the methodological structure of the experiment and the established data enables us to contemplate the Hypotheses and attempt to create a strong link between the data and the hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1 of the experiment states that Proposers are more likely to make unfair offers in the gain frame condition of the Ultimatum game as opposed to the loss frame condition. This Hypothesis is supported by the existing data which shows that 51 offers were made in the gain frame, as opposed to 28 in the loss frame; this reinforces Hypothesis 1 as it shows a statistically significant difference in offers between the gain and loss frames. This statistical difference creates a link between the data and Hypothesis 1 which, in turn, rejects the null hypothesis as proven by the p value of 0.009. In addition, Hypothesis 2 states that acceptors will be more likely to accept very unfair offers in the loss frame condition than in the gain frame condition. This hypothesis is supported by the evidence recorded from the Ultimatum game as 24 very unfair offers were accepted in the loss frame as opposed to 14 very unfair offers being accepted in the gain frame. This link between Hypothesis 2 and the recorded data, also rejects the null hypothesis as reinforced by the p value of .026. In contrast, Hypothesis 3 is statistically insignificant due the higher value of p. This higher value provides greater room for error and rejects the link between the data and the Hypothesis.
The methodological structure of the experiment presents some possible discrepancies...
... middle of paper ...
...utomatic assumption that the loss frame correlates with unfairness.
Fowler and Christakis (2013) explain that “variation in ultimatum gameplay is heritable”. Future research that could be conducted in order to improve the results of the ultimatum game, include the reduction of the number of people in each experiment, which will help decrease this genetic inclination to decline offers due to the unfairness that is being perceived by the acceptor. Maintaining the study within a similar group of people (i.e.: all studying psychology), will also be beneficial as bias will be avoided when conducting the experiment.
References
Fowler, J. & Christakis, N. (2013). A random world is a fair world. 110, 10-11
Zhou, X. & Wu, Y. (2011). Sharing losses and sharing gains: Increased demand for fairness under adversity. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 47, 582-588
Lewicki, J. R., Barry, B., & Saunders, M. D. (2010). Negotiation: Readings, exercises and cases
In Stephen Chapman’s essay, “The Prisoner’s Dilemma”, he questions whether the Western world’s idea of punishment for criminals is as humane as its citizens would like to believe or would Westerners be better off adopting the Eastern Islamic laws for crime and punishment. The author believes that the current prison systems in the Western world are not working for many reasons and introduces the idea of following the Koranic laws. Chapman’s “The Prisoner’s Dilemma” is persuasive because of his supporting evidence on the negative inhumane impact from the Western form of criminal punishment and his strong influential testament to the actions used by Eastern Islamic societies for crimes committed.
Sommers, Tamler. "The Two Faces Of Revenge: Moral Responsibility And The Culture Of Honor." Biology & Philosophy 24.1 (2009): 35-50. Academic Search Complete. Web. 15 Mar. 2014.
Higgins, Tory. “Self-Discrepancy Theory: What Patterns of Self-Beliefs Cause People to Suffer?”(1989). Advances in Experimental Social psychology, Vol.22 (1989):93-136. Academic Press Inc.
Fisher, Roger, William Ury, and Bruce Patton. Getting to yes: negotiating agreement without giving in. 2nd ed. New York, N.Y.: Penguin Books, 1991. Print.
Fung, Kaiser, and Andrew Gelman. "Freakonomics: what went wrong?" American Scientist 100.1 (2012): 6+. General OneFile. Web. 17 Feb. 2014.
...extrinsic and internal sanctions. This shows that utility is desired to be impartial and equal.
Given the principles and explanation that John Stuart Mill gives in Utilitarianism, and given the assumptions and arguments of Harris’s “Survival Lottery,” Mill would not accept the implementation of the “Survival Lottery”. In this paper I will describe Mill’s utilitarian principles, provide a detailed summary of the “Survival Lottery”, and finally I will prove why Mill would not accept Harris’s lottery.
Negotiations styles are scholastically recognized as being broken down into two general categories and those are distributive bargaining styles and integrative negotiation styles. Distributive bargaining styles of negotiation are understood to be a competitive type of negotiation. “Distributive bargaining, also known as positional bargaining, negotiating zero-sum, competitive negotiation, or win-lose negotiation, is a type or style of negotiation in which the parties compete for the distribution of a fixed amount of value” (Business Blog Reviews, 2011). This type of negotiation skill or style approach might be best represented in professional areas such as the stock market where there is a fixed goal in mind or even in a garage sale negotiation where the owner would have a specific value of which he/she would not go below. In contrast, an integrative negotiation approach/style is that of cooperative bargaining, or win-win types ...
Sorry, I have written too much, but I hope this serves the purpose of the social norm experiment extra credit exercise, and if not, I can surely give many more examples.
The problem of how resources can be fairly distributed has remained at the forefront of political, academic, and social life for centuries. According to political scientist Steven J. Brams (1996) and mathematician Alan D. Taylor (1996), the issue of fair division can be traced back to the Hebrew Bible, with King Solomon’s proposal to divide a baby in two in order to appease the claims of two mothers. Within the last century, questions regarding the fair division and allocation of property have arisen throughout various spheres—divorce claims, estate settlements, assessments of taxes—and attempts to solve these dilemmas have increased as well (Brams & Taylor 1996). It is my intention with this essay to better understand this issue of fair division by looking at two permutations of the fair division problem. I would like to look at two existing methods—Divider-Chooser and the Method of Sealed Bids—and criteria—cooperation, rationality, privacy, symmetry—in order to examine the ways in which people have used mathematical devices to guarantee a fair share. However, it is also my intention with this essay to a introduce a new criteria—manipulation—to see how it coexists with the existing criteria, and how well it works in accordance with the two methods.
By comparing ourselves with other people we categorize and label those who are similar to us as the in-group and people who differ from our-self are categorized as the out-group (Duff & Peace, 2012). We act in ways to favor our in-group rather than out group, this is called in-group favoritism. In-groups and out-groups are evident in many social environments, for example, children form groups with those who like playing similar games to them. In a study that explains in-group favoritism, an experiment was conducted by allocating individuals into groups based on the result of a coin flip (Billing & Tajfel, 1973). After having been told their group members, the participants then had to allocate points to members of their own group (‘in-group’) and to the members of the other group (‘out-group’). These members of the in-group ...
Violations of expectations in turn may confuse their receivers, shifting more attention to the violator and the significance of the violation itself. Someone who can assume that they are well regarded by their listeners is safer engaging in violations and more probable to profit from doing so than someone who is poorly regarded. When the act of violation is one that is likely to be unclear in its meaning or to convey numerous interpretations that are not consistently positive or negative, then the reward valence of the communicator can be particularly important in moderating clarifications, assessments, and consequences. Violations have comparatively consensual meanings and valences related to them, so that engaging in them produces similar effects for positive and negative communication.
In their book Homicide, evolutionary psychologists Margo Wilson and Martin Daly identify one such conflict between human nature and the contemporary cultural order. They argue that humans have an innate concept of justice which is based on the idea of personal revenge. According to this concept of justice, it is legitimate and even praise-worthy for people to whom a wrong has been done to avenge the wrong-doing themselves.
Michael W. Morris& Kwok Leung, “Justice For All? Progress in Research On Cultural Variation in the Psychology of Distributive and Procedural Justice” Applied Psychology; An International Review, Vol. 49, 1999.