Theories Of Multiple Realizability

979 Words2 Pages

Hilary Putnam. The thesis states that different physical properties may implement the same mental property. This argument has evolved since Putnam’s original goal of rejecting type-identity theory and many philosophers have redefined the implications of multiple realizability. There are two philosophers in philosophy of mind that are famous for their work in exploring multiple realizability and the implications this thesis has on science, or more specifically psychology. Jaegwon Kim and Jerry Fodor both take a stab at multiple realizability, but neither will come to the same conclusion.
This essay will discuss both Kim and Fodor’s view on multiple realizability, and how it may affect the way we view psychology. I will first explain Kim’s response to multiple realizability in his 1992 paper “Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction.” This paper was written to respond to Fodor’s paper on multiple realizability and functionalism. Kim believes if we advocate a thesis such as multiple realizability we will be unable to view psychology as a science. This paper will specifically focus on Kim’s jade analogy. I will then discuss why it is I believe that Fodor’s response in “Special Sciences” reveals Kim’s jade analogy to be a mistake, and of false references.
Multiple realizability is the thesis that states that different physical properties can produce the same mental property. The theory was originally constructed by Hilary Putnam to combat the type-identity theorist who asserted that “pain is identical to c-fibers firing.”(Wikipedia) Putnam looked to explain how it might be that humans with their distinct neuroanatomy seem to experience the same pain as a dog or a cat may experience. How is it that a dog can experience t...

... middle of paper ...

... b, and so forth, and if this is unable to be the case for pain to follow a set of natural laws because of its infinite set of neural-physical kinds, then it would follow that psychology is not of the sciences. In light of Kim’s jade/pain analogy he makes this response in supporting his consequences of multiple realizability, “there are no scientific theories of jade, we don’t need any.” (Kim 16)
In 1997 Jerry Fodor wrote an essay to express his continual belief in multiple realizability and the existence of psychology as an autonomous science, not just locally but globally. His essay is a response to Kim’s 1992 paper, and in this essay I will focus specifically on his response to Kim’s jade analogy, and why it is he believes that jade and pain are not of the same structure of natural kinds, and in turn not subject to disjunctions and the problems that come with it.

Open Document